Why I Am So Wise

The happiness of my existence, its unique character perhaps, consists in its fatefulness: to speak in a riddle, as my own father I am already dead, as my own mother I still live and grow old. This double origin, taken as it were from the highest and lowest rungs of the ladder of life, at once a decadent and a beginning, this, if anything, explains that neutrality, that freedom from partisanship in regard to the general problem of existence, which perhaps distinguishes me. To the first indications of ascending or of descending life my nostrils are more sensitive than those of any man that has yet lived. In this domain I am a master to my backbone—I know both sides, for I am both sides. My father died in his six-and-thirtieth year: he was delicate, lovable, and morbid, like one who is preordained to pay simply a flying visit—a gracious reminder of life rather than life itself. In the same year that his life declined mine also declined: in my six-and-thirtieth year I reached the lowest point in my vitality,—I still lived, but my eyes could distinguish nothing that lay three paces away from me. At that time—it was the year 1879—I resigned my professorship at Bâle, lived through the summer like a shadow in St. Moritz, and spent the following winter, the most sunless of my life, like a shadow in Naumburg. This was my lowest ebb. During this period I wrote The Wanderer and His Shadow. Without a doubt I was conversant with shadows then. The winter that followed, my first winter in Genoa, brought forth that sweetness and spirituality which is almost inseparable from extreme poverty of blood and muscle, in the shape of The Dawn of Day, The perfect lucidity and cheerfulness, the intellectual exuberance even, that this work reflects, coincides, in my case, not only with the most profound physiological weakness, but also with an excess of suffering. In the midst of the agony of a headache which lasted three days, accompanied by violent nausea, I was possessed of most singular dialectical clearness, and in absolutely cold blood I then thought out things, for which, in my more healthy moments, I am not enough of a climber, not sufficiently subtle, not sufficiently cold. My readers perhaps know to what extent I consider dialectic a symptom of decadence, as, for instance, in the most famous of all cases—the case of Socrates. All the morbid disturbances of the intellect, even that semi-stupor which accompanies fever, have, unto this day, remained completely unknown to me; and for my first information concerning their nature and frequency, I was obliged to have recourse to the learned works which have been compiled on the subject. My circulation is slow. No one has ever been able to detect fever in me. A doctor who treated me for some time as a nerve patient finally declared: "No! there is nothing wrong with your nerves, it is simply I who am nervous." It has been absolutely impossible to ascertain any local degeneration in me, nor any organic stomach trouble, however much I may have suffered from profound weakness of the gastric system as the result of general exhaustion. Even my eye trouble, which sometimes approached so parlously near to blindness, was only an effect and not a cause; for, whenever my general vital condition improved, my power of vision also increased. Having admitted all this, do I need to say that I am experienced in questions of decadence? I know them inside and out. Even that filigree art of prehension and comprehension in general, that feeling for delicate shades of difference, that psychology of "seeing through brick walls," and whatever else I may be able to do, was first learnt then, and is the specific gift of that period during which everything in me was subtilised,—observation itself, together with all the organs of observation. To look upon healthier concepts and values from the standpoint of the sick, and conversely to look down upon the secret work of the instincts of decadence from the standpoint of him who is laden and self-reliant with the richness of life—this has been my longest exercise, my principal experience. If in anything at all, it was in this that I became a master. To-day my hand knows the trick, I now have the knack of reversing perspectives: the first reason perhaps why a Transvaluation of all Values has been possible to me alone.

The happiness of my existence, and perhaps its unique character, lies in its fatefulness. To put it as a riddle: as my own father I am already dead, and as my own mother I still live and grow old. This double origin comes, as it were, from both the highest and the lowest rungs on the ladder of life. I am at once a decadent and a beginning. This, if anything, explains the neutrality that perhaps sets me apart: my freedom from taking sides on the general problem of existence. My nostrils are more sensitive to the first signs of ascending or descending life than those of any man who has ever lived. In this field I am a master to my very backbone. I know both sides, because I am both sides. My father died in his thirty-sixth year. He was delicate, lovable, and sickly, like someone destined to pay only a brief visit, a gracious reminder of life rather than life itself. My life declined at the same age his did. In my thirty-sixth year I reached the lowest point of my vitality. I was still alive, but my eyes could make out nothing more than three paces away. At that time (it was the year 1879) I resigned my professorship at Bâle. I lived through the summer like a shadow in St. Moritz. I spent the following winter, the most sunless of my life, like a shadow in Naumburg. This was my lowest ebb. During this period I wrote The Wanderer and His Shadow. Without a doubt, I was well acquainted with shadows then. The next winter, my first in Genoa, brought forth the sweetness and spirituality that are almost inseparable from an extreme poverty of blood and muscle. It took the shape of The Dawn of Day. That work reflects perfect clarity and cheerfulness, even intellectual exuberance. In my case, these came not only with the deepest physiological weakness, but also with an excess of suffering. In the middle of an agonizing headache that lasted three days, with violent nausea, I had a most remarkable dialectical clarity. In absolutely cold blood, I then thought out things that, in my healthier moments, I am not climber enough, subtle enough, or cold enough to reach. My readers may know how far I consider dialectic a symptom of decadence, as in the most famous case of all: the case of Socrates. To this day, I have never known any of the sick disturbances of the intellect, not even the half-stupor that comes with fever. I first learned about their nature and frequency from the learned works written on the subject. My circulation is slow. No one has ever been able to detect fever in me. A doctor who treated me for some time as a nerve patient finally declared: "No! There is nothing wrong with your nerves. It is only I who am nervous." No one has ever been able to find any local degeneration in me, or any organic disease of the stomach. That holds however much my digestive system may have suffered from a deep weakness caused by general exhaustion. Even my eye trouble, which at times came dangerously close to blindness, was only an effect and not a cause. I know this because whenever my general vitality improved, my eyesight improved too. Having admitted all this, do I need to say that I am experienced in questions of decadence? I know them inside and out. It was then that I first learned that fine filigree art of grasping and understanding in general, that feel for delicate shades of difference, that psychology of "seeing through brick walls," and whatever else I can do. All of it is the special gift of that period, when everything in me grew more refined: observation itself, and all the organs of observation. My longest practice, my main experience, has been this. I looked at healthier concepts and values from the standpoint of the sick. And in reverse, I looked down on the secret work of the instincts of decadence from the standpoint of someone rich in life and sure of himself. If I became a master of anything at all, it was this. Today my hand knows the trick. I now have the knack of reversing perspectives. This is perhaps the first reason why a Transvaluation of all Values has been possible for me alone.

For, apart from the fact that I am a decadent, I am also the reverse of such a creature. Among other things my proof of this is, that I always instinctively select the proper remedy when my spiritual or bodily health is low; whereas the decadent, as such, invariably chooses those remedies which are bad for him. As a whole I was sound, but in certain details I was a decadent. That energy with which I sentenced myself to absolute solitude, and to a severance from all those conditions in life to which I had grown accustomed; my discipline of myself, and my refusal to allow myself to be pampered, to be tended hand and foot, and to be doctored—all this betrays the absolute certainty of my instincts respecting what at that time was most needful to me. I placed myself in my own hands, I restored myself to health: the first condition of success in such an undertaking, as every physiologist will admit, is that at bottom a man should be sound. An intrinsically morbid nature cannot become healthy. On the other hand, to an intrinsically sound nature, illness may even constitute a powerful stimulus to life, to a surplus of life. It is in this light that I now regard the long period of illness that I endured: it seemed as if I had discovered life afresh, my own self included. I tasted all good things and even trifles in a way in which it was not easy for others to taste them—out of my Will to Health and to Life I made my philosophy.... For this should be thoroughly understood; it was during those years in which my vitality reached its lowest point that I ceased from being a pessimist: the instinct of self-recovery forbade my holding to a philosophy of poverty and desperation. Now, by what signs are Nature's lucky strokes recognised among men? They are recognised by the fact that any such lucky stroke gladdens our senses; that he is carved from one integral block, which is hard, sweet, and fragrant as well. He enjoys that only which is good for him; his pleasure, his desire, ceases when the limits of that which is good for him are overstepped. He divines remedies for injuries; he knows how to turn serious accidents to his own advantage; that which does not kill him makes him stronger. He instinctively gathers his material from all he sees, hears, and experiences. He is a selective principle; he rejects much. He is always in his own company, whether his intercourse be with books, with men, or with natural scenery; he honours the things he chooses, the things he acknowledges, the things he trusts. He reacts slowly to all kinds of stimuli, with that tardiness which long caution and deliberate pride have bred in him—he tests the approaching stimulus; he would not dream of meeting it half-way. He believes neither in "ill-luck" nor "guilt"; he can digest himself and others; he knows how to forget—he is strong enough to make everything turn to his own advantage.

For although I am a decadent, I am also the opposite. Among other things, I can prove this by how I respond when my mental or physical health is poor. I always instinctively choose the right remedy. A decadent, by contrast, always chooses remedies that are bad for him. On the whole, I was healthy, though in certain respects I was a decadent. I energetically condemned myself to absolute solitude and cut myself off from all the conditions of life I had grown used to. I disciplined myself and refused to be pampered, waited on hand and foot, or treated by doctors. All this shows how certain my instincts were about what I needed most at the time. I took myself into my own hands and restored myself to health. As every physiologist will admit, the first condition for succeeding in such an undertaking is to be healthy at bottom. A fundamentally sick nature cannot become healthy. But for a fundamentally healthy nature, illness may even be a powerful stimulus to life, to an abundance of life. That is how I now see the long period of illness I endured. It seemed as though I had discovered life anew, including myself. I savored all good things, even small ones, in a way others could not easily match. I made my philosophy out of my Will to Health and to Life.... This must be clearly understood: I stopped being a pessimist during the years when my vitality was at its lowest. My instinct to recover would not let me cling to a philosophy of poverty and desperation. Now, how do we recognize Nature's lucky strokes among human beings? We recognize them because such a person delights our senses. He is carved from a single block that is hard, sweet, and fragrant. He enjoys only what is good for him. His pleasure and desire stop when he goes beyond the limits of what is good for him. He senses remedies for injuries and knows how to turn serious accidents to his advantage. What does not kill him makes him stronger. He instinctively gathers material from everything he sees, hears, and experiences. He is a selective principle and rejects much. He remains in his own company, whether he is with books, people, or natural scenery. He honors what he chooses, acknowledges, and trusts. He responds slowly to all kinds of stimuli. Long caution and deliberate pride have taught him this slowness. He tests each stimulus as it approaches and would never think of meeting it halfway. He believes neither in "ill-luck" nor "guilt". He can digest himself and others, and he knows how to forget. He is strong enough to turn everything to his advantage.

Lo then! I am the very reverse of a decadent, for he whom I have just described is none other than myself.

Look! I am the very opposite of a decadent, because the person I have just described is none other than myself.

This double thread of experiences, this means of access to two worlds that seem so far asunder, finds in every detail its counterpart in my own nature—I am my own complement: I have a "second" sight, as well as a first. And perhaps I also have a third sight. By the very nature of my origin I was allowed an outlook beyond all merely local, merely national and limited horizons; it required no effort on my part to be a "good European." On the other hand, I am perhaps more German than modern Germans—mere Imperial Germans—can hope to be,—I, the last anti-political German. Be this as it may, my ancestors were Polish noblemen: it is owing to them that I have so much race instinct in my blood—who knows? perhaps even the liberum veto¹ When I think of the number of times in my travels that I have been accosted as a Pole, even by Poles themselves, and how seldom I have been taken for a German, it seems to me as if I belonged to those only who have a sprinkling of German in them. But my mother, Franziska Oehler, is at any rate something very German; as is also my paternal grandmother, Erdmuthe Krause. The latter spent the whole of her youth in good old Weimar, not without coming into contact with Goethe's circle. Her brother, Krause, the Professor of Theology in Königsberg, was called to the post of General Superintendent at Weimar after Herder's death. It is not unlikely that her mother, my great grandmother, is mentioned in young Goethe's diary under the name of "Muthgen." She married twice, and her second husband was Superintendent Nietzsche of Eilenburg. In 1813, the year of the great war, when Napoleon with his general staff entered Eilenburg on the 10th of October, she gave birth to a son. As a daughter of Saxony she was a great admirer of Napoleon, and maybe I am so still. My father, born in 1813, died in 1849. Previous to taking over the pastorship of the parish of Röcken, not far from Lützen, he lived for some years at the Castle of Altenburg, where he had charge of the education of the four princesses. His pupils are the Queen of Hanover, the Grand-Duchess Constantine, the Grand-Duchess of Oldenburg, and the Princess Theresa of Saxe-Altenburg. He was full of loyal respect for the Prussian King, Frederick William the Fourth, from whom he obtained his living at Röcken; the events of 1848 saddened him extremely. As I was born on the 15 th of October, the birthday of the king above mentioned, I naturally received the Hohenzollern names of Frederick William. There was at all events one advantage in the choice of this day: my birthday throughout the whole of my childhood was a day of public rejoicing. I regard it as a great privilege to have had such a father: it even seems to me that this embraces all that I can claim in the matter of privileges—life, the great yea to life, excepted. What I owe to him above all is this, that I do not need any special intention, but merely a little patience, in order involuntarily to enter a world of higher and more delicate things. There I am at home, there alone does my inmost passion become free. The fact that I had to pay for this privilege almost with my life, certainly does not make it a bad bargain. In order to understand even a little of my Zarathustra, perhaps a man must be situated and constituted very much as I am myself—with one foot beyond the realm of the living.

This double thread of experience gives me access to two worlds that seem far apart. Every detail of it has a counterpart in my own nature. I am my own complement: I have "second" sight as well as ordinary sight. And perhaps I have a third sight too. Because of my origins, I could see beyond all merely local, merely national, and limited horizons. It took no effort for me to be a "good European." On the other hand, I am perhaps more German than modern Germans, mere Imperial Germans, can hope to be. I am the last anti-political German. In any case, my ancestors were Polish noblemen. I owe to them the strong instinct of race in my blood. Who knows? Perhaps I owe them even the liberum veto¹. On my travels, people have often taken me for a Pole, even Poles themselves, and rarely for a German. When I think of that, I feel as if I belonged only to those with a sprinkling of German blood. But my mother, Franziska Oehler, is at any rate thoroughly German, as was my paternal grandmother, Erdmuthe Krause. My grandmother spent her entire youth in good old Weimar, where she had some contact with Goethe's circle. Her brother Krause was Professor of Theology in Königsberg. After Herder's death, he was called to the post of General Superintendent at Weimar. Her mother, my great-grandmother, may well be mentioned in young Goethe's diary under the name "Muthgen." She married twice. Her second husband was Superintendent Nietzsche of Eilenburg. In 1813, the year of the great war, she gave birth to a son. That year, on October 10, Napoleon entered Eilenburg with his general staff. As a daughter of Saxony, she greatly admired Napoleon, and perhaps I still do too. My father was born in 1813 and died in 1849. Before becoming pastor of the parish of Röcken, not far from Lützen, he lived for several years at the Castle of Altenburg. There he was responsible for educating the four princesses. His pupils are the Queen of Hanover, the Grand-Duchess Constantine, the Grand-Duchess of Oldenburg, and the Princess Theresa of Saxe-Altenburg. He felt loyal respect for the Prussian King, Frederick William the Fourth, who gave him his position at Röcken. The events of 1848 saddened him deeply. I was born on October 15, the king's birthday, so naturally I received the Hohenzollern names Frederick William. Being born on that day had at least one advantage. Throughout my childhood, my birthday was a day of public rejoicing. I consider it a great privilege to have had such a father. Indeed, it seems to me that this includes all the privileges I can claim, except for life and the great yes to life. Above all, I owe him the ability to enter a world of higher and more delicate things without trying. I need only a little patience, and I enter it involuntarily. There I am at home. There alone my deepest passion is set free. The fact that I paid for this privilege almost with my life certainly does not make it a bad bargain. To understand even a little of my Zarathustra, perhaps a person must be much like me in circumstances and nature, with one foot beyond the realm of the living.

I have never understood the art of arousing ill-feeling against myself,—this is also something for which I have to thank my incomparable father,—even when it seemed to me highly desirable to do so. However un-Christian it may seem, I do not even bear any ill-feeling towards myself. Turn my life about as you may, you will find but seldom—perhaps indeed only once—any trace of some one's having shown me ill-will. You might perhaps discover, however, too many traces of goodwill.... My experiences even with those on whom every other man has burnt his fingers, speak without exception in their favour; I tame every bear, I can make even clowns behave decently. During the seven years in which I taught Greek to the sixth form of the College at Bâle, I never had occasion to administer a punishment; the laziest youths were diligent in my class. The unexpected has always found me equal to it; I must be unprepared in order to keep my self-command. Whatever the instrument was, even if it were as out of tune as the instrument "man" can possibly be,—it was only when I was ill that I could not succeed in making it express something that was worth hearing. And how often have I not been told by the "instruments" themselves, that they had never before heard their voices express such beautiful things.... This was said to me most delightfully perhaps by that young fellow Heinrich von Stein, who died at such an unpardonably early age, and who, after having considerately asked leave to do so, once appeared in Sils-Maria for a three days' sojourn, telling everybody there that it was not for the Engadine that he had come. This excellent person, who with all the impetuous simplicity of a young Prussian nobleman, had waded deep into the swamp of Wagnerism (and into that of Dübringism² into the bargain!), seemed almost transformed during these three days by a hurricane of freedom, like one who has been suddenly raised to his full height and given wings. Again and again I said to him that this was all owing to the splendid air; everybody felt the same,—one could not stand 6000 feet above Bayreuth for nothing,—but he would not believe me.... Be this as it may, if I have been the victim of many a small or even great offence, it was not "will," and least of all ill-will that actuated the offenders; but rather, as I have already suggested, it was goodwill, the cause of no small amount of mischief in f my life, about which I had to complain. My experience gave me a right to feel suspicious in regard to all so-called "unselfish" instincts, in regard to the whole of "neighbourly love" which is ever ready and waiting with deeds or with advice. To me it seems that these instincts are a sign of weakness, they are an example of the inability to withstand a stimulus—it is only among decadents that this pity is called a virtue. What I reproach the pitiful with is, that they are too ready to forget shame, reverence, and the delicacy of feeling which knows how to keep at a distance; they do not remember that this gushing pity stinks of the mob, and that it is next of kin to bad manners—that pitiful hands may be thrust with results fatally destructive into a great destiny, into a lonely and wounded retirement, and into the privileges with which great guilt endows one. The overcoming of pity I reckon among the noble virtues; In the "Temptation of Zarathustra" I have imagined a case, in which a great cry of distress reaches his ears, in which pity swoops down upon him like a last sin, and would make him break faith with himself. To remain one's own master in such circumstances, to keep the sublimity of one's mission pure in such cases,—pure from the many ignoble and more short-sighted impulses which come into play in so-called unselfish actions,—this is the rub, the last test perhaps which a Zarathustra has to undergo—the actual proof of his power.

I have never understood how to make people dislike me. This, too, is something I owe to my incomparable father. I have never understood it even when I thought it highly desirable. Un-Christian as it may seem, I do not even dislike myself. Examine my life however you like, and you will rarely find any trace of ill will toward me. Perhaps you will find it only once. You might, however, find too many traces of goodwill.... Even my experiences with people who have burned everyone else's fingers speak, without exception, in their favor. I tame every bear. I can make even clowns behave decently. For seven years, I taught Greek to the sixth form at the College in Bâle. During that time, I never had to punish anyone. The laziest students worked hard in my class. I have always been equal to the unexpected. I must be unprepared to keep my self-command. Whatever the instrument, I could make it express something worth hearing. This was true even if it was as out of tune as the instrument "man" can possibly be. Only when I was ill did I fail. And how often the "instruments" themselves have told me that they had never heard their voices express such beautiful things before.... Perhaps the most delightful instance was the young Heinrich von Stein, who died unpardonably early. After considerately asking permission, he once came to Sils-Maria for three days. He told everyone there that he had not come for the Engadine. With all the impetuous simplicity of a young Prussian nobleman, this excellent person had plunged deep into the swamp of Wagnerism. He had plunged into the swamp of Dübringism² as well! During those three days, he seemed almost transformed by a hurricane of freedom. He seemed suddenly raised to his full height and given wings. Again and again I told him that it was all due to the splendid air. Everyone felt the same, I said. After all, one could not stand 6000 feet above Bayreuth for nothing. But he would not believe me.... Be that as it may, I have been the victim of many small and even great offenses. Yet the offenders were not moved by "will", and least of all by ill will. Rather, as I have already suggested, it was goodwill that caused no small amount of mischief in my life. That was what I had to complain about. My experience gave me reason to distrust all so-called "unselfish" instincts. It made me distrust the whole of "neighbourly love", always ready and waiting with help or advice. To me, these instincts seem a sign of weakness. They show an inability to resist a stimulus. Only among decadents is this pity called a virtue. What I hold against those who pity is their readiness to forget shame, reverence, and the delicacy that knows how to keep its distance. They forget that this gushing pity stinks of the mob and is closely related to bad manners. They forget that pitying hands may intrude with fatally destructive results. They may intrude on a great destiny, a lonely and wounded retreat, and the privileges that come with great guilt. I count the overcoming of pity among the noble virtues. In "Temptation of Zarathustra", I imagined a great cry of distress reaching his ears. Pity swoops down on him like a last sin and threatens to make him betray himself. In such circumstances, one must remain one's own master and keep the sublimity of one's mission pure. One must keep it free from the many ignoble, more short-sighted impulses at work in so-called unselfish actions. That is the challenge. It is perhaps the final test a Zarathustra must undergo, the actual proof of his power.

In yet another respect I am no more than my father over again, and as it were the continuation of his life after an all-too-early death. Like every man who has never been able to meet his equal, and unto whom the concept "retaliation" is just as incomprehensible as the notion of "equal rights," I have forbidden myself the use of any sort of measure of security or protection—and also, of course, of defence and "justification"—in all cases in which I have been made the victim either of trifling or even very great foolishness. My form of retaliation consists in this: as soon as possible to set a piece of cleverness at the heels of an act of stupidity; by this means perhaps it may still be possible to overtake it. To speak in a parable: I dispatch a pot of jam in order to get rid of a bitter experience.... Let anybody only give me offence, I shall "retaliate," he can be quite sure of that: before long I discover an opportunity of expressing my thanks to the "offender" (among other things even for the offence)—or of asking him for something, which can be more courteous even than giving. It also seems to me that the rudest word, the rudest letter, is more good-natured, more straightforward, than silence. Those—who keep silent are almost always lacking in subtlety and refinement of heart; silence is an objection, to swallow a grievance must necessarily produce a bad temper—it even upsets the stomach. All silent people are dyspeptic. You perceive that I should not like to see rudeness undervalued; it is by far the most humane form of contradiction, and, in the midst of modern effeminacy, it is one of our first virtues; If one is sufficiently rich for it, it may even be a joy to be wrong. If a god were to descend to this earth, he would have to do nothing but wrong—to take guilt not punishment, on one's shoulders, is the first proof of divinity.

In another way, too, I am simply my father all over again. It is as if his life continued in me after his much too early death. I am like any man who has never been able to meet his equal. For such a man, the idea of "retaliation" is just as incomprehensible as the idea of "equal rights." When I have been the victim of minor or even very great foolishness, I have forbidden myself all precautions and protections. Of course, I have also forbidden myself any defence or "justification." My form of retaliation is this: I follow an act of stupidity with a clever act as soon as possible. Perhaps that way I can still catch up with the stupidity. To put it as a parable: I send a pot of jam to get rid of a bitter experience.... Let anyone offend me, and he can be quite sure I shall "retaliate." Before long, I find a chance to thank the "offender," even for the offence, among other things. Or I find a chance to ask him for something, which can be even more courteous than giving. It also seems to me that the rudest word or letter is kinder and more straightforward than silence. Those who keep silent almost always lack subtlety and refinement of heart. Silence is an objection. Swallowing a grievance is bound to put you in a bad mood. It even upsets your stomach. All silent people suffer from indigestion. You can see that I would not like rudeness to be undervalued. It is by far the most humane way to disagree. In the midst of modern effeminacy, it is one of our foremost virtues. If one is rich enough for it, even being wrong can be a joy. If a god came down to this earth, he would have to do nothing but wrong. The first proof of divinity is to take guilt, not punishment, on one's shoulders.

Freedom from resentment and the understanding of the nature of resentment—who knows how very much after all I am indebted to my long illness for these two things? The problem is not exactly simple: a man must have experienced both through his strength and through his weakness, If illness and weakness are to be charged with anything at all, it is with the fact that when they prevail, the very instinct of recovery, which is the instinct of defence and of war in man, becomes decayed. He knows not how to get rid of anything, how to come to terms with anything, and how to cast anything behind him. Everything wounds him. People and things draw importunately near, all experiences strike deep, memory is a gathering wound. To be ill is a sort of resentment in itself. Against this resentment the invalid has only one great remedy—I call it Russian fatalism, that fatalism which is free from revolt, and with which the Russian soldier, to whom a campaign proves unbearable, ultimately lays himself down in the snow. To accept nothing more, to undertake nothing more, to absorb nothing more—to cease entirely from reacting.... The tremendous sagacity of this fatalism, which does not always imply merely the courage for death, but which in the most dangerous cases may actually constitute a self-preservative measure, amounts to a reduction of activity in the vital functions, the slackening down of which is like a sort of will to hibernate. A few steps farther in this direction we find the fakir, who will sleep for weeks in a tomb.... Owing to the fact that one would be used up too quickly if one reacted, one no longer reacts at all: this is the principle. And nothing on earth consumes a man more quickly than the passion of resentment. Mortification, morbid susceptibility, the inability to wreak revenge, the desire and thirst for revenge, the concoction of every sort of poison—this is surely the most injurious manner of reacting which could possibly be conceived by exhausted men. It involves a rapid wasting away of nervous energy, an abnormal increase of detrimental secretions, as, for instance, that of bile into the stomach. To the sick man resentment ought to be more strictly forbidden than anything else—it is his special danger: unfortunately, however, it is also his most natural propensity. This was fully grasped by that profound physiologist Buddha. His "religion," which it would be better to call a system of hygiene, in order to avoid confounding it with a creed so wretched as Christianity, depended for its effect upon the triumph over resentment: to make the soul free therefrom was considered the first step towards recovery. "Not through hostility is hostility put to flight; through friendship does hostility end": this stands at the beginning of Buddha's teaching—this is not a precept of morality, but of physiology. Resentment born of weakness is not more deleterious to anybody than it is to the weak man himself—conversely, in the case of that man whose nature is fundamentally a rich one, resentment is a superfluous feeling, a feeling to remain master of which is almost a proof of riches. Those of my readers who know the earnestness-with which my philosophy wages war against the feelings of revenge and rancour, even to the extent of attacking the doctrine of "free will" (my conflict with Christianity is only a particular instance of it), will understand why I wish to focus attention upon my own personal attitude and the certainty of my practical instincts precisely in this matter. In my moments of decadence I forbade myself the indulgence of the above feelings, because they were harmful; as soon as my life recovered enough riches and pride, however, I regarded them again as forbidden, but this time because they were beneath me. That "Russian fatalism" of which I have spoken manifested itself in me in such a way that for years I held tenaciously to almost insufferable conditions, places, habitations, and companions, once chance had placed them on my path—it was better than changing them, than feeling that they could be changed, than revolting against them.... He who stirred me from this fatalism, he who violently tried to shake me into consciousness, seemed to me then a mortal enemy—in point of fact, there was danger of death each time this was done. To regard one's self as a destiny, not to wish one's self "different"—this, in such circumstances, is sagacity, itself.

Freedom from resentment and an understanding of its nature: who knows how much I owe these two things to my long illness? The problem is not simple. A person must have experienced both through strength and through weakness. If illness and weakness can be blamed for anything, it is this: when they prevail, the very instinct for recovery decays. That is the human instinct for defense and war. A sick person does not know how to let go of anything, come to terms with anything, or put anything behind him. Everything wounds him. People and things press insistently upon him. Every experience cuts deep. Memory becomes a festering wound. Being ill is itself a kind of resentment. The sick person has only one great remedy against this resentment. I call it Russian fatalism. It is a fatalism without revolt. It is what finally makes a Russian soldier lie down in the snow when a campaign becomes unbearable. Accept nothing more, undertake nothing more, take in nothing more. Stop reacting altogether.... This fatalism is remarkably wise. It does not always mean merely having the courage to die. In the most dangerous cases, it may actually be a means of self-preservation. It reduces the activity of the vital functions, slowing them down through a kind of will to hibernate. A few steps further in this direction, we find the fakir, who sleeps for weeks in a tomb.... The principle is this: because reacting would use you up too quickly, you stop reacting altogether. Nothing on earth consumes a person more quickly than the passion of resentment. Humiliation, unhealthy sensitivity, the inability to take revenge, the desire and thirst for revenge, the brewing of every kind of poison. Surely these are the most harmful ways exhausted people could possibly react. They quickly drain nervous energy and cause an abnormal increase in harmful secretions, such as bile in the stomach. A sick person should be forbidden resentment more strictly than anything else. It is his particular danger. Unfortunately, it is also his most natural tendency. The profound physiologist Buddha fully understood this. His "religion" would be better called a system of hygiene. This would keep it from being confused with a creed as wretched as Christianity. It achieved its effect by overcoming resentment. Freeing the soul from resentment was considered the first step toward recovery. "Not through hostility is hostility put to flight; through friendship does hostility end": this stands at the beginning of Buddha's teaching. It is not a moral rule, but a physiological one. Resentment born of weakness harms no one more than the weak person himself. Conversely, for someone whose nature is fundamentally rich, resentment is a needless feeling. To remain master of it is almost a sign of riches. My readers know how earnestly my philosophy wages war against revenge and bitterness. It even attacks the doctrine of "free will" (my conflict with Christianity is only one instance of this war). Those readers will understand why I want to draw attention to my own attitude and the certainty of my practical instincts on this very matter. In my moments of decline, I forbade myself these feelings because they were harmful. But as soon as my life regained enough richness and pride, I again regarded them as forbidden. This time, it was because they were beneath me. The "Russian fatalism" I have described showed itself in me in a particular way. For years, I stubbornly held on to almost unbearable conditions, places, homes, and companions once chance had put them in my path. This was better than changing them, or feeling that they could be changed, or revolting against them.... Anyone who disturbed me in this fatalism, anyone who violently tried to shake me awake, seemed to me a mortal enemy. In fact, each attempt put me in danger of death. To regard oneself as a destiny and not wish to be "different": in such circumstances, that is wisdom itself.

War, on the other hand, is something different. At heart I am a warrior. Attacking belongs to my instincts. To be able to be an enemy, to be an enemy—maybe these things presuppose a strong nature; in any case all strong natures involve these things. Such natures need resistance, consequently they go in search of obstacles: the pathos of aggression belongs of necessity to strength as much as the feelings of revenge and of rancour belong to weakness. Woman, for instance, is revengeful; her weakness involves this passion, just as it involves her susceptibility in the presence of other people's suffering. The strength of the aggressor can be measured by the opposition which he needs; every increase of growth betrays itself by a seeking out of more formidable opponents—or problems: for a philosopher who is combative challenges even problems to a duel. The task is not to overcome opponents in general, but only those opponents against whom one has to summon all one's strength, one's skill, and one's swordsmanship—in fact, opponents who are one's equals.... To be one's enemy's equal—this is the first condition of an honourable duel. Where one despises, one cannot wage war. Where one commands, where one sees something beneath one, one ought not to wage war. My war tactics can be reduced to four principles A First, I attack only things that are triumphant—if necessary I wait until they become triumphant. Secondly, I attack only those things against which I find no allies, against which I stand alone—against which I compromise nobody but myself.... I have not yet taken one single step before the public eye, which did not compromise me: that is my criterion of a proper mode of action. Thirdly, I never make personal attacks—I use a personality merely as a magnifying-glass, by means of which I render a general, but elusive and scarcely noticeable evil, more apparent. In this way I attacked David Strauss, or rather the success given to a senile book by the cultured classes of Germany—by this means I caught German culture red-handed. In this way I attacked Wagner, or rather the falsity or mongrel instincts of our "culture" which confounds the super-refined with the strong, and the effete with the great. Fourthly, I attack only those things from which all personal differences are excluded, in which any such thing as a background of disagreeable experiences is lacking. On the contrary, attacking is to me a proof of goodwill and, in certain circumstances, of gratitude. By means of it, I do honour to a thing, I distinguish a thing; whether I associate my name with that of an institution or a person, by being against or for either, is all the same to me. If I wage war against Christianity, I feel justified in doing so, because in that quarter I have met with no fatal experiences and difficulties—the most earnest Christians have always been kindly disposed to me. I, personally, the most essential opponent of Christianity, am far from holding the individual responsible for what is the fatality of long ages.

War, on the other hand, is different. At heart, I am a warrior. Attacking is instinctive to me. To be able to be an enemy, to be an enemy, may require a strong nature. In any case, all strong natures have this ability. Such natures need resistance, so they go in search of obstacles. The passion for aggression belongs to strength as surely as revenge and resentment belong to weakness. Woman, for example, is vengeful. Her weakness brings with it this passion, just as it makes her sensitive to other people's suffering. An aggressor's strength can be measured by the opposition he needs. Every increase in strength shows itself in a search for more formidable opponents or problems. A combative philosopher challenges even problems to a duel. The task is not to overcome opponents in general. It is to overcome only those opponents who require all one's strength, skill, and swordsmanship. In fact, they must be one's equals.... Being equal to one's enemy is the first condition of an honorable duel. Where one feels contempt, one cannot wage war. Where one commands, where one sees something beneath one, one ought not to wage war. My tactics in war can be reduced to four principles. First, I attack only things that are triumphant. If necessary, I wait until they become triumphant. Second, I attack only things against which I can find no allies, things against which I stand alone. I compromise nobody but myself.... I have never taken a single step in public that did not compromise me. That is my criterion for acting properly. Third, I never make personal attacks. I use a person only as a magnifying glass. Through that person, I make a general evil more visible, an evil that is elusive and barely noticeable. This is how I attacked David Strauss. Or rather, I attacked the success the cultured classes of Germany gave to a senile book. In doing so, I caught German culture red-handed. This is how I attacked Wagner. Or rather, I attacked the falsity and mixed-breed instincts of our "culture". Our "culture" confuses the overly refined with the strong, and the worn-out with the great. Fourth, I attack only things that do not involve personal differences or a history of unpleasant experiences. On the contrary, for me, attacking is a sign of goodwill and, in certain circumstances, gratitude. By attacking something, I honor it and single it out. It makes no difference to me whether I link my name to an institution or a person by being against or for either. When I wage war against Christianity, I feel justified because I have encountered no disastrous experiences or difficulties there. The most earnest Christians have always treated me kindly. I am personally Christianity's most fundamental opponent. Yet I am far from holding any individual responsible for what is the fate of long ages.

May I be allowed to hazard a suggestion concerning one last trait in my character, which in my intercourse with other men has led me into some difficulties? I am gifted with a sense of cleanliness the keenness of which is phenomenal; so much so, that I can ascertain physiologically—that is to say, smell—the proximity, nay, the inmost core, the "entrails" of every human soul.... This sensitiveness of mine is furnished with psychological antennæ, wherewith I feel and grasp every secret: the quality of concealed filth lying at the base of many a human character which may be the inevitable outcome of base blood, and which education may have veneered, is revealed to me at the first glance. If my observation has been correct, such people, whom my sense of cleanliness rejects, also become conscious, on their part, of the cautiousness to which my loathing prompts me: and this does not make them any more fragrant.... In keeping with a custom which I have long observed,—pure habits and honesty towards myself are among the first conditions of my existence, I would die in unclean surroundings,—I swim, bathe, and splash about, as it were, incessantly in water, in any kind of perfectly transparent and shining element. That is why my relations with my fellows try my patience to no small extent; my humanity does not consist in the fact that I understand the feelings of my fellows, but that I can endure to understand.... My humanity is a perpetual process of self-mastery. But I need solitude—that is to say, recovery, return to myself, the breathing of free, crisp, bracing air.... The whole of my Zarathustra is a dithyramb in honour of solitude, or, if I have been understood, in honour of purity. Thank Heaven, it is not in honour of "pure foolery"!³ He who has an eye for colour will call him a diamond. The loathing of mankind, of the rabble, was always my greatest danger.... Would you hearken to the words spoken by Zarathustra concerning deliverance from loathing?

May I suggest one last trait of my character that has caused me difficulties with other people? I have a phenomenally keen sense of cleanliness. I can detect physiologically, that is, smell, the presence of every human soul. I can even smell its innermost core, its "entrails".... My sensitivity has psychological antennae, with which I feel and grasp every secret. At first glance, I can detect the nature of the hidden filth underlying many a human character. This filth may be the inevitable result of base blood, and education may have covered it over. If my observations are correct, the people my sense of cleanliness rejects also become aware of my disgust. They notice how cautious it makes me, and this does not make them any more fragrant.... I have long followed a certain practice. Clean habits and honesty with myself are among the first conditions of my existence. I would die in unclean surroundings. So I swim, bathe, and splash about constantly, as it were, in water, in any perfectly clear, shining element. That is why my relations with other people test my patience considerably. My humanity does not lie in understanding other people's feelings, but in being able to bear understanding them.... My humanity is a constant exercise in self-mastery. But I need solitude, meaning recovery, a return to myself, and the chance to breathe free, crisp, bracing air.... The whole of my Zarathustra is a dithyramb in honor of solitude, or, if I have been understood, in honor of purity. Thank Heaven, it is not in honor of "pure foolery"!³ Anyone with an eye for color will call him a diamond. My disgust with humanity, with the rabble, was always my greatest danger.... Would you listen to Zarathustra's words about deliverance from disgust?

"What forsooth hath come unto me? How did I deliver myself from loathing? Who hath made mine eye younger? How did I soar to the height, where there are no more rabble sitting about the well?

"What has happened to me? How did I free myself from loathing? Who made my eyes young again? How did I soar to the heights, where the rabble no longer sit around the well?

"Did my very loathing forge me wings and the strength to scent fountains afar off? Verily to the loftiest heights did I need to fly, to find once more the spring of joyfulness.

"Did my very disgust give me wings and the strength to smell distant springs? Indeed, I had to fly to the greatest heights to find the spring of joy again.

"Oh, I found it, my brethren! Up here, on the loftiest height, the spring of joyfulness gusheth forth for me. And there is a life at the well of which no rabble can drink with you.

“Oh, I found it, my brothers! Up here, on the highest peak, the spring of joy flows for me. And there is a life whose well no rabble can drink from with you.

"Almost too fiercely dost thou rush, for me, thou spring of joyfulness! And ofttimes dost thou empty the pitcher again in trying to fill it.

"You rush almost too fiercely for me, spring of joy! And often, in trying to fill the pitcher, you empty it again.

"And yet must I learn to draw near thee more humbly. Far too eagerly doth my heart jump to meet thee.

"And yet I must learn to approach you more humbly. My heart leaps to meet you far too eagerly.

"My heart, whereon my summer burneth, my short, hot, melancholy, over-blessed summer: how my summer heart yearneth for thy coolness!

"My heart, where my summer burns, my short, hot, melancholy, over-blessed summer: how my summer heart longs for your coolness!

"Farewell, the lingering affliction of my spring! Past is the wickedness of my snowflakes in June! Summer have I become entirely, and summer noontide!

"Goodbye, lingering pain of my spring! The wickedness of my June snowflakes is over! I have become entirely summer, summer at noon!

"A summer in the loftiest heights, with cold springs and blessed stillness: oh come, my friends, that the stillness may wax even more blessed!

"A summer on the highest peaks, with cold springs and blessed stillness. Oh, come, my friends, so that the stillness may become even more blessed!

"For this is our height and our home: too high and steep is our dwelling for all the unclean and their appetites.

"For this is our height and our home: our home is too high and steep for all the unclean and their appetites.

"Do but cast your pure eyes into the well of my joyfulness, my friends! How could it thus become muddy! It will laugh back at you with its purity.

"Just look with your pure eyes into the well of my joy, my friends! How could it become muddy this way? It will laugh back at you with its purity.

"On the tree called Future do we build our nest: eagles shall bring food in their beaks unto us lonely ones!

"We build our nest in the tree called Future: eagles will carry food in their beaks to us lonely ones!

"Verily not the food whereof the unclean might partake. They would think they ate fire and would burn their mouths!

"Truly, this is not food for the unclean. They would think they were eating fire and burn their mouths!

"Verily, no abodes for the unclean do we here hold in readiness! To their bodies our happiness would seem an ice-cavern, and to their spirits also!

"Truly, we have no homes ready here for the unclean! Our happiness would seem like an ice cave to their bodies and their spirits alike!

"And like strong winds will we live above them, neighbours to the eagles, companions of the snow, and playmates of the sun: thus do strong winds live.

"And like strong winds, we will live above them, neighbors to the eagles, companions of the snow, and playmates of the sun. That is how strong winds live.

"And like a wind shall I one day blow amidst them, and take away their soul's breath with my spirit: thus my future willeth it.

"And one day I will blow among them like a wind. With my spirit, I will take away the breath of their souls. This is what my future wills.

"Verily, a strong wind is Zarathustra to all low lands; and this is his counsel to his foes and to all those who spit and spew: 'Beware of spitting against the wind!'"

"Indeed, Zarathustra is a strong wind to all lowlands. And he has this advice for his enemies and for all who spit and spew: 'Beware of spitting against the wind!'"