Part 9

But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said DEMEA, had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori, which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of the Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from contemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. Whereas the argument a priori ...

But if the argument a posteriori faces so many difficulties, said DEMEA, should we not prefer the simple, sublime argument a priori? By offering an infallible proof, the argument a priori removes all doubt and difficulty at once. With this argument, we can also prove that God’s attributes are infinite. I fear no other line of reasoning can establish their infinity with certainty. For how can a finite effect prove an infinite cause? Even if the effect is not finite, it may be finite for all we know. How, I ask, can such an effect prove an infinite cause? It is also very difficult, if not entirely impossible, to establish God’s oneness merely by studying the works of nature. Nor can the uniformity of nature’s plan alone assure us of God’s oneness, even if we grant that uniformity. By contrast, the argument a priori ...

You seem to reason, DEMEA, interposed CLEANTHES, as if those advantages and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, from itself, better than from its useful consequences, endeavour to determine what value we ought to put upon it.

You seem to reason, DEMEA, as if the abstract argument’s advantages and benefits fully proved its soundness, CLEANTHES interrupted. But first, in my opinion, we should establish which argument of this kind you want to defend. Then we can try to judge its worth from the argument itself, rather than from its useful consequences.

The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed to be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a Deity.

The argument I would insist on, replied DEMEA, is the familiar one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason for its existence. It is absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself or cause its own existence. So, when we trace effects back to their causes, we face two possibilities. Either we follow an infinite chain, with no ultimate cause at all, or we eventually reach an ultimate cause. That ultimate cause must necessarily exist. Now, the first possibility can be proved absurd as follows. In an infinite chain of causes and effects, each effect owes its existence to the cause immediately before it. But nothing determines or causes the eternal chain as a whole to exist. Yet clearly, the whole chain needs a cause or reason just as much as anything that begins to exist in time. We can still reasonably ask why this particular chain of causes has existed forever. Why not some other chain, or no chain at all? If no being necessarily exists, any possibility we can imagine is equally possible. The idea that nothing has existed forever is no more absurd than an eternal chain of causes constituting the universe. What, then, made something exist rather than nothing? What gave existence to one particular possibility rather than all the others? We are assuming there are no external causes. Chance is a word without meaning. Did nothing produce the universe? But nothing can ever produce anything. We must therefore turn to a necessarily existing Being, who contains within himself the REASON for his existence. To suppose that he does not exist would involve a direct contradiction. Consequently, such a Being exists. In other words, there is a Deity.

I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it.

I will not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. Though I know that raising objections is his greatest pleasure, I will take on the task myself. This reasoning seems to me so clearly unfounded, and so unimportant to genuine piety and religion, that I will venture to expose its flaw.

I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.

I will begin by noting an obvious absurdity: claiming to prove a matter of fact through reasoning alone, without experience. Nothing can be proved this way unless its opposite involves a contradiction. Nothing we can clearly conceive involves a contradiction. Whatever we can conceive as existing, we can also conceive as not existing. So there is no being whose nonexistence involves a contradiction. Therefore, no being’s existence can be proved through reasoning alone. I consider this argument completely decisive, and I am willing to rest the whole debate on it.

It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.

It is claimed that the Deity must necessarily exist. The attempt to explain this necessity goes as follows. If we knew his entire essence or nature, we would see that his nonexistence is impossible. It would be as impossible as twice two not being four. But clearly, we can never see this as long as our mental abilities remain as they are now. We will always be able to imagine that something does not exist, even if we previously imagined it existing. Nor can the mind ever be compelled to think that any object must always exist. By contrast, we are compelled to think that twice two is always four. So the words necessary existence have no meaning, or, what amounts to the same thing, no consistent meaning.

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said[]Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it.

But further, why might the material universe itself not be the necessarily existing Being, according to this supposed explanation of necessity? We cannot claim to know all the properties of matter. For all we can tell, matter may have some properties that, if known, would make its nonexistence seem contradictory. The contradiction would be as great as saying that twice two is five. I find only one argument used to prove that the material world is not the necessarily existing Being. The argument rests on the claim that both the matter and the form of the world could have been otherwise. "Any particle of matter," says []Dr. Clarke, "can be imagined to cease to exist, and any form can be imagined to change. Such destruction or change is therefore not impossible." But failing to see that the same argument applies equally to the Deity seems greatly biased. The argument applies as far as we have any conception of him. The mind can at least imagine that he does not exist, or that his attributes could change. Only some unknown, inconceivable properties could make his nonexistence seem impossible, or his attributes unchangeable. And no reason can be given why matter could not have these properties. Since these properties are entirely unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with matter.

Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

Moreover, when tracing an eternal sequence of objects, it seems absurd to ask for an overall cause or original creator. How can anything that has existed forever have a cause? A cause must come before its effect in time, and the effect must have a beginning.

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.

In such a chain or sequence of objects, too, each part is caused by the part before it. Each part also causes the part after it. So where is the difficulty? But the whole, you say, needs a cause. My answer is that combining these parts into a whole is merely an arbitrary act of the mind. It is like combining several separate countries into one kingdom, or several separate members into one body. This mental act has no effect on the nature of things. Suppose I showed you the specific cause of each particle in a collection of twenty particles of matter. I would think it very unreasonable if you then asked me what caused all twenty together. Explaining the causes of the parts sufficiently explains the cause of the whole.

Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis!

Your arguments, CLEANTHES, may well excuse me from raising any more difficulties, said PHILO. Yet I cannot help pressing one more point. Mathematicians observe that adding the digits of any multiple of 9 always gives either 9 or a smaller multiple of 9. For example, 18, 27, and 36 are multiples of 9. Adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, or 3 to 6 gives 9. Similarly, 369 is a multiple of 9. Adding 3, 6, and 9 gives 18, a smaller multiple of 9. A casual observer may marvel at such remarkable regularity as the result of either chance or design. But a skilled algebraist immediately concludes that this regularity is necessary. The algebraist proves that this pattern must always follow from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the entire universe operates under a similar necessity? This could be so even though no human algebra can provide a key to the puzzle. And instead of marveling at the order of natural things, might we find something else? If we could understand the innermost nature of bodies, might we clearly see why no other arrangement was possible? Introducing this idea of necessity into the present question is so dangerous! And how naturally this idea leads to a conclusion directly opposed to the religious hypothesis!

But dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning.

But let us leave these abstractions behind, continued PHILO, and turn to more familiar topics. I will venture to add an observation. The a priori argument has seldom seemed very convincing, except to people drawn to metaphysics and accustomed to abstract reasoning. Mathematics has taught them that reason often reaches truth through obscure steps and against first appearances. They have carried this same habit of thought into subjects where it does not belong. Other people always sense some weakness in such arguments, even people with good sense and the strongest sympathy for religion. Yet perhaps they cannot clearly explain where the weakness lies. This is certain proof that people have always drawn their religion from sources other than this kind of reasoning. And they always will.