Part 5

But to show you still more inconveniences, continued PHILO, in your Anthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of your principles. Like effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this, you say too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that the liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you to reject its consequences.

But to show you still more problems with your Anthropomorphism, PHILO continued, please take another look at your principles. Similar effects prove similar causes. This is the argument from experience. And you say this is also the only argument for God’s existence. Now, the more similar the observed effects and the inferred causes are, the stronger the argument. Every difference on either side reduces the probability and makes the evidence from experience less conclusive. You cannot doubt this principle, nor should you reject its consequences.

All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects of human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even following the old system of the world, could exclaim,

All the new discoveries in astronomy reveal the immense grandeur and magnificence of Nature’s works. According to the true system of Theism, each discovery adds another argument for a Deity. But according to your theory of experimental Theism, each discovery becomes another objection. For each discovery makes Nature’s works seem even less like the products of human skill and design. For if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even following the old view of the universe, could exclaim,

If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural, as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN:

If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] thought this reasoning so natural that he had his EPICUREAN express it:

"Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?"

"How could your Plato see in his mind how God constructed and built so vast a world? What labor was involved? What tools, what levers, what machines were used? Who helped with such a great task? And how could air, fire, water, and earth obey and follow the architect’s will?"

If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention.

If this argument had any force in earlier times, I say, how much stronger must it be today? For Nature's boundaries have now expanded infinitely, and such a magnificent scene has opened before us. It is even more unreasonable now to form our idea of such an unlimited cause from our experience of the limited products of human design and invention.

The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from any object of human experience and observation.

Discoveries made with microscopes open up a new universe in miniature. You still see these discoveries as objections, while I see them as supporting arguments. The further we pursue this research, the more we are led to the same conclusion about the cause of everything. This cause is vastly different from humans or anything humans have experienced or observed.

And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... These surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said PHILO. I know of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted PHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES.

And what do you say about the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... These discoveries surely raise no objections, replied CLEANTHES. They only reveal new examples of skill and design. We still see the image of a mind reflected in countless objects. Add, a mind like the human mind, said PHILO. I know of no other kind, replied CLEANTHES. And the more like the human mind, the better, insisted PHILO. Certainly, said CLEANTHES.

Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same time weaken all proofs of his existence.

Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, eagerly and triumphantly, consider the consequences. First, this way of reasoning gives up all claim that any of the Deity’s attributes are infinite. For the cause should only be in proportion to the effect. And the effect, as far as we can observe it, is not infinite. So, on your assumptions, what grounds do we have for calling the Divine Being infinite? You will still insist that making him so unlike human beings leads us to accept a completely arbitrary hypothesis. At the same time, you will argue, we weaken all proofs of his existence.

Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real systems. Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other production?

Secondly, your theory gives you no reason to call the Deity perfect, even within his limited abilities. Nor does it justify supposing that his undertakings are free from every error, mistake, or inconsistency. Nature’s works contain many difficulties we cannot explain. If we accept that a perfect creator has been proved through reasoning independent of experience, these difficulties are easily resolved. They become merely apparent difficulties, arising from the limits of human understanding. We cannot trace the infinite connections involved. But with your method of reasoning, all these difficulties become real. Perhaps they will even be used as further examples of nature’s resemblance to human skill and design. At least you must admit that our limited perspective makes it impossible to judge this system against other systems. We cannot tell whether it has any great faults or deserves much praise compared with other possible, or even actual, systems. If the Aeneid were read to a peasant, could he declare the poem completely faultless? Could he even give it its proper rank among works of human creativity, having never encountered any other work?

But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?

But even if this world were a perfect creation, one question would remain uncertain. Can all the work’s merits fairly be credited to its maker? If we examine a ship, how highly must we regard the ingenuity of the carpenter who built it? What a complex, useful, and beautiful machine! And how surprised must we be to discover that the carpenter is a dull mechanic who merely imitated others? He copied a craft gradually improved over many centuries through repeated trials, mistakes, corrections, discussions, and disputes. Many worlds might have been botched and bungled throughout eternity before this system was finally worked out. Much labor might have been wasted, and many fruitless attempts made. The art of making worlds might have improved slowly but steadily over infinite ages. In such matters, who can determine where the truth lies? Indeed, who can even guess what is probable among so many possible explanations, with still more that could be imagined?

And what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect!

And what trace of an argument, continued PHILO, can your hypothesis offer to prove there is only one Deity? Many people work together to build a house or ship, establish a city, or form a state. Why may several deities not work together to design and build a world? Such cooperation would only make the resemblance to human affairs even closer. By dividing the work among several deities, we may further limit each deity’s attributes. We may thus avoid assuming the vast power and knowledge that a single deity would need. According to you, assuming such vast power and knowledge can only weaken the evidence for his existence. And if creatures as foolish and wicked as humans can still often unite to devise and carry out one plan, how much more could those deities or demons, whom we may suppose to be several degrees more perfect!

To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings, by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy? Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all analogy, and even comprehension.

Introducing more causes than necessary does indeed go against sound philosophy. But this principle does not apply to the present case. Suppose your theory had already proved that one deity possessed every attribute needed to produce the universe. Then I admit that assuming another deity existed would be unnecessary, though not absurd. But the question remains whether all these attributes belong to one being or are spread among several independent beings. What evidence in nature could we use to settle this dispute? When we see one pan of a balance raised, we know the opposite pan holds an equal counterweight. We know this even if the counterweight is hidden from sight. But we may still doubt whether the counterweight consists of several separate bodies or one solid, unified mass. And suppose the required weight far exceeds any weight we have ever seen combined in a single body. Then the assumption that several bodies make up the counterweight becomes still more probable and natural. An intelligent being with the vast power and ability needed to produce the universe goes beyond all analogy and even comprehension. Or, in the language of ancient philosophy, so extraordinary an animal goes beyond all analogy and even comprehension.

But further, CLEANTHES: men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says MILTON, animate the world. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us.

But further, CLEANTHES: humans are mortal and keep their species going through reproduction, as all living creatures do. As MILTON says, the two great sexes, male and female, bring the world to life. Why must something so universal and essential be excluded from those many gods with limited powers? Look, then, we are back to the ancient accounts of the gods’ births and ancestry.

And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.? EPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to you, solid and philosophical.

And why not become a complete Anthropomorphite, believing the gods have human form? Why not claim that the deity or deities have physical bodies, with eyes, a nose, a mouth, ears, and so on? EPICURUS argued that no one had ever seen reason except in a human form. Therefore, the gods must have a human form. CICERO quite rightly ridiculed this argument. Yet according to you, the argument becomes sound and philosophical.

In a word, CLEANTHES, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give signs of horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions; but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES's suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, preferable to none at all.

In short, CLEANTHES, someone who accepts your hypothesis can perhaps claim, or guess, that the universe once arose from something like design. But beyond that claim, he cannot establish a single detail with certainty. He must then settle every point of his theology by giving his imagination and speculation complete freedom. For all he knows, this world is deeply flawed and imperfect compared with a higher standard. Perhaps the world was only the first rough attempt of some infant deity. That deity later abandoned the world, ashamed of his clumsy work. Or the world is merely the work of some lesser, dependent deity, whose superiors ridicule it. Or the world is the product of some aged deity in his declining years, with his mind failing. Since that deity’s death, the world has run on haphazardly, driven by the initial impulse and energy he gave it. You rightly show horror at these strange possibilities, DEMEA. But these possibilities, and a thousand others like them, belong to CLEANTHES’s hypothesis, not mine. Once the Deity’s attributes are assumed to be limited, all these possibilities become admissible. For my part, I cannot think that such a wild and uncertain theology is in any way better than none at all.

These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried CLEANTHES: they strike me, however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion.

I completely reject these assumptions, cried CLEANTHES. Still, they do not horrify me, especially when you toss them out in such a rambling way. On the contrary, your assumptions please me. I see that even when you give your imagination the greatest freedom, you never escape the idea of design in the universe. Instead, you have to turn back to that idea at every step. I hold firmly to this admission of yours, and I consider it a sufficient foundation for religion.