Introduction

In the Meno, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words: 'That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men harm than to do them good;' and Socrates was anticipating another opportunity of talking with him. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is awaiting his trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would like to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.

In the Meno, Anytus had left Socrates with these significant words: 'In any city, especially Athens, it is easier to harm people than to help them.' Socrates was looking forward to another chance to speak with Anytus. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is awaiting trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato wants to put the world itself on trial. He wants to show people their ignorance about the very subject on which Socrates is accused. The discussion arises from an incident that may perhaps really have happened in Euthyphro's family. Euthyphro was a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer.

This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the porch of the King Archon. (Compare Theaet.) Both have legal business in hand. Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety which Meletus has brought against him (it is remarked by the way that he is not a likely man himself to have brought a suit against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in an action for murder, which he has brought against his own father. The latter has originated in the following manner:—A poor dependant of the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of Euthyphro's father, who sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens to ask what should be done with him. Before the messenger came back the criminal had died from hunger and exposure.

Euthyphro and Socrates are shown meeting in the porch of the King Archon. (Compare Theaet.) Both have legal matters to attend to. Socrates is defending himself against a charge of impiety brought by Meletus. (As an aside, Socrates himself is not the sort of man likely to bring a lawsuit against someone else.) Euthyphro is bringing a murder charge against his own father. The case against his father arose as follows: A poor man dependent on the family killed one of their household slaves in Naxos. Euthyphro's father ordered the killer to be tied up and thrown into a ditch. He then sent a messenger to the religious interpreters at Athens to ask what should be done with the man. Before the messenger returned, the killer had died of hunger and exposure.

This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings against his father. Socrates is confident that before he could have undertaken the responsibility of such a prosecution, he must have been perfectly informed of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is going to be tried for impiety himself, he thinks that he cannot do better than learn of Euthyphro (who will be admitted by everybody, including the judges, to be an unimpeachable authority) what piety is, and what is impiety. What then is piety?

This is why Euthyphro brings a murder charge against his father. Socrates is sure Euthyphro must have fully understood piety and impiety before taking on the responsibility of such a prosecution. Since Socrates himself is about to stand trial for impiety, he thinks his best course is to learn from Euthyphro. Everyone, including the judges, will accept Euthyphro as an unquestionable authority on what piety and impiety are. What, then, is piety?

Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do, prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing as the gods do—as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.

Euthyphro, with his vast knowledge, is very willing to take all the responsibility. He replies: Piety means doing what I do, prosecuting your father for murder if he is guilty. It means doing what the gods do, as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.

Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety. 'Are they really true?' 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell Socrates some more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing as I do, charging a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety, but can hardly be regarded as a general definition.

Socrates dislikes these mythological tales. He thinks his dislike may be the reason he is accused of impiety. 'Are these tales really true?' 'Yes, they are.' And Euthyphro will gladly tell Socrates some more of them. But first, Socrates would like a more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing what I do, charging a father with murder,' may be one example of piety. But it can hardly count as a general definition.

Euthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety is what is not dear to them.' But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good and evil, which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear to one god may not be dear to another, and the same action may be both pious and impious; e.g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his own father), but not equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the hands of their sons).

Euthyphro replies, 'Piety is what the gods love, and impiety is what they do not love.' But might the gods disagree, just as people do? Might they disagree especially about good and evil, for which there is no fixed standard? These are precisely the kinds of disagreements that lead to quarrels. So one god may love what another does not, and the same action may be both pious and impious. For example, Euthyphro, your punishment of your father may please Zeus (who punished his own father in a similar way). But your punishment may not be equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at their sons' hands).

Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the gods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving this last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.' To this Euthyphro agrees.

Euthyphro answers that neither gods nor humans disagree about whether a murderer should be punished. Yes, Socrates replies, when they know the person is a murderer. But you are assuming the very point being disputed. If all the circumstances are considered, can you show that your father was guilty of murder? Or can you show that all the gods approve of our prosecution of him? And must you not admit that one god may like what another hates? Setting aside this last point, however, Socrates proposes changing the definition to say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.' Euthyphro agrees to this definition.

Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows that in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being carried, loved, etc. precedes the state of being carried, loved, etc., and therefore that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because it is first loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them. But the pious or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to them. Here then appears to be a contradiction,—Euthyphro has been giving an attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence. Euthyphro acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk away or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his descendants.

Socrates goes on to examine the new version of the definition. He shows that in other cases, an action comes before the resulting state. For example, carrying or loving something comes before that thing’s state of being carried or loved. So something is dear to the gods because they first love it. The gods do not love something because it is dear to them. But the gods love what is pious or holy because it is pious or holy. This amounts to saying that the gods love it because it is dear to them. So there seems to be a contradiction. Euthyphro has described only a quality or incidental feature of piety, not its essential nature. Euthyphro himself admits that his explanations seem to walk away or go around in circles. They are like the moving figures made by Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates, who passed his skill to his descendants.

Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious just?' 'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is piety?' Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which 'attends' to the gods, as there is another part of justice which 'attends' to men. But what is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods? The word 'attending,' when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'a science of asking and giving'—asking what we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between gods and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? 'Nay, but we give them honour.' Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been already disproved.

Socrates wants to stir Euthyphro’s lazy mind, so he approaches the question differently: 'Is everything pious also just?' 'Yes.' 'Is everything just also pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is piety?' Euthyphro replies that piety is the part of justice that 'cares for' the gods. Another part of justice 'cares for' people. But what does 'caring for' the gods mean? When applied to dogs, horses, and people, 'caring for' means making them better in some way. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that by pious acts he means acts of service or assistance. Yes, but the services of farmers, doctors, and builders have a goal. What goal do we serve the gods for, and what do we help them accomplish? Euthyphro replies that all these difficult questions cannot be answered in a short time. He would rather say simply that piety means knowing how to please the gods through words and actions. We do this through prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'the knowledge of how to ask and give'. We ask for what we want and give the gods what they want. In short, piety is a way of doing business between gods and people. But although the gods give us all good things, how can we give them anything good in return? 'No, but we give them honour.' Then we give the gods not something beneficial, but something pleasing or dear to them. And this is the very idea that has already been disproved.

Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro, remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the Euthydemus the irony is carried on to the end.

Although Socrates is tired of Euthyphro's tricks and evasions, he remains convinced that Euthyphro must know what piety is. Otherwise, Euthyphro would never have prosecuted his elderly father. Socrates still hopes Euthyphro will lower himself to teach him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. So Socrates has lost his last hope of learning what piety is before being prosecuted for impiety. As in the Euthydemus, the irony continues to the end.

The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own character, refuses to answer himself.

The Euthyphro clearly aims to contrast the true nature of piety and impiety with popular ideas about them. But once those popular ideas have been disproved, Socrates offers no definition of his own. As in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for an answer to the question he has raised. But, true to his character, he refuses to answer the question himself.

Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing steeds' Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away. He has the conceit and self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness, positiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His failure to apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect which is observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest. Though unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame. To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal.

Euthyphro is a religious thinker. Elsewhere, if the reference is to the same person, he is described as the author of a philosophy of names. In the Cratylus, Socrates is carried away by the 'prancing steeds' of this philosophy. Euthyphro has the vanity and self-confidence of a Sophist. He has never doubted that he is right to prosecute his father. Like a Sophist, he cannot formulate a general definition or follow an argument. His misguided views, one-sidedness, narrow-mindedness, and absolute certainty are typical of his priestly role. His failure to grasp an argument may be compared to a similar weakness in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly toward Socrates. He recognizes Socrates’ familiar divine sign with interest. Though he cannot follow Socrates’ reasoning, he is very willing to be guided by him. He eagerly seizes on any suggestion that saves him the trouble of thinking. Moreover, he is an enemy of Meletus. According to Euthyphro, Meletus is exploiting popular hostility toward religious innovations to harm Socrates. At the same time, Euthyphro is amusingly confident that his own weapons would be more than a match for Meletus. He is entirely sincere in prosecuting his father, who has accidentally killed someone and is not entirely blameless. Euthyphro sees cleansing the guilt of the crime as a duty, whoever the criminal may be.

Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. 'Piety is doing as I do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are not easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that other nations, e.g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief difference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what we are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of them, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one answer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death,' suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, 'The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:' which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at Athens only. In the course of the argument Socrates remarks that the controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty of verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be referred.

Here begins the contrast between religion that follows rules blindly, guided by a narrow and unenlightened conscience, and a higher understanding. Socrates tries in vain to draw this higher understanding of religion from Euthyphro. 'Piety is doing as I do' is the first idea of religion that occurs to Euthyphro. Many others think the same, though they do not express their thoughts as frankly. People are not easily persuaded that any religion is better than their own. Nor are they easily persuaded that other nations took their religious beliefs and difficulties just as seriously. The Greeks in the time of Socrates are one example. The chief difference between us and the Greeks is that they were slowly learning what we are now forgetting. Greek mythology hardly recognized a distinction between accidental killing and murder. The Athenian diviner likewise feels that the stain of bloodshed is the same in both cases. He had not yet learned the lesson philosophy was teaching: Homer and Hesiod should not be treated as religious authorities. At the very least, their authority must be rejected, even if they are not banished from the state. Nor need they be whipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus more roughly proposed. Yet Euthyphro is ready to defend his actions by pointing to the gods' examples. These are the very stories Socrates cannot stand. He suspects that his dislike of these stories has earned him a reputation for impiety. Here, in passing, is one suggested answer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death'. Another answer appears in these words: 'The Athenians do not mind anyone being thought wise until he starts making others wise. Then, for some reason or other, they become angry.' This may be called the rule of public tolerance in most other countries, not just Athens. During the argument, Socrates observes that morality and religion provoke disagreement because their claims are difficult to verify. There is no measure or standard against which to judge those claims.

The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle (philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' fails because of a subtle distinction. The distinction is between a state and an act, expressed respectively by the adjective (philon) and the participle (philoumenon). Or perhaps, more accurately, the distinction is between the participle and the verb (philoumenon and phileitai). The act comes before the state (just as, in Aristotle, energeia comes before dunamis). And the state of being loved follows the act of being loved. But piety or holiness follows the act of being pious, not the act of being loved. So piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtle reasoning, Socrates works his way toward deeper thought and feeling. His point is that the words 'loved of the gods' describe only a quality of piety, not its essence.

Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,' he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions, (compare Symp.; Republic; Politicus.) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

Then comes the third and final definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' So far, Socrates has worked to give religion a moral foundation. He seeks to bring religion and morality into harmony. The great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had anticipated this harmony without consciously recognizing it. All people need this harmony. To this moral foundation, the soothsayer adds a ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' Socrates asks further what this 'attention to the gods' involves. The soothsayer replies that piety is a business transaction, a science of giving and asking, and so on. Socrates points out that these ideas treat the gods as human beings (compare Symp., Republic, Politicus). But we expect him to go further and explain what truly serving the gods means. Such service would involve serving in spirit and working with the gods in everything true and good. Instead, he stops short. The soothsayer could not have been made to understand this lesson, and everyone must learn it for themselves.

There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only; (3) the defence of Socrates.

This short dialogue seems to have three main aims or concerns: (1) developing the idea of piety through reasoned discussion. (2) Contrasting true and false religion, though the contrast is explored only to a limited extent. (3) Defending Socrates.

The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back of the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other Dialogues; the deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II. The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic IV. The figure of Daedalus has occurred in the Meno; that of Proteus in the Euthydemus and Io. The kingly science has already appeared in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.

Several features give us reason to believe that the Euthyphro is genuinely Plato’s work. It has subtle connections with the Apology and the Crito. It leaves its conclusion unstated, as do the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other Dialogues. It also shows deep insight into the religious world, dramatic power in the two characters’ exchanges, and unmistakable irony. The spirit of its attack on popular portrayals of mythology recalls Republic II. Piety has already been mentioned as one of five virtues in the Protagoras. But piety is not counted among the four cardinal virtues in Republic IV. The figure of Daedalus has appeared in the Meno, and Proteus in the Euthydemus and Io. The science of ruling has already appeared in the Euthydemus and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither these nor any other similarities or differences provide evidence for the date of the Euthyphro. Still less can arguments about whether this short work could have helped Socrates at his trial establish its date.