And finally, as it is not enough, before commencing to rebuild the house in which we live, that it be pulled down, and materials and builders provided, or that we engage in the work ourselves, according to a plan which we have beforehand carefully drawn out, but as it is likewise necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may live commodiously during the operations, so that I might not remain irresolute in my actions, while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgement, and that I might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible felicity, I formed a provisory code of morals, composed of three or four maxims, with which I am desirous to make you acquainted.
Finally, before rebuilding the house we live in, tearing it down and arranging for materials and builders is not enough. Nor is doing the work ourselves according to a plan we have carefully prepared beforehand. We also need another house where we can live comfortably while the work is underway. In the same way, I needed to avoid indecision in my actions while reason required me to suspend judgment. I also wanted nothing to prevent me from living as happily as possible from then on. So I drew up a temporary moral code, consisting of three or four guiding principles. I would like to share these principles with you.
The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering firmly to the faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated from my childhood and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed from extremes, which should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most judicious of those among whom I might be living. For as I had from that time begun to hold my own opinions for nought because I wished to subject them all to examination, I was convinced that I could not do better than follow in the meantime the opinions of the most judicious; and although there are some perhaps among the Persians and Chinese as judicious as among ourselves, expediency seemed to dictate that I should regulate my practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom I should have to live; and it appeared to me that, in order to ascertain the real opinions of such, I ought rather to take cognizance of what they practised than of what they said, not only because, in the corruption of our manners, there are few disposed to speak exactly as they believe, but also because very many are not aware of what it is that they really believe; for, as the act of mind by which a thing is believed is different from that by which we know that we believe it, the one act is often found without the other. Also, amid many opinions held in equal repute, I chose always the most moderate, as much for the reason that these are always the most convenient for practice, and probably the best (for all excess is generally vicious), as that, in the event of my falling into error, I might be at less distance from the truth than if, having chosen one of the extremes, it should turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted. And I placed in the class of extremes especially all promises by which somewhat of our freedom is abridged; not that I disapproved of the laws which, to provide against the instability of men of feeble resolution, when what is sought to be accomplished is some good, permit engagements by vows and contracts binding the parties to persevere in it, or even, for the security of commerce, sanction similar engagements where the purpose sought to be realized is indifferent: but because I did not find anything on earth which was wholly superior to change, and because, for myself in particular, I hoped gradually to perfect my judgments, and not to suffer them to deteriorate, I would have deemed it a grave sin against good sense, if, for the reason that I approved of something at a particular time, I therefore bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent time, when perhaps it had ceased to be so, or I had ceased to esteem it such.
The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country. I would hold firmly to the faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been raised from childhood. In all other matters, I would guide my conduct by the most moderate opinions, those furthest from extremes. These would be opinions generally accepted in practice by the wisest people wherever I might be living. By then, I had begun to set no value on my own opinions, because I wanted to examine them all. So I was convinced that, meanwhile, I could do no better than follow the opinions of the wisest people. Perhaps some among the Persians and Chinese are as wise as those among us. Still, practical considerations seemed to require following the opinions of the people with whom I would have to live. To discover their real opinions, I thought I should observe their actions rather than their words. One reason was that our conduct is so corrupt that few people are willing to say exactly what they believe. Another was that very many people do not know what they really believe. Believing something is a different act of the mind from knowing that we believe it. The first act often occurs without the second. Also, among opinions held in equal regard, I always chose the most moderate. One reason was that moderate opinions are always the easiest to put into practice, and probably the best. For all excess is generally wrong. Another reason was that, if I made a mistake, I might be less far from the truth. I might otherwise choose one extreme only to discover that I should have chosen the other. I counted especially as extremes all promises that limit our freedom in some way. I did not disapprove of laws designed to guard against the unsteadiness of people with weak resolve. When some good is the goal, these laws allow vows and contracts that bind people to keep pursuing that good. Such laws even allow similar commitments for morally neutral purposes, to ensure security in trade. But I found nothing on earth entirely beyond change. And I hoped, in particular, that my own judgments would gradually improve rather than grow worse. So I would have considered it a serious offense against good sense to bind myself in the following way. Approving of something at one time should not bind me to regard it as good at a later time. By then, perhaps it would no longer be good, or I would no longer consider it good.
My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions, when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain; imitating in this the example of travelers who, when they have lost their way in a forest, ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one place, but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible, without changing their direction for slight reasons, although perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection; for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest. In the same way, since in action it frequently happens that no delay is permissible, it is very certain that, when it is not in our power to determine what is true, we ought to act according to what is most probable; and even although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion than in another, we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other, and afterwards consider it, in so far as it relates to practice, as no longer dubious, but manifestly true and certain, since the reason by which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these qualities. This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds as, destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice, allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best, which they abandon the next, as the opposite.
My second rule was to be as firm and decisive in my actions as I could. Once I adopted an opinion, however doubtful, I would follow it as steadily as if it were highly certain. In doing so, I followed the example of travelers who have lost their way in a forest. They should not wander from side to side, much less stay in one place. Instead, they should keep moving in the same direction, in as straight a line as possible. They should not change direction for slight reasons, although perhaps their first choice of direction was entirely random. For by proceeding this way, even if they do not reach their intended destination, they will eventually reach somewhere. That place will probably be better than the middle of a forest. In the same way, action often cannot wait. So when we cannot determine what is true, we should certainly act on what is most probable. Even if one opinion seems no more probable than another, we should still choose one. Afterward, for practical purposes, we should treat our chosen opinion as no longer doubtful, but clearly true and certain. For the reason that led us to make a choice is itself clear and certain. From then on, this principle freed me from all the regrets and pangs of remorse that usually trouble weak, indecisive minds. Such people have no clear, definite principle for making choices. They therefore adopt a course of action one day as the best, only to reject it the next as the opposite.
My third maxim was to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in general, accustom myself to the persuasion that, except our own thoughts, there is nothing absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our best in things external to us, all wherein we fail of success is to be held, as regards us, absolutely impossible: and this single principle seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future anything which I could not obtain, and thus render me contented; for since our will naturally seeks those objects alone which the understanding represents as in some way possible of attainment, it is plain, that if we consider all external goods as equally beyond our power, we shall no more regret the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth, when deprived of them without any fault of ours, than our not possessing the kingdoms of China or Mexico, and thus making, so to speak, a virtue of necessity, we shall no more desire health in disease, or freedom in imprisonment, than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds, or the wings of birds to fly with. But I confess there is need of prolonged discipline and frequently repeated meditation to accustom the mind to view all objects in this light; and I believe that in this chiefly consisted the secret of the power of such philosophers as in former times were enabled to rise superior to the influence of fortune, and, amid suffering and poverty, enjoy a happiness which their gods might have envied. For, occupied incessantly with the consideration of the limits prescribed to their power by nature, they became so entirely convinced that nothing was at their disposal except their own thoughts, that this conviction was of itself sufficient to prevent their entertaining any desire of other objects; and over their thoughts they acquired a sway so absolute, that they had some ground on this account for esteeming themselves more rich and more powerful, more free and more happy, than other men who, whatever be the favors heaped on them by nature and fortune, if destitute of this philosophy, can never command the realization of all their desires.
My third rule was always to try to master myself rather than fortune. I would change my desires rather than the way the world works. In general, I would train myself to believe that nothing is entirely within our power except our own thoughts. So, once we have done our best with things outside ourselves, any outcome we fail to achieve must count as entirely impossible for us. This principle alone seemed enough to keep me from desiring anything in the future that I could not obtain. In this way, it seemed enough to make me content. For our will naturally seeks only what our understanding presents as possible to obtain in some way. Clearly, then, we should regard all external goods as equally beyond our power. If we do, we will not regret losing goods that seem ours by birth, through no fault of our own. We will regret their absence no more than we regret not possessing the kingdoms of China or Mexico. By thus making a virtue of necessity, so to speak, we will no longer desire health when sick or freedom when imprisoned. We will desire them no more than we now desire bodies as indestructible as diamonds, or birds’ wings for flying. But I admit that training the mind to see everything this way requires long practice and frequent reflection. I believe this was the chief secret of the strength of certain philosophers in earlier times. They were able to rise above fortune’s influence. Even amid suffering and poverty, they enjoyed a happiness their gods might have envied. For they constantly considered the limits nature had placed on their power. They became entirely convinced that nothing was under their control except their own thoughts. This conviction alone was enough to keep them from desiring anything else. And they gained such complete control over their thoughts that they had some reason to consider themselves richer and more powerful than others. They also had some reason to consider themselves freer and happier. For without this philosophy, other people can never ensure that all their desires are fulfilled, whatever advantages nature and fortune give them.
In fine, to conclude this code of morals, I thought of reviewing the different occupations of men in this life, with the view of making choice of the best. And, without wishing to offer any remarks on the employments of others, I may state that it was my conviction that I could not do better than continue in that in which I was engaged, viz., in devoting my whole life to the culture of my reason, and in making the greatest progress I was able in the knowledge of truth, on the principles of the method which I had prescribed to myself. This method, from the time I had begun to apply it, had been to me the source of satisfaction so intense as to lead me to, believe that more perfect or more innocent could not be enjoyed in this life; and as by its means I daily discovered truths that appeared to me of some importance, and of which other men were generally ignorant, the gratification thence arising so occupied my mind that I was wholly indifferent to every other object. Besides, the three preceding maxims were founded singly on the design of continuing the work of self-instruction. For since God has endowed each of us with some light of reason by which to distinguish truth from error, I could not have believed that I ought for a single moment to rest satisfied with the opinions of another, unless I had resolved to exercise my own judgment in examining these whenever I should be duly qualified for the task. Nor could I have proceeded on such opinions without scruple, had I supposed that I should thereby forfeit any advantage for attaining still more accurate, should such exist. And, in fine, I could not have restrained my desires, nor remained satisfied had I not followed a path in which I thought myself certain of attaining all the knowledge to the acquisition of which I was competent, as well as the largest amount of what is truly good which I could ever hope to secure Inasmuch as we neither seek nor shun any object except in so far as our understanding represents it as good or bad, all that is necessary to right action is right judgment, and to the best action the most correct judgment, that is, to the acquisition of all the virtues with all else that is truly valuable and within our reach; and the assurance of such an acquisition cannot fail to render us contented.
Finally, to complete this moral code, I considered the different occupations people pursue in life, hoping to choose the best. I had no wish to comment on other people’s work. But I was convinced that I could do no better than continue the work I had already begun. I would devote my whole life to developing my reason and advancing as far as possible in knowing the truth. I would follow the principles of the method I had set for myself. From the time I began using this method, it had given me intense satisfaction. I came to believe that no more complete or innocent satisfaction could be enjoyed in this life. Through this method, I discovered truths every day that seemed important to me and were generally unknown to others. The pleasure of these discoveries so absorbed my mind that I was entirely indifferent to everything else. Besides, the three preceding maxims rested solely on my plan to continue educating myself. God has given each of us some light of reason to distinguish truth from error. So I could not have thought I should accept another person’s opinions, even for a moment, without one firm resolve. I had to resolve to examine those opinions with my own judgment whenever I became properly qualified to do so. Nor could I have acted on those opinions without misgivings if doing so meant losing any opportunity for greater accuracy. That applies if more accurate opinions existed. Finally, I could not have controlled my desires or remained satisfied without following a path I believed offered certain rewards. I believed this path would bring me all the knowledge I was capable of gaining. I also believed it would bring me the greatest amount of true good I could ever hope to obtain. We seek or avoid anything only insofar as our understanding presents it as good or bad. Therefore, sound judgment is all we need to act rightly, and the soundest judgment is all we need to act best. Acting best means acquiring all the virtues, along with everything else truly valuable and within our reach. The assurance that we can acquire all these things cannot fail to make us content.
Having thus provided myself with these maxims, and having placed them in reserve along with the truths of faith, which have ever occupied the first place in my belief, I came to the conclusion that I might with freedom set about ridding myself of what remained of my opinions. And, inasmuch as I hoped to be better able successfully to accomplish this work by holding intercourse with mankind, than by remaining longer shut up in the retirement where these thoughts had occurred to me, I betook me again to traveling before the winter was well ended. And, during the nine subsequent years, I did nothing but roam from one place to another, desirous of being a spectator rather than an actor in the plays exhibited on the theater of the world; and, as I made it my business in each matter to reflect particularly upon what might fairly be doubted and prove a source of error, I gradually rooted out from my mind all the errors which had hitherto crept into it. Not that in this I imitated the sceptics who doubt only that they may doubt, and seek nothing beyond uncertainty itself; for, on the contrary, my design was singly to find ground of assurance, and cast aside the loose earth and sand, that I might reach the rock or the clay. In this, as appears to me, I was successful enough; for, since I endeavored to discover the falsehood or incertitude of the propositions I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and certain reasonings, I met with nothing so doubtful as not to yield some conclusion of adequate certainty, although this were merely the inference, that the matter in question contained nothing certain. And, just as in pulling down an old house, we usually reserve the ruins to contribute towards the erection, so, in destroying such of my opinions as I judged to be Ill-founded, I made a variety of observations and acquired an amount of experience of which I availed myself in the establishment of more certain. And further, I continued to exercise myself in the method I had prescribed; for, besides taking care in general to conduct all my thoughts according to its rules, I reserved some hours from time to time which I expressly devoted to the employment of the method in the solution of mathematical difficulties, or even in the solution likewise of some questions belonging to other sciences, but which, by my having detached them from such principles of these sciences as were of inadequate certainty, were rendered almost mathematical: the truth of this will be manifest from the numerous examples contained in this volume. And thus, without in appearance living otherwise than those who, with no other occupation than that of spending their lives agreeably and innocently, study to sever pleasure from vice, and who, that they may enjoy their leisure without ennui, have recourse to such pursuits as are honorable, I was nevertheless prosecuting my design, and making greater progress in the knowledge of truth, than I might, perhaps, have made had I been engaged in the perusal of books merely, or in holding converse with men of letters.
I had now equipped myself with these principles and set them aside alongside the truths of faith. Those truths had always held first place in my beliefs. I concluded that I could freely begin clearing away the rest of my opinions. I hoped to do this more successfully by mixing with people than by remaining in seclusion. So, before winter had fully ended, I left the retreat where these thoughts had come to me and resumed traveling. For the next nine years, I did nothing but roam from place to place. I wanted to watch the plays performed on the world’s stage rather than take part in them. In every matter, I made a point of considering what could reasonably be doubted and might lead to error. In this way, I gradually rooted out all the errors that had crept into my mind. I was not imitating the skeptics who doubt only for the sake of doubting and seek nothing beyond uncertainty itself. On the contrary, my sole aim was to find firm ground for certainty. I wanted to cast aside the loose earth and sand so that I could reach rock or clay. In this effort, I believe I was fairly successful. I tried to uncover falsehood or uncertainty in the claims I examined through clear, certain reasoning, not weak guesses. Nothing I encountered was so doubtful that it failed to yield a sufficiently certain conclusion. Sometimes, however, the conclusion was merely that the matter contained nothing certain. When we pull down an old house, we usually save the materials to help build a new one. Likewise, while dismantling opinions I judged poorly founded, I gathered observations and experience that helped me establish more certain opinions. I also continued to practice the method I had set out for myself. Besides taking care to guide all my thoughts by its rules, I occasionally set aside hours specifically to apply it. I used the method to solve mathematical problems and even some questions from other sciences. I separated those questions from the principles of those sciences that lacked sufficient certainty, making the questions almost mathematical. The many examples in this volume will make this clear. Outwardly, then, I lived like people whose only occupation is to spend their lives pleasantly and innocently. Such people try to separate pleasure from vice. To enjoy their leisure without boredom, they turn to honorable pursuits. Yet I was still pursuing my aim and making progress in knowing the truth. Perhaps I made greater progress than I would have by merely reading books or talking with scholars.
These nine years passed away, however, before I had come to any determinate judgment respecting the difficulties which form matter of dispute among the learned, or had commenced to seek the principles of any philosophy more certain than the vulgar. And the examples of many men of the highest genius, who had, in former times, engaged in this inquiry, but, as appeared to me, without success, led me to imagine it to be a work of so much difficulty, that I would not perhaps have ventured on it so soon had I not heard it currently rumored that I had already completed the inquiry. I know not what were the grounds of this opinion; and, if my conversation contributed in any measure to its rise, this must have happened rather from my having confessed my Ignorance with greater freedom than those are accustomed to do who have studied a little, and expounded perhaps, the reasons that led me to doubt of many of those things that by others are esteemed certain, than from my having boasted of any system of philosophy. But, as I am of a disposition that makes me unwilling to be esteemed different from what I really am, I thought it necessary to endeavor by all means to render myself worthy of the reputation accorded to me; and it is now exactly eight years since this desire constrained me to remove from all those places where interruption from any of my acquaintances was possible, and betake myself to this country, in which the long duration of the war has led to the establishment of such discipline, that the armies maintained seem to be of use only in enabling the inhabitants to enjoy more securely the blessings of peace and where, in the midst of a great crowd actively engaged in business, and more careful of their own affairs than curious about those of others, I have been enabled to live without being deprived of any of the conveniences to be had in the most populous cities, and yet as solitary and as retired as in the midst of the most remote deserts.
Those nine years passed, however, before I reached any firm conclusions about the questions disputed among scholars. Nor had I begun seeking the foundations of a philosophy more certain than commonly accepted views. Many men of the greatest genius had attempted this inquiry before me, but without success, as it seemed to me. Their examples made me think the task was extremely difficult. Perhaps I would not have attempted it so soon had I not heard widespread rumors that I had already completed it. I do not know what gave rise to this belief. If my conversations contributed at all, it must have been because I admitted my ignorance more freely than most. People who have studied a little are usually less willing to admit theirs. Perhaps I also explained why I doubted many things that others considered certain. Any such belief must have come from these admissions and explanations, rather than from my boasting about a philosophical system. But I dislike being thought different from what I really am. So I felt I had to do everything possible to deserve the reputation I had been given. Exactly eight years ago, this desire drove me to leave every place where any acquaintance might interrupt me. I moved to this country, where the long war has established such discipline that its armies seem useful for one purpose alone. They seem to serve only to let the inhabitants enjoy the blessings of peace more securely. Here I live among crowds busy with their work, more concerned with their own affairs than curious about other people's. As a result, I have been able to enjoy all the conveniences available in the most populous cities. Yet I have lived as alone and secluded as if I were in the most remote deserts.