Book 10

Next, it would seem, follows a discussion respecting Pleasure, for it is thought to be most closely bound up with our kind: and so men train the young, guiding them on their course by the rudders of Pleasure and Pain. And to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most important for the formation of good moral character: because these feelings extend all one’s life through, giving a bias towards and exerting an influence on the side of Virtue and Happiness, since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.

Next, it seems, we should discuss pleasure, because pleasure is thought to be closely connected with our human nature. So people train the young by using pleasure and pain as rudders to guide their course. Liking and disliking the right things is considered most important in developing good moral character. This is because these feelings last throughout our lives, shaping our inclinations and influencing our virtue and happiness. For people choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.

Subjects such as these then, it would seem, we ought by no means to pass by, and specially since they involve much difference of opinion. There are those who call Pleasure the Chief Good; there are others who on the contrary maintain that it is exceedingly bad;¹ some perhaps from a real conviction that such is the case, others from a notion that it is better, in reference to our life and conduct, to show up Pleasure as bad, even if it is not so really; arguing that, as the mass of men have a bias towards it and are the slaves of their pleasures, it is right to draw them to the contrary, for that so they may possibly arrive at the mean.²

It seems, then, that we should certainly not ignore subjects like these, especially since opinions about them differ so widely. Some people call Pleasure the highest good. Others, by contrast, maintain that Pleasure is extremely bad.¹ Some perhaps genuinely believe this. Others think that presenting Pleasure as bad is better for how we live and act, even if Pleasure is not really bad. They argue that most people are drawn to Pleasure and are slaves to their pleasures. So, they say, we should pull these people in the opposite direction, so that they may possibly reach a balance.²

I confess I suspect the soundness of this policy; in matters respecting men’s feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts: whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience, they not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, for instance, who deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets the credit of backsliding to it as being universally such as he said it was, the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions.

I admit that I doubt the wisdom of this policy. In matters of human feelings and actions, theories are less convincing than facts. So whenever theories conflict with actual experience, people dismiss them, and the truth falls into disrepute along with them. For example, suppose someone condemns Pleasure but is then seen pursuing it. People take this as a lapse into the very thing he condemned. They assume that all Pleasure is just as he described it, because most people cannot make fine distinctions.

Real accounts, therefore, of such matters seem to be most expedient, not with a view to knowledge merely but to life and conduct: for they are believed as being in harm with facts, and so they prevail with the wise to live in accordance with them.

Accurate accounts of such matters therefore seem most useful, not just for knowledge but for life and conduct. For people believe these accounts because they agree with the facts. As a result, these accounts persuade wise people to live by them.

But of such considerations enough: let us now proceed to the current maxims respecting Pleasure.

But enough of these considerations. Let us now turn to the common sayings about pleasure.

Now Eudoxus thought Pleasure to be the Chief Good because he saw all, rational and irrational alike, aiming at it: and he argued that, since in all what was the object of choice must be good and what most so the best, the fact of all being drawn to the same thing proved this thing to be the best for all: “For each,” he said, “finds what is good for itself just as it does its proper nourishment, and so that which is good for all, and the object of the aim of all, is their Chief Good.”

Eudoxus thought pleasure was the highest good because he saw all beings, rational and irrational alike, seeking pleasure. He argued that, for all beings, what they choose must be good, and what they choose most must be best. So the fact that all beings were drawn to pleasure proved that pleasure was best for all. “For each being,” he said, “finds what is good for itself, just as each finds its proper food. So what is good for all, and what all seek, is their highest good.”

(And his theories were received, not so much for their own sake, as because of his excellent moral character; for he was thought to be eminently possessed of perfect self-mastery, and therefore it was not thought that he said these things because he was a lover of Pleasure but that he really was so convinced.)

(And his theories were accepted less for their own sake than because of his excellent moral character. For he was thought to have perfect self-control to an exceptional degree. So people did not think he said these things because he loved pleasure, but because he genuinely believed them.)

And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from the contrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance to all the contrary must be in like manner an object of choice.

And he thought the argument from opposites proved his position just as strongly. Since pain itself is something all avoid, its opposite must likewise be something all choose.

Again he urged that that is most choice-worthy which we choose, not by reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is confessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what purpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself choice-worthy.

Again, he argued that what is most worth choosing is what we choose for its own sake, without any further purpose. Pleasure is admittedly something we choose in this way. For no one ever asks what purpose their pleasure serves, because they feel that Pleasure is worth choosing in itself.

Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more choice-worthy; as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected self-mastery; and good can only be increased by itself.

Again, when added to any other good, it makes that good more worth choosing. Examples include just actions or complete self-mastery. And good can only be increased by good.

However, this argument at least seems to prove only that it belongs to the class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything else: for every good is more choicewortby in combination with some other than when taken quite alone. In fact, it is by just such an argument that Plato proves that Pleasure is not the Chief Good:³ “For,” says he, “the life of Pleasure is more choice-worthy in combination with Practical Wisdom than apart from it; but, if the compound better then simple Pleasure cannot be the Chief Good; because the very Chief Good cannot by any addition become choice-worthy than it is already:” and it is obvious that nothing else can be the Chief Good, which by combination with any of the things in themselves good comes to be more choice-worthy.

However, this argument seems to show only that Pleasure is a good, not that it is better than every other good. For every good is more desirable when combined with another good than when taken alone. In fact, Plato uses just this argument to prove that Pleasure is not the Chief Good:³ “For,” he says, “a life of Pleasure is more desirable with Practical Wisdom than without it. But if the combination is better, then Pleasure alone cannot be the Chief Good. This is because adding anything to the Chief Good cannot make it more desirable than it already is.” And clearly, nothing else can be the Chief Good if combining it with anything good in itself makes it more desirable.

What is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof we can partake; because that which we are in search of must be such).

What, then, has this nature? (I mean, of course, something we can share in, because what we seek must be something we can share in.)

As for those who object that “what all aim at is not necessarily good,” I confess I cannot see much in what they say, because what all think we say is. And he who would cut away this ground from under us will not bring forward things more dependable: because if the argument had rested on the desires of irrational creatures there might have been something in what he says, but, since the rational also desire Pleasure, how can his objection be allowed any weight? and it may be that, even in the lower animals, there is some natural good principle above themselves which aims at the good peculiar to them.

Some object that “what all aim at is not necessarily good.” I admit I see little force in their argument, because what all think is true, we say is true. Anyone who takes away this foundation will not offer anything more reliable. For if the argument rested on the desires of irrational creatures, the objection might have some force. But since rational beings also desire Pleasure, how can the objection carry any weight? And even in the lower animals, there may be some natural good principle higher than the animals themselves. This principle aims at the good specific to them.

Nor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the argument from the contrary: I mean, some people say “it does not follow that Pleasure must be good because Pain is evil, since evil may be opposed to evil, and both evil and good to what is indifferent:” now what they say is right enough in itself but does not hold in the present instance. If both Pleasure and Pain were bad both would have been objects of avoidance; or if neither then neither would have been, at all events they must have fared alike: but now men do plainly avoid the one as bad and choose the other as good, and so there is a complete opposition.

The objection to the argument from opposites does not seem sound either. I mean, some people say, “Pleasure need not be good just because Pain is evil. One evil may oppose another, and both evil and good may oppose what is neither good nor evil.” This claim is correct in itself, but it does not apply here. If both Pleasure and Pain were bad, people would have avoided both. Or if neither were bad, people would have avoided neither. In any case, people would have treated both alike. But people clearly avoid Pain as bad and choose Pleasure as good. So the opposition between Pleasure and Pain is complete.

Nor again is Pleasure therefore excluded from being good because it does not belong to the class of qualities:⁴ the acts of Virtue are not qualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely both are goods].

Nor is Pleasure ruled out as good because it is not a quality:⁴ acts of Virtue are not qualities. Neither is Happiness [yet surely both are good].

Again, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited, in that it admits of degrees.

Again, they say the highest good is limited, but pleasure is unlimited because pleasure can vary in degree.

Now if they judge this from the act of feeling Pleasure then the same thing will apply to justice and all the other virtues,⁵ in respect of which clearly it is said that men are more or less of such and such characters (according to the different virtues), they are more just or more brave, or one may practise justice and self-mastery more or less.

Now if they judge this by the experience of pleasure, the same applies to justice and all the other virtues.⁵ Clearly, people are said to have these character traits to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the virtue. They are more just or more brave, or they may practice justice and self-control to a greater or lesser degree.

If, on the other hand, they judge in respect of the Pleasures themselves then it may be they miss the true cause, namely that some are unmixed and others mixed: for just as health being in itself limited, admits of degrees, why should not Pleasure do so and yet be limited? in the former case we account for it by the fact that there is not the same adjustment of parts in all men, nor one and the same always in the same individual: but health, though relaxed, remains up to a certain point, and differs in degrees; and of course the same may be the case with Pleasure.

If, on the other hand, they judge the pleasures themselves, they may miss the true cause. Some pleasures are unmixed, while others are mixed. For health has definite limits, yet varies in degree. Why should pleasure not also vary in degree while still having definite limits? We explain differences in health by noting that the body's parts are not balanced in the same way in everyone. Nor does that balance always remain the same in any one person. But even when health declines, it remains health up to a certain point and varies in degree. And of course, the same may be true of pleasure.

Again, assuming the Chief Good to be perfect and all Movements⁶ and Generations imperfect, they try to shew that Pleasure is a Movement and a Generation.

Again, they assume that the highest good is perfect. They also assume that all movements⁶ and processes of becoming are imperfect. On these assumptions, they try to show that pleasure is a movement and a process of becoming.

Yet they do not seem warranted in saying even that it is a Movement: for to every Movement are thought to belong swiftness and slowness, and if not in itself, as to that of the universe, yet relatively: but to Pleasure neither of these belongs: for though one may have got quickly into the state Pleasure, as into that of anger, one cannot be in the state quickly,⁷ nor relatively to the state of any other person; but we can walk or grow, and so on, quickly or slowly.

Yet they do not seem justified even in saying that pleasure is a movement. For every movement is thought to have speed or slowness, either in itself or relative to something else. The movement of the universe, for example, has speed or slowness only in relative terms. But pleasure has neither. Although someone may enter a state of pleasure quickly, just as they may become angry quickly, they cannot experience pleasure quickly,⁷ even compared with someone else’s experience of pleasure. But we can walk or grow, and so on, quickly or slowly.

Of course it is possible to change into the state of Pleasure quickly or slowly, but to act in the state (by which, I mean, have the perception of Pleasure) quickly, is not possible.

Of course, we can enter a state of pleasure quickly or slowly. But we cannot act quickly in that state. By acting in a state of pleasure, I mean experiencing pleasure.

And how can it be a Generation? because, according to notions generally held, not _any_thing is generated from _any_thing, but a thing resolves itself into that out of which it was generated: whereas of that of which Pleasure is a Generation Pain is a Destruction.

And how can pleasure be a process of coming into being? Because, according to common belief, not _any_thing can come from _any_thing. Rather, a thing breaks down into what it came from. But pain destroys the very thing that pleasure brings into being.

Again, they say that Pain is a lack of something suitable to nature and Pleasure a supply of it.

Again, they say that pain is a lack of something suited to our nature. Pleasure is a supply of that same thing.

But these are affections of the body: now if Pleasure really is a supplying of somewhat suitable to nature, that must feel the Pleasure in which the supply takes place, therefore the body of course: yet this is not thought to be so: neither then is Pleasure a supplying, only a person of course will be pleased when a supply takes place just as he will be pained when he is cut short.

But these are bodily experiences. Now, suppose pleasure really is the replenishment of something that nature needs. Whatever is replenished must then feel the pleasure, so the body must, of course, feel it. Yet this is not thought to be the case. So pleasure is not replenishment. A person will, of course, be pleased when replenished, just as they will feel pain when deprived.

This notion would seem to have arisen out of the Pains and Pleasures connected with natural nourishment; because, when people have felt a lack and so have had Pain first, they, of course, are pleased with the supply of their lack.

This idea seems to have come from the pains and pleasures connected with the body's natural need for nourishment. For when people feel a lack and first experience pain, they are naturally pleased when that lack is filled.

But this is not the case with all Pleasures: those attendant on mathematical studies, for instance, are unconnected with any Pain; and of such as attend on the senses those which arise through the sense of Smell; and again, many sounds, and sights, and memories, and hopes: now of what can these be Generations? because there has been here no lack of anything to be afterwards supplied.

But not all pleasures are like this. For example, the pleasures of mathematical study are not connected with any pain. Among sensory pleasures, the same is true of those arising from smell. It is also true of many sounds, sights, memories, and hopes. Now, what could these pleasures be bringing into being? For there was no lack of anything that needed to be supplied afterward.

And to those who bring forward disgraceful Pleasures we may reply that these are not really pleasant things; for it does not follow because they are pleasant to the ill-disposed that we are to admit that they are pleasant except to them; just as we should not say that those things are really wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the sick, or those objects really white which give that impression to people labouring under ophthalmia.⁸

To those who point to shameful pleasures, we may reply that these things are not truly pleasant. Just because corrupt people find them pleasant, we need not admit that they are pleasant to anyone else. Similarly, we should not call things truly healthy, sweet, or bitter just because they seem so to sick people. Nor should we call objects truly white just because they look white to people with inflamed eyes.⁸

Or we might say thus, that the Pleasures are choice-worthy but not as derived from these sources: just as wealth is, but not as the price of treason; or health, but not on the terms of eating anything however loathsome.

Or we might put it this way: pleasures are worth choosing, but not when they come from these sources. Just as wealth is worth choosing, but not as payment for treason. Or health, but not if it means eating anything, however disgusting.

Or again, may we not say that Pleasures differ in kind? those derived from honourable objects, for instance are different from those arising from disgraceful ones; and it is not possible to experience the Pleasure of the just man without being just, or of the musical man without being musical; and so on of others.

Or again, may we not say that pleasures differ in kind? For example, pleasures from honorable things differ from pleasures from disgraceful things. And you cannot experience the pleasure of a just person without being just yourself. Nor can you experience the pleasure of a musical person without being musical yourself. The same applies to other pleasures.

The distinction commonly drawn between the friend and the flatterer would seem to show clearly either that Pleasure is not a good, or that there are different kinds of Pleasure: for the former is thought to have good as the object of his intercourse, the latter Pleasure only; and this last is reproached, but the former men praise as having different objects in his intercourse.

The usual distinction between a friend and a flatterer would seem to show one of two things clearly. Either pleasure is not a good, or there are different kinds of pleasure. For a friend is thought to seek what is good in his dealings with others, while a flatterer seeks only pleasure. People criticize the flatterer, but praise the friend because his dealings with others have different aims.

Again, no one would choose to live with a child’s intellect all his life through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure from such objects as children receive it from; or to take Pleasure in doing any of the most disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained.

Again, no one would choose to have a child’s intellect for their entire life, even if they received the greatest possible pleasure from the things children enjoy. Nor would anyone choose to enjoy doing the most disgraceful things, even if they were certain never to suffer pain.

There are many things also about which we should be diligent even though they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do follow on these naturally makes no difference, because we should certainly choose them even though no Pleasure resulted from them.

There are also many things we should pursue even if they brought no pleasure. These include seeing, remembering, knowing, and possessing the various virtues. The fact that these things naturally bring pleasure makes no difference. We would certainly choose them even if they brought no pleasure.

It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is every kind of it choice-worthy: and that there are some choice-worthy in themselves, differing in kind, i.e. in the sources from which they are derived. Let this then suffice by way of an account of the current maxims respecting Pleasure and Pain.

It seems clear, then, that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is every kind worth choosing. But some pleasures are worth choosing for their own sake. These differ in kind, that is, in the sources they come from. Let this account of the common views on Pleasure and Pain be enough.

Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up the subject afresh.

What it is and what characterizes it will become clearer if we take a fresh look at the subject.

An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to say, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete its whole nature.

An act of seeing is thought to be complete at any moment. In other words, nothing needs to be added later to make the act fully complete.

Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say; and one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole nature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for this reason it is not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time of certain duration and has a certain End to accomplish; for instance, the Movement of house-building⁹ is then only complete when the builder has produced what he intended, that is, either in the whole time [necessary to complete the whole design], or in a given portion.¹⁰ But all the subordinate Movements are incomplete in the parts of the time, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from one another (I mean, for instance, that the fitting the stones together is a Movement different from that of fluting the column, and both again from the construction of the Temple as a whole: but this last is complete as lacking nothing to the result proposed; whereas that of the basement, or of the triglyph, is incomplete, because each is a Movement of a part merely).

Well, pleasure is like this, because it is, so to speak, a whole. At no moment could a pleasure become more complete in its nature simply by lasting longer. For this reason, pleasure is not a movement. For all movement takes a certain amount of time and has a particular goal to achieve. For example, the movement of house-building⁹ is complete only when the builder has produced what he intended. This happens either over the whole time [needed to complete the whole design], or within a given portion.¹⁰ But all the component movements are incomplete during portions of that time. They differ in kind from the whole movement and from one another. I mean, for example, that fitting stones together is a different movement from carving flutes in a column. Both movements also differ from building the Temple as a whole. But building the Temple is complete because nothing needed for the intended result is missing. By contrast, building the foundation or the triglyph is incomplete, because each movement concerns only a part.

As I said then, they differ in kind, and you cannot at any time you choose find a Movement complete in its whole nature, but, if at all, in the whole time requisite.

As I said, they differ in kind. You cannot find a Movement fully complete at any moment you choose. A Movement can be complete, if at all, only over the entire time it requires.

And so it is with the Movement of walking and all others: for, if motion be a Movement from one place to another place, then of it too there are different kinds, flying, walking, leaping, and such-like. And not only so, but there are different kinds even in walking: the where-from and where-to are not the same in the whole Course as in a portion of it; nor in one portion as in another; nor is crossing this line the same as crossing that: because a man is not merely crossing a line but a line in a given place, and this is in a different place from that.

The same is true of walking and all other movements. For if motion is movement from one place to another, it too has different kinds: flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And even walking has different kinds. The starting and ending points of a whole route differ from those of a section of that route. They also differ from one section to another. Nor is crossing one line the same as crossing another. This is because a person crosses not just a line, but a line in a particular place. And one line is in a different place from the other.

Of Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will now therefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given moment; and that most movements are incomplete and specifically different, since the whence and whither constitute different species.

I have discussed movement in detail in another work. So I will now say only that movement seems not to be complete at any given moment. Most movements are incomplete and differ in kind, because their starting and ending points define different kinds of movement.

But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and complete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving except in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the sensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a kind of “whole.”

But the whole nature of pleasure is complete at any given moment. Clearly, then, pleasure and movement must differ, and pleasure belongs among things that are whole and complete. The difference might also be seen in the fact that movement requires a definite span of time. The sensation of pleasure, however, requires no such span, because the pleasure present at any given moment is a kind of “whole.”

From these considerations then it is plain that people are not warranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation: because these terms are not applicable to all things, only to such as are divisible and not “wholes:” I mean that of an act of Sight there is no Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one of these a Movement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there Movement or Generation, because it is, as one may say, “a whole.”¹¹

These considerations make it clear that people have no grounds for saying that pleasure is a movement or a coming-into-being. These terms do not apply to all things, but only to things that are divisible and not “wholes.” I mean that an act of sight does not come into being, nor does a point or a monad. Nor is any of these a movement or a coming-into-being. So pleasure, too, is neither a movement nor a coming-into-being, because pleasure is, one might say, “a whole.”¹¹

Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about saying “the Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the Faculty resides”), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And this will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is attendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range.

Now every faculty of perception works on its corresponding object. A faculty in good condition works perfectly on the finest object within its range. For perfect activity is thought to be much as I have described it. We need not question the wording “the faculty” works, rather than “the subject in which the faculty resides” works. So, in each case, the best activity involves a faculty in its best condition working on its finest corresponding object. This activity will also be the most perfect and most pleasant. For pleasure accompanies the activity of every faculty of perception, as well as every act of thought and contemplation. The most perfect activity is the most pleasant. And the most perfect activity involves the best faculty working on the finest object within its range.

And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in the same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good; just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a healthy state.

And pleasure completes an activity. But pleasure does not complete an activity as a well-functioning sense and a good object of perception do. Similarly, health and a physician do not cause a healthy state in the same way.

And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.

And pleasure clearly arises from the exercise of every faculty of perception, since we commonly call sights and sounds pleasant. Pleasure is also clearly greatest when the faculty is at its best and perceives an equally excellent object. When both the object and the faculty of perception meet these conditions, pleasure will always arise. This assumes, of course, that something acts and something is acted upon.

Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an inherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people at their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or sensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which discerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working: because when that which has the capacity of being acted on and that which is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same result follows naturally.

Furthermore, pleasure completes an activity, not as an inherent quality, but as a finishing touch. It is like the bloom of health in people in their prime. So an activity will remain pleasant as long as both the object perceived and the perceiving ability are as they should be. This applies whether perception involves thought or the senses. For when what can be acted upon and what can act remain unchanged and maintain the same relationship, the same result naturally follows.

How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that he wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting exertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because that follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which please when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the same reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these Objects with its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing stedfastly at anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the kind it was at first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.

Why, then, does no one feel pleasure continuously? Isn't it because people grow tired, since all human faculties are incapable of continuous effort? So, of course, pleasure also stops, because pleasure follows activity. But some things are pleasing when new and less pleasing later, for exactly the same reason. At first, the mind is stirred and focuses all its powers on these things, just as people do when staring intently at something. But later, the activity is no longer what it was at first. Instead, the mind works carelessly, and so the pleasure also fades.

Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No wonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects Life, which is itself choice-worthy. (We will take leave to omit the question whether we choose Life for Pleasure’s sake of Pleasure for Life’s sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit not of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working, and again, every Working Pleasure perfects.)

Again, we may conclude that all people seek pleasure because all people also seek life. Life is an activity, and everyone pursues activities involving the things they like best, using the faculties they like best. For example, a musical person uses hearing to engage with music. A studious person uses the intellect to explore theoretical questions, and so on. Pleasure completes these activities and therefore completes the life people seek. So it is no wonder that people also seek pleasure. For each person, pleasure completes life, and life is itself worth choosing. (We will leave aside whether we choose life for pleasure’s sake or pleasure for life’s sake. The two are clearly closely connected and cannot be separated. For pleasure cannot arise without activity, and pleasure, in turn, completes every activity.)

And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind, because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected by things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions of Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues, and houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts of Working which are different in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from those of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do the Pleasures which perfect them.

And here is one reason why pleasures are thought to differ in kind. We suppose that things differing in kind must be perfected by things that also differ in kind. This is plainly true of the products of nature and art: animals, trees, pictures, statues, houses, and furniture. So we suppose that activities differing in kind are likewise perfected by things that differ in kind. Now intellectual activities differ in kind from sensory activities, and sensory activities differ in kind from one another. Therefore, the pleasures that perfect these activities also differ in kind.

This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between each Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the Pleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who work with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a greater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians who take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points more completely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or architecture, or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit, because they feel Pleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others specifically different are themselves also specifically different.

This may also be shown by the close connection between each pleasure and the activity it perfects. I mean that the pleasure belonging to an activity strengthens that activity. For people who enjoy an activity examine everything more closely and carry it out with greater precision. For example, people who enjoy geometry become geometers and understand particular points more fully. Similarly, people who enjoy music, architecture, or anything else improve in their own pursuits because they enjoy them. Thus, pleasures help strengthen activities, and pleasures that help in this way belong specifically to those activities. But things that belong specifically to activities different in kind must themselves also differ in kind.

Yet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the Pleasures arising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for instance, people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their attention to conversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a flute; because they take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the Working they are at the time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure attendant on flute-playing destroys the Working of conversation or discourse.

Yet the point may be shown even more clearly by how pleasures from one activity interfere with other activities. For example, people who love flute music cannot concentrate on a conversation or speech when they hear a flute. This is because they enjoy flute playing more than the activity they are currently engaged in. In other words, the pleasure of flute playing destroys their engagement in conversation or speech.

Much the same kind of thing takes place in other cases, when a person is engaged in two different Workings at the same time: that is, the pleasanter of the two keeps pushing out the other, and, if the disparity in pleasantness be great, then more and more till a man even ceases altogether to work at the other.

Much the same happens in other cases when a person engages in two different activities at once. The more pleasant activity keeps pushing out the other. If the difference in pleasure is great, the more pleasant activity increasingly takes over until the person stops the other altogether.

This is the reason why, when we are very much pleased with anything whatever, we do nothing else, and it is only when we are but moderately pleased with one occupation that we vary it with another: people, for instance, who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when the performance is indifferent.

This is why, when we enjoy something very much, we do nothing else. Only when we enjoy an activity moderately do we alternate it with another. For example, people who eat sweets at the theatre do so most when the performance is mediocre.

Since then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to the Workings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, while those Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain there is a wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to any Working have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it,¹² which, in fact, destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikes writing, or another calculation, the one does not write, the other does not calculate; because, in each case, the Working is attended with some Pain: so then contrary effects are produced upon the Workings by the Pleasures and Pains proper to them, by which I mean those which arise upon the Working, in itself, independently of any other circumstances. As for the Pleasures foreign to a Working, we have said already that they produce a similar effect to the Pain proper to it; that is they destroy the Working, only not in like way.

The pleasure specific to an activity makes that activity more precise, more lasting, and better of its kind. By contrast, pleasures unrelated to the activity interfere with it. So there is clearly a great difference between these pleasures. In fact, unrelated pleasures have much the same effect as the pains specific to an activity,¹² which destroy the activity. I mean that if one person dislikes writing and another dislikes calculation, the first does not write, and the second does not calculate. This is because each activity involves some pain for that person. So the pleasures and pains specific to an activity have opposite effects on that activity. By these pleasures and pains, I mean those arising from the activity itself, independently of any other circumstances. As we have already said, pleasures unrelated to an activity have a similar effect to the pain specific to it. That is, unrelated pleasures destroy the activity, but not in the same way.

Well then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness, some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in their nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its own proper Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a good Working is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires for what is noble are praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.

Well then, activities differ in goodness and badness. Some are worth choosing, others should be avoided, and others are neither good nor bad in themselves. Pleasures differ in the same way, since each activity has its own particular pleasure. Of course, the pleasure belonging to a good activity is good, and the pleasure belonging to a bad activity is bad. For even desires for what is noble deserve praise, while desires for what is base deserve blame.

Furthermore, the Pleasures attendant on Workings are more closely connected with them even than the desires after them: for these last are separate both in time and nature, but the former are close to the Workings, and so indivisible from them as to raise a question whether the Working and the Pleasure are identical; but Pleasure does not seem to be an Intellectual Operation nor a Faculty of Perception, because that is absurd; but yet it gives some the impression of being the same from not being separated from these.

Furthermore, the pleasures accompanying activities are even more closely connected with those activities than the desires for them are. For desires are separate from activities in both time and nature. But pleasures are closely linked to activities and so inseparable from them that we might ask whether they are identical. Yet pleasure does not seem to be an act of thought or a faculty of perception, because that is absurd. Still, some people think pleasure is the same as thought or perception because pleasure is not separate from them.

As then the Workings are different so are their Pleasures; now Sight differs from Touch in purity, and Hearing and Smelling from Taste; therefore, in like manner, do their Pleasures; and again, Intellectual Pleasures from these Sensual, and the different kinds both of Intellectual and Sensual from one another.

Just as activities differ, so do their pleasures. Sight differs from touch in purity, as do hearing and smell from taste. So the pleasures of these senses differ in the same way. Intellectual pleasures also differ from sensory pleasures. And the various kinds of intellectual and sensory pleasures differ from one another.

It is thought, moreover, that each animal has a Pleasure proper to itself, as it has a proper Work; that Pleasure of course which is attendant on the Working. And the soundness of this will appear upon particular inspection: for horse, dog, and man have different Pleasures; as Heraclitus says, an ass would sooner have hay than gold; in other words, provender is pleasanter to asses than gold. So then the Pleasures of animals specifically different are also specifically different, but those of the same, we may reasonably suppose, are without difference.

Moreover, each animal is thought to have its own particular pleasure, just as it has its own particular activity. This pleasure is, of course, the pleasure that accompanies the activity. Looking at particular cases will show that this view is sound. Horses, dogs, and humans have different pleasures. As Heraclitus says, a donkey would rather have hay than gold. In other words, feed is more pleasant to donkeys than gold. So animals of different species also have different kinds of pleasure. But we may reasonably suppose that animals of the same species have the same pleasures.

Yet in the case of human creatures they differ not a little: for the very same things please some and pain others: and what are painful and hateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the case with sweet things: the same will not seem so to the man in a fever as to him who is in health: nor will the invalid and the person in robust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with other things also.

Yet humans differ considerably in these matters. For the very same things please some people and cause others pain. And what some find painful and hateful, others find pleasant and like. The same is true of sweet things. The same things will not taste as sweet to someone with a fever as to someone in good health. Nor will a sick person and someone in excellent health have the same sense of warmth. The same is true of other things as well.

Now in all such cases that is held to be which impresses the good man with the notion of being such and such; and if this is a second maxim (as it is usually held to be), and Virtue, that is, the Good man, in that he is such, is the measure of everything, then those must be real Pleasures which gave him the impression of being so and those things pleasant in which he takes Pleasure. Nor is it at all astonishing that what are to him unpleasant should give another person the impression of being pleasant, for men are liable to many corruptions and marrings; and the things in question are not pleasant really, only to these particular persons, and to them only as being thus disposed.

Now in all such cases, something is held to be as the good man perceives it to be. If this is a second principle, as it is usually considered, and Virtue is the measure of everything, certain conclusions follow. By Virtue, we mean the Good man, insofar as he is good. The Pleasures he perceives as real must then be real, and the things he takes Pleasure in must be pleasant. Nor is it at all surprising that things unpleasant to him should seem pleasant to someone else. For people are subject to many kinds of corruption and damage. The things in question are not truly pleasant, but pleasant only to these particular people, and only in their condition.

Well of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert those which are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except to depraved tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind, or which, must we say is The Pleasure of Man? is not the answer plain from considering the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?

Well, of course, you may say, we must call admittedly disgraceful pleasures real pleasures, except to people with depraved tastes. But among pleasures thought to be good, what kind, or which particular pleasures, should we call The Pleasure of Man? Isn’t the answer clear from considering the activities, since pleasures follow from these activities?

If then there be one or several Workings which belong to the perfect and blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings must be said to be specially and properly The Pleasures of Man; and all the rest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as the Workings are related to those highest and best ones.

If, then, one or more activities belong to the perfect and blessed person, certain pleasures must have a special status. The pleasures that complete those activities must be called, most properly, The Pleasures of Man; all others qualify only secondarily. Those other pleasures qualify to varying degrees, depending on how their activities relate to the highest and best activities.

Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and Friendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out Happiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things: and we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated before.

We have now discussed both kinds of excellence, the varieties of friendship, and pleasure. We still need to outline happiness, since we assume happiness is the ultimate goal of all human activity. We will save time and effort by reviewing what we said earlier.

Well then, we said that it is not a State merely; because, if it were, it might belong to one who slept all his life through and merely vegetated, or to one who fell into very great calamities: and so, if these possibilities displease us and we would rather put it into the rank of some kind of Working (as was also said before), and Workings are of different kinds (some being necessary and choice-worthy with a view to other things, while others are so in themselves), it is plain we must rank Happiness among those choice-worthy for their own sakes and not among those which are so with a view to something further: because Happiness has no lack of anything but is self-sufficient.

Well then, we said that happiness is not merely a state. If happiness were merely a state, someone could have it while sleeping all their life and merely vegetating. Someone suffering very great calamities could also have it. So, if we reject these possibilities, we would rather classify happiness as a kind of activity, as we said before. Activities differ in kind. Some are necessary and worth choosing for the sake of other things, while others are worth choosing for themselves. Clearly, we must place happiness among activities worth choosing for themselves, not those chosen for the sake of something further. This is because happiness lacks nothing and is self-sufficient.

By choice-worthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be the actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and excellent is one of those things which are choice-worthy for their own sake alone.

Things worth choosing for their own sake are those we seek only for the activity itself, not for anything beyond it. Actions guided by virtue are thought to belong in this category, because noble and excellent conduct is worth choosing for its own sake alone.

And again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not choose them with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm than profit from them, neglecting their persons and their property. Still the common run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such pastimes, which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such are highly esteemed among despots; because they make themselves pleasant in those things which these aim at, and these accordingly want such men.

And again, there are enjoyable amusements, which people choose without any further purpose. In fact, people gain more harm than benefit from these amusements, neglecting their health and property. Still, most people considered happy turn to such pastimes. This is why people with varied talents for such amusements are highly valued by despots. These entertainers provide pleasure in the activities despots seek out, so despots want such people around.

Now these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness because men in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannot argue from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue nor Intellect necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are the only sources of good Workings: nor does it follow that because these men, never having tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge in bodily ones, we are therefore to believe them to be more choice-worthy: for children too believe that those things are most excellent which are precious in their eyes.

These things are thought to be part of happiness because men in power spend their leisure on them. Yet perhaps we cannot draw conclusions from the example of such men. Having power does not necessarily involve virtue or intellect, yet virtue and intellect are the only sources of good activity. Nor should we consider bodily pleasures more desirable because these men turn to them, never having experienced pure and noble pleasure. For children too believe that the things they value are the best.

We may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as to what is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we have many times said, those things are really precious and pleasant which seem so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working is most choice-worthy which is in accordance with his own state to the good man that is so which is in accordance with Virtue.

We may well believe that children and adults differ in what they value, and so do bad and good people. Therefore, as we have often said, things are truly valuable and pleasant when they seem so to a good person. Each person finds the activity that suits their character most worth choosing. So a good person finds activity in keeping with virtue most worth choosing.

Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is absurd of the End being amusement, and of one’s toiling and enduring hardness all one’s life long with a view to amusement: for everything in the world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view, except Happiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to take pains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish and very childish: but to amuse one’s self with a view to steady employment afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for amusement is like rest, and men want rest because unable to labour continuously.

Happiness, then, does not consist in amusement. In fact, the very idea that amusement is our ultimate goal is absurd. So is the idea of working and enduring hardship all our lives for the sake of amusement. For almost everything we choose, so to speak, we have some further goal in mind. Happiness is the exception, because happiness is the ultimate goal that includes all others. Now, taking pains and working for the sake of amusement is plainly foolish and very childish. But amusing ourselves so we can return to steady work afterward is thought to be right, as Anacharsis says. For amusement is like rest, and people need rest because they cannot work continuously.

Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to Working afterwards.

Rest, therefore, is not a goal in itself, because we rest so we can work afterward.

Again, it is held that the Happy Life must be one in the way of Excellence, and this is accompanied by earnestness,¹³ and stands not in amusement. Moreover those things which are done in earnest, we say, are better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement: and we say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, is more earnest; and the Working of the better is at once better and more capable of Happiness.

Again, people hold that a happy life must be lived with excellence. Such a life involves serious effort,¹³ not amusement. Moreover, we say that serious activities are better than those done merely for fun and amusement. We also say that the activity of the better part of us, or the better person, is more serious. And the activity of the better is both better and more capable of producing happiness.

Then, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or even a slave, might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living but Happiness no one supposes a slave to share except so far as it is implied in life: because Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in the Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before.

Again, any ordinary person, or even a slave, might enjoy bodily pleasures just as much as the best person alive. But no one thinks a slave shares in happiness, except insofar as happiness is implied in being alive. This is because happiness lies not in such pastimes but in acting with excellence, as stated before.

Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the best Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some other which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of noble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the most divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this in accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect Happiness.

Now, if happiness is activity guided by excellence, that excellence must, of course, be the highest. That is, it must be the excellence of our best faculty. This faculty may be intellect or another faculty thought naturally to rule, lead, and understand noble and divine things. It may be divine in its own nature or the most divine of all our inner faculties. In either case, the activity of this faculty, guided by its own proper excellence, must be perfect happiness.

That it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem to be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the first place, this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect is the highest of our internal Principles and the subjects with which it is conversant the highest of all which fall within the range of our knowledge.

We have already said that it is contemplative. This seems consistent with what we said before and with the truth. First, contemplation is the highest kind of activity because the intellect is the highest of our inner faculties. And the subjects the intellect considers are the highest of all the things we can know.

Next, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplate than to do anything else whatever, continuously.

Next, contemplation is also the most continuous activity. This is because we can contemplate continuously longer than we can do anything else.

Again, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in Happiness, and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in the way of Science is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit of Science is thought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and permanence; and it is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more pleasant to those who have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking for, it.¹⁴

Again, we think pleasure must be part of happiness in some way. Of all activities guided by excellence, the pursuit of knowledge is admittedly the most pleasant. At least, the pursuit of knowledge is thought to offer pleasures remarkable for their purity and lasting quality. And it is reasonable to suppose that using knowledge is more pleasant for those who have mastered it. They enjoy using knowledge more than those who are still seeking it.¹⁴

And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to the Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are needed alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the just man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to practise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected self-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the man of science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the more entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so: it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he is certainly most Self-Sufficient.

And the self-sufficiency people speak of belongs chiefly to contemplation. Of course, the thinker, the just man, and people of every other character all need life's necessities. But suppose all have enough of these necessities. The just man needs other people to act justly toward and to act justly alongside. The same is true of the man with complete self-control, the brave man, and all the others. By contrast, the thinker can contemplate and reflect even when entirely alone. The more fully he deserves to be called a thinker, the more capable he is of contemplating alone. He may do better with fellow thinkers, but he is still certainly the most self-sufficient.

Again, this alone would seem to be rested in for its own sake, since nothing results from it beyond the fact of having contemplated; whereas from all things which are objects of moral action we do mean to get something beside the doing them, be the same more or less.

Again, contemplation alone seems to be valued for its own sake, because nothing results from it beyond having contemplated. By contrast, in all moral actions, we aim to gain something beyond the action itself, whether more or less.

Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest;¹⁵ for we toil that we may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the Practical Virtues require either society or war for their Working, and the actions regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war entirely, because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war’s sake: he would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make enemies of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and bloodshed. The Working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest, and, beside the actual work of government, seeks for power and dignities or at least Happiness for the man himself and his fellow-citizens: a Happiness distinct¹⁶ from the national Happiness, which we evidently seek as being different and distinct.

Happiness is also thought to involve complete rest.¹⁵ For we work so that we may rest, and fight wars so that we may live in peace. Now all the practical virtues require either social life or war to be exercised. Actions in these areas are thought to leave no room for rest. This is entirely true of warfare, because no one chooses war or prepares for war for its own sake. Indeed, someone who turned friends into enemies to ensure fighting and bloodshed would be considered a bloodthirsty villain. A statesman’s work also leaves no room for rest. Beyond the actual work of governing, the statesman seeks power and honors. Or he seeks at least happiness for himself and his fellow citizens. This happiness is distinct¹⁶ from national happiness, which we clearly seek as something different and separate.

If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those of policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these are restless, and aim at some further End and are not choice-worthy for their own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase the Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of rest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmity of human nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness, plainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, if attaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added because none of the points of Happiness is incomplete.

Suppose, then, that among all virtuous actions, those of politics and war rank highest in honor and greatness. Yet these actions allow no rest and aim at some further goal, rather than being worth choosing for themselves. But intellectual activity devoted to contemplation is thought to excel in seriousness and to aim at nothing beyond itself. It also has its own pleasure, which strengthens the activity. Suppose, too, that this activity clearly has self-sufficiency, the capacity for rest, and freedom from weariness. Freedom from weariness is possible only as far as the frailty of human nature allows. Suppose this activity also clearly has all the other qualities of the highest happiness. If all these conditions hold, contemplative activity must be perfect happiness, provided it extends over a complete lifetime. This condition is added because no aspect of happiness is incomplete.

But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the life in accordance with it be divine compared with man’s ordinary life.

But such a life will go beyond human nature alone. For a man will live this way not simply as a human, but through a divine principle within him. The more this principle surpasses his combined human nature, the more its activity surpasses activity guided by any other virtue. Therefore, if pure intellect is divine compared with human nature, a life guided by pure intellect will also be divine compared with ordinary human life.

Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man’s affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance with the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in power and preciousness it far more excels all the others.

Yet we must not listen to those who say that, as humans, we should concern ourselves only with human affairs. Nor should we listen to those who say that, as mortals, we should concern ourselves only with mortal things. Instead, as far as we can, we must make ourselves like immortals. We must do everything with the aim of living according to the highest principle within us. For although this principle may be small in size, it far surpasses all the others in power and value.

In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man’s “Self,” since it is supreme and above all others in goodness it would be absurd then for a man not to choose his own life but that of some other.

In fact, this Principle seems to be each man’s “Self,” since it is supreme and surpasses all others in goodness. So it would be absurd for a man to choose someone else’s life rather than his own.

And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man the life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is most truly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.

An earlier observation applies here: what is natural to each person is best and most pleasant for that person. So, for human beings, the best and most pleasant life is one guided by pure Intellect. This is because Intellect is what most truly makes us human. If so, a life guided by pure Intellect is also the happiest.

And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in accordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in accordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of justice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in contracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and feelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all these plainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moral character is thought to result in some points from physical circumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with the passions.

And second in happiness is the life lived according to the other kind of excellence. For activities expressing this excellence are distinctly human. I mean that we act justly, courageously, and with other virtues toward one another. We do so in contracts, various kinds of service, and all kinds of actions and feelings, observing what each requires. All these activities are plainly human. Furthermore, moral excellence is thought to arise in some respects from physical conditions. In many respects, moral excellence is also thought to be very closely connected with emotions.

Again, Practical Wisdom¹⁷ and Excellence of the Moral character are very closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in accordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord with Practical Wisdom.

Again, practical wisdom¹⁷ and excellence of moral character are very closely linked. This is because the principles of practical wisdom agree with the moral virtues. And the moral virtues are right when they agree with practical wisdom.

These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the composite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite nature are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and Happiness which is in accordance with them. But that of the Pure Intellect is separate and distinct: and let this suffice upon the subject, since great exactness is beyond our purpose,

Moreover, because these are tied to the passions, they must belong to our combined nature of body and soul. The excellences or virtues of this combined nature are proper to human beings. Therefore, so too are the life and happiness that follow these virtues. But the life and happiness of the Pure Intellect are separate and distinct. Let this be enough on the subject, since greater precision is beyond our purpose.

It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small degree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as necessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to need them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives in society does take more pains about his person and all that kind of thing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come to consider their Workings there will be found a great difference.

It also seems to need few external goods, or certainly fewer than Moral Happiness does. For life's necessities, let us assume that both kinds of people have equal needs. (In fact, though, someone living in society takes more care over his appearance and similar matters. So there will actually be a slight difference.) But when we consider their activities, we will find a great difference.

I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with, and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions are uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of wishing to do justly), and the brave man must have power, if he is to perform any of the actions which appertain to his particular Virtue, and the man of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity of temptation, else how shall he or any of the others display his real character?

I mean, a generous man must have money to act generously, and a just man needs money to meet his obligations. (For intentions alone are uncertain, and even unjust people pretend to wish to act justly.) A brave man must have power if he is to perform any action that calls for courage. And a man with complete self-control must have opportunities to face temptation. Otherwise, how can he or any of the others show his true character?

(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice or the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both: it is plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but for the actions many things are required, and the greater and more numerous they are the more.) But as for the man engaged in Contemplative Speculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his Working, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the Contemplation at least; because of course in so far as he is Man and lives in society he chooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will need such things for maintaining his character as Man though not as a speculative philosopher.

(By the way, people sometimes ask whether moral choice or action matters more for virtue, since virtue involves both. Clearly, fully virtuous action requires both. But actions require many resources, and the greater and more numerous the actions, the more resources they require.) But someone engaged in philosophical contemplation does not need such resources for his activity. In fact, so to speak, such resources can even get in the way, at least of contemplation itself. Of course, as a human being living in society, he chooses to do what virtue requires. So he will need such resources to fulfill his role as a human being, though not as a contemplative philosopher.

And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the gods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of Moral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay, will they not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming contracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall we picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear and meeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to whom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they have money or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfected self-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praise that they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subject into all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actions would appear trivial and unworthy of Gods.

The following consideration may also show that perfect happiness must be a kind of contemplative activity. We think of the gods as supremely blessed and happy. Now, what kinds of moral actions should we attribute to them? Acts of justice? Wouldn't the gods look ridiculous if we pictured them making contracts, returning deposits, and so on? Should we then picture them acting bravely, facing frightening things and meeting dangers because doing so is noble? Or acting generously? But to whom would the gods give anything? Besides, it is absurd to think the gods have money or anything of the kind. And what actions could show their perfect self-control? Wouldn't praising the gods for having no bad desires be demeaning? In short, if we examined every detail, all the circumstances surrounding moral actions would seem trivial and unworthy of gods.

Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they Work because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of the Gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative Speculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatest capacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.

Still, everyone believes that the gods live and therefore act, because no one thinks they sleep their lives away like Endymion. Now, if you take action away from a living being, and even more so creative activity, what remains but contemplation? So the activity of the gods, whose happiness is supreme, must be contemplative. And among all human activities, the one most like divine contemplation will have the greatest capacity for happiness.

A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals do not partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such Working.

The fact that other animals cannot share in happiness supports this position. They are completely excluded from such activity.

To the Gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as there is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none is happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.

The Gods, then, are blessed throughout their lives. Humans are blessed insofar as their lives contain some likeness of this contemplative activity. But no other animal is happy, because no other animal shares in contemplation at all.

Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they also the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative Speculation because it is in itself precious.

Happiness, then, extends as far as contemplation does. The more people engage in contemplation, the happier they are. This happiness is not incidental but comes through contemplation, because contemplation is valuable in itself.

So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity, because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all kinds.

So happiness must be a kind of contemplation. But since we are speaking of human beings, they will also need favorable external conditions. This is because human nature alone is not enough for contemplation. People also need physical health, nourishment, and care of every kind.

However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and great goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without being ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may act in accordance with Virtue.

However, a man cannot enjoy great happiness without some external goods. But we should not therefore assume that happiness requires many possessions or great wealth. Neither self-sufficiency nor action depends on having more than enough. A man can act nobly without ruling the seas and the land. Even with moderate means, he may act virtuously.

And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are thought to act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even more: it will be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man as is necessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance with Virtue.

And this can be seen clearly in how people judge men who hold no public office. Such men are thought to act not just as justly as men in power, but even more justly. A man needs only enough possessions to meet his needs, because whoever acts according to Virtue will live happily.

Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they are men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved the most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect self-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act as they ought.

Solon perhaps gave a fair picture of happy people. He described them as men with a moderate share of material goods. They have done what he considered the noblest deeds and have lived with complete self-control. For men of moderate means can certainly act as they should.

Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either rich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted a strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by outward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.

Anaxagoras also seems to have thought of the happy man as neither rich nor powerful. He said he would not be surprised if most people considered him strange. For most people judge by outward circumstances, the only things they can perceive.

And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account of the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in matters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life, for herein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine the preceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, and when they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are at variance with them conceive of them as mere theories.

So the opinions of the wise seem to agree with our account of the matter. Of course, such opinions carry some weight. But in matters of moral action, truth is judged by facts and real life, which provide the deciding test. So we should test the preceding statements against facts and real life. When the statements agree with the facts, we may accept them. When the statements conflict with the facts, we should regard them as mere theories.

Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of mind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is bestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to think that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves (and this must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite with kindness those who love and honour this most, as paying observance to what is dear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is quite obvious that the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is therefore dearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the same time most Happy.

A person who acts according to Pure Intellect, honors it, and nurtures it seems likely to have the best state of mind. Such a person also seems likely to be dearest to the Gods. For if the Gods care at all about human affairs, as people believe, the following conclusion seems reasonable. The Gods take pleasure in what is best and most like themselves, and that must be Pure Intellect. They also reward with kindness those who love and honor Pure Intellect most. For such people honor what is dear to the Gods and act rightly and nobly. Clearly, the person devoted to knowledge combines all these qualities more than anyone else. Such a person is therefore dearest to the Gods and is probably also the happiest.

Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.

So, from this perspective too, the person devoted to knowledge will be happiest.

Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure; are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take whatever other means there are of becoming good.

Now we have said enough, in our rough outline, about these subjects: the virtues, friendship, and pleasure. Should we suppose we have achieved our original purpose? Should we not instead accept the common view that, in moral matters, the real goal is action, not merely thought and knowledge? If so, knowing about virtue is not enough either. We must also strive to become virtuous and act virtuously, and use whatever other means can make us good.

Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to fear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is disgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in fact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their own proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the contrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they have not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.

If speaking and writing alone were enough to make people good, they would rightly earn many great rewards. Theognis makes this point, and if that were so, we should provide those rewards. In fact, words clearly can guide and inspire young people of noble character. They can also ground any noble and truly high-minded character in true principles of virtue. But words are just as clearly powerless to guide most people toward virtue and goodness. For most people are naturally moved not by shame but only by fear. They avoid low and mean actions not because such actions are disgraceful, but because they bring punishment. In fact, these people live at the mercy of their passions. They pursue their own particular pleasures and the means of securing those pleasures, and avoid the opposite pains. But they have no idea of what is noble and truly pleasant, because they have never experienced it.

Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter by words what has been of old taken into men’s very dispositions: and, it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and appliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.

What mere words, then, can transform men like these? None, indeed! Changing deeply ingrained habits through words is either impossible or extremely difficult. And perhaps we can be content if we attain Virtue with every means of becoming good at our disposal.

The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to Custom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature’s part, be it what it may, obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest sense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,

Some attribute the development of a virtuous character to nature, some to habit, and some to teaching. Whatever part nature plays, nature’s contribution is clearly beyond our control. Instead, nature’s contribution belongs to those who are truly fortunate, thanks to some divine influence.

Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not avail with all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to have been previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought; just as the soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in obedience to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him, nor, if he heard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform? in fact, generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to brute force. So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity to Virtue in the disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable and loath what is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue from the earliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws of such kind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not pleasant to the mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this reason the food, and manner of living generally, ought to be the subject of legal regulation, because things when become habitual will not be disagreeable.

As for words and instruction, we must fear that they will not work for everyone. The student's mind may need preparation beforehand to like and dislike the right things. Just as soil must be prepared to nourish seeds, the mind must be prepared to receive instruction. Someone ruled by passion cannot listen to advice meant to turn him away from it. Even if he heard such advice, he would not understand it. How can someone like that be reformed? In general, passion is thought to yield not to reason but to brute force. So a person's character must have some natural leaning toward virtue from the start. He must hold firmly to what is honorable and hate what is shameful. But receiving proper guidance toward virtue from early youth is not easy unless one grows up under suitable laws. For most people, especially the young, living with self-control and endurance is not pleasant. For this reason, food and the way people live generally should be regulated by law. Once these practices become habits, they will no longer be unpleasant.

Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and become accustomed to certain things even after they have attained to man’s estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine, respecting one’s whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense of honour.

Yet perhaps proper food and care during youth are not enough for men. Men will still need to practice certain things and make them habits even after reaching adulthood. So we will need laws governing these matters too, and ultimately, laws covering the whole of life. For most men respond more to force than to reason, and more to punishment than to a sense of honor.

And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the sense of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion that they will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they should impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are of less promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the good man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to reason; and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in check, like beasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the pains should be such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are liked.

Therefore, some people believe lawmakers should appeal to a sense of honor to encourage and guide people toward virtue. The idea is that people trained in good habits will then obey. But lawmakers should punish those who disobey and whose character shows less promise. Those beyond reform should be expelled entirely. This is because good people and those guided by honor will obey reason. By contrast, baser people who chase pleasure will be kept in check by pain, like beasts of burden. For this reason, these thinkers also say punishments should cause pain most directly opposed to the pleasures those people enjoy.

As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought up and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good institutions, and never do what is low and mean, either against or with his will. Now these objects can be attained only by men living in accordance with some guiding Intellect and right order, with power to back them.

As already noted, anyone who is to become good must have been raised well and taught good habits. They must then live by those habits under good institutions. They must never do anything base or shameful, either willingly or against their will. These goals can be achieved only by people living under some guiding Intellect and proper order, backed by power.

As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory power, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or some one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a declaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people feel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however rightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of hatred, though enforcing right rules.

A father's authority has neither strength nor the power to compel. Nor does any individual man's authority, unless he is a king or holds a similar position. But the law has the power to compel, because it is a statement grounded in practical wisdom and reason. People resent others who oppose their impulses, however right those others may be. By contrast, the law is not hated, even though it enforces right rules.

The Lacedæmonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are entirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his wife and children Cyclops-Fashion.

The Lacedæmonian state seems almost the only state whose constitution-maker made any provision for the people's food and way of life. In most states, these matters are entirely neglected. Each man lives just as he likes, ruling his wife and children Cyclops-Fashion.

Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public System and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a public matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to devolve upon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with his own children and friends, or at least to make this his aim and purpose: and this, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be best able to do by making a Legislator of himself: since all public systems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and those are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they are written or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one or many, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not in music, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are gained by practice.

Of course, the best outcome would be a sound public system that we could put into practice. But since these matters are neglected in public life, the duty would seem to fall to each individual. Each person should help his own children and friends develop virtue, or at least make that his aim. From what has been said, he would seem best able to do so by becoming a lawmaker himself. For all public systems are clearly shaped by laws, and good systems are shaped by good laws. Whether those laws are written or unwritten would seem to make no difference. Nor, it seems, would it matter whether the laws guide the training of one person or many. The same is true of music, physical training, and other skills acquired through practice.

For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families the express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in the latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred: for there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are naturally obedient to the authority which controls them.

Just as laws and customs govern communities, so the family head’s direct commands and family customs govern families. Commands and customs have even greater force in families because of blood ties and the benefits family members receive. For family members already feel affection and are naturally obedient to the authority governing them.

Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in the case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who is in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case, perhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration, the boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.

Furthermore, private training has advantages over public training, just as individualized treatment does in medicine. For example, as a general rule, a man with a fever should rest and go without food. But in a particular case, perhaps this advice may not apply. Or, to take another example, a boxer will not fight every opponent in the same way.

It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to under Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what is expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or gymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better for being acquainted with general rules; as, “that so and so is good for all, or for men in such and such cases:” because general maxims are not only said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this is no reason against the possibility of a man’s taking excellent care of some one case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but from experience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point; just as some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they would be wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem to be necessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real artist and well acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have recourse to general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for we have already stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.

It seems, then, that private care will give each individual the most precise attention. This is because each person will be more likely to receive what benefits him. Of course, in medicine, gymnastics, or any other field, someone who knows general rules will treat individual cases better. Such rules include “such and such is good for everyone, or for people in such and such circumstances.” For general principles are not merely said to be the subject of scientific knowledge. They actually are its subject. Still, someone without scientific knowledge may take excellent care of one particular case. Through experience, he may know exactly what happens in every detail. Similarly, some people are thought best at treating themselves, though they would be entirely unable to help others. Yet someone who wants to become a true expert and understand the theory of his profession may still need general principles. He may need to study those principles and establish the full range of their applications. For, as we have already said, general principles are the subject of scientific knowledge.

If then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentality of laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of care and training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treat skilfully just any one who may be put before you is not what any ordinary person can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in the healing art, and all others which involve careful practice and skill.

If, then, it seems we may become good through laws, anyone seeking to improve people through systematic care and training must, of course, try to become a lawmaker. For no ordinary person can skillfully guide just anyone placed in their care. If anyone can, it is someone with knowledge, just as in medicine and all other fields requiring careful practice and skill.

Will not then our next business be to enquire from what sources, or how one may acquire this faculty of Legislation; or shall we say, that, as in similar cases, Statesmen are the people to learn from, since this faculty was thought to be a part of the Social Science? Must we not admit that the Political Science plainly does not stand on a similar footing to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean, that while in all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert them are identical (physicians and painters for instance) matters of Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them practises it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack and by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process: for they neither write nor speak on these matters (though it might be more to their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly), nor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons or their friends.

Should we next ask where or how someone can acquire the skill of making laws? Or should we say that, as in similar cases, statesmen are the people to learn from? After all, this skill was considered part of social science. Yet must we not admit that political science clearly differs from other sciences and skills? In all other cases, the people who teach a skill also practice it, as doctors and painters do. But the Sophists claim to teach statesmanship, though not one of them practices it. Its practice is left to those actually engaged in politics. These politicians might well be thought to work through some special knack and practical experience alone, rather than intellectual reasoning. For they neither write nor speak about these matters. Yet doing so might bring them more credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly. Nor have they made statesmen of their own sons or their friends.

One can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could, seeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to their communities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or their dearest friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.

We can hardly doubt that they would have done so if they could. For they could have left their communities no more precious legacy. Nor would they have preferred any other ability for themselves or their dearest friends.

Practice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition; merely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made Statesmen of them, and therefore we may conclude that they who would acquire a knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.

Practice, however, seems to contribute a great deal to gaining this knowledge. Simply being surrounded by politics would never have made them statesmen. So we may conclude that those who want to understand statesmanship must also have practical experience.

But of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long way off from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its nature and objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the same footing with Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they have conceived it to be “an easy matter to legislate by simply collecting such laws as are famous because of course one could select the best,” as though the selection were not a matter of skill, and the judging aright a very great matter, as in Music: for they alone, who have practical knowledge of a thing, can judge the performances rightly or understand with what means and in what way they are accomplished, and what harmonises with what: the unlearned must be content with being able to discover whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.

But the Sophists who claim to teach it are clearly far from doing so. In fact, they know nothing at all about its nature and aims. If they did, they would never have ranked it alongside Rhetoric, or even below it. Nor would they have thought it “easy to make laws simply by collecting well-known laws, because of course one could choose the best.” They speak as though choosing required no skill, and judging correctly were not a very demanding task, as in Music. For only those with practical knowledge of a subject can judge performances correctly. Only those people can understand the means and methods used, and what works in harmony with what. Those without such knowledge must be content with recognizing whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.

Now laws may be called the performances or tangible results of Political Science; how then can a man acquire from these the faculty of Legislation, or choose the best? we do not see men made physicians by compilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour to give not only the cases but also how they may be cured, and the proper treatment in each case, dividing the various bodily habits. Well, these are thought to be useful to professional men, but to the unprofessional useless. In like manner it may be that collections of laws and Constitutions would be exceedingly useful to such as are able to speculate on them, and judge what is well, and what ill, and what kind of things fit in with what others: but they who without this qualification should go through such matters cannot have right judgment, unless they have it by instinct, though they may become more intelligent in such matters.

Laws may be called the practical achievements or tangible results of Political Science. How, then, can someone learn the art of making laws from existing laws, or choose the best laws? We do not see people becoming doctors by reading collections of medical writings. Yet these works try to describe not only cases but also their cures and the proper treatment for each. They also distinguish between different bodily conditions. Such works are considered useful to medical professionals but useless to people without medical training. Similarly, collections of laws and Constitutions may be extremely useful to people able to study and assess them. Such people can judge what is good, what is bad, and what kinds of arrangements fit together. But people who study these collections without that ability cannot judge correctly, unless they have an instinct for sound judgment. They may, however, gain a better understanding of these matters.

Since then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated the subject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigate it ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what we may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.

Our predecessors have left the subject of legislation unexplored, so perhaps we should examine it ourselves. In fact, we should examine the whole subject of government. Our aim is to complete, as far as we can, what we may call human philosophy.

First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there may be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities we have collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy Communities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some are well and others ill managed, for after such enquiry, we shall be the better able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of Constitution is best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and what laws and customs.

First, let us try to gather whatever useful insights there may be in the writings of our predecessors. Next, let us examine the accounts of constitutions we have collected. We should identify what preserves or destroys communities, and what preserves or destroys particular constitutions. We should also ask why some communities are well governed and others poorly governed. After this inquiry, we will be better able to form a clear overall view of the best kind of constitution. We will also better understand what regulations, laws, and customs are best for each constitution.