Part 2

I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me, than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees and attributes.

I must admit, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing surprises me more than the way you have presented this argument throughout. From everything you have said, one would think you were defending God’s existence against the objections of atheists and unbelievers. One would think you had been forced to champion that basic principle of all religion. But I hope God’s existence is not at all in question among us. I am convinced that no one has ever seriously doubted a truth so certain and self-evident. At least, no one with common sense has done so. The question concerns not God’s existence, but his nature. Given the weaknesses of human understanding, I maintain that God’s nature is entirely beyond our understanding and knowledge. The essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, how he exists, and the very nature of his duration are mysteries to us. So is every detail concerning so divine a Being. As limited, weak, and blind creatures, we should humble ourselves in his majestic presence. Aware of our weaknesses, we should silently adore his infinite perfections. No eye has seen those perfections, no ear has heard them, and no human mind has ever conceived them. They are hidden from human curiosity behind a deep cloud. Trying to penetrate these sacred mysteries is irreverent. And next to the impiety of denying his existence comes the reckless boldness of probing his nature, essence, decrees, and attributes.

But lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated for piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus expresses himself [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. "One ought not so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material.... he comprehends also the perfections of created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal."

But you may think my religious devotion has here overcome my philosophy. To prevent that impression, I shall support my opinion, if it needs support, with a very great authority. I could cite almost all the theologians who have discussed this or any other theological subject since Christianity began. But for now, I shall limit myself to one man equally celebrated for religious devotion and philosophy. He is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, expresses himself as follows [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. "We should call God a spirit," he says, "less to say positively what he is than to say he is not matter. He is an infinitely perfect Being. We cannot doubt his perfection. But even if we supposed him to be bodily, we should not imagine him with a human body. The ANTHROPOMORPHITES claimed he had a human body on the grounds that the human form was the most perfect. In the same way, we should not imagine that God's spirit has human ideas or resembles our spirit. Knowing nothing more perfect than a human mind does not justify that belief. Instead, we should believe that he contains the perfections of matter without being material.... Likewise, he contains the perfections of created spirits without being a spirit as we understand spirit. His true name is He that is. In other words, he is Being without limits, All Being, infinite and universal Being."

After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of disputation in the schools.

“DEMEA,” replied PHILO, “you have cited such a great authority, and you could cite a thousand more. After that, adding my opinion or expressing agreement with your doctrine would seem ridiculous. But surely, when reasonable people discuss these subjects, the question can never concern God’s existence, only his nature. As you rightly observe, his existence is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause. We call the original cause of this universe God, whatever that cause may be. And we reverently attribute every kind of perfection to him. Anyone who doubts this fundamental truth deserves every punishment philosophers can inflict: the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapproval. But all perfection is entirely relative. So we should never imagine that we understand the attributes of this divine Being. Nor should we suppose that his perfections bear any resemblance to those of a human being. We rightly attribute wisdom, thought, design, and knowledge to him, because these words carry honor among human beings. We have no other language or concepts through which to express our adoration of him. But we must beware of thinking that our ideas correspond in any way to his perfections. Nor should we think that his attributes resemble these human qualities. He is infinitely beyond our limited understanding. He is more properly an object of worship in the temple than of debate in places of learning.”

In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in order to come at this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not conclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound piety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being.

In fact, CLEANTHES, he continued, we do not need to reach this conclusion through the forced skepticism you find so displeasing. Our ideas extend no further than our experience. We have no experience of divine qualities or actions. I need not finish my argument. You can draw the conclusion yourself. And I am pleased that sound reasoning and sincere faith lead here to the same conclusion. I hope you are pleased too. Both establish that the Supreme Being is mysterious and beyond understanding, and worthy of worship for that very reason.

Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing himself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious declamations of PHILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

Rather than waste time talking around the subject, said CLEANTHES, addressing DEMEA, I will briefly explain my view. Still less will I waste time answering PHILO’s pious speeches. Look around the world. Consider the whole and every part of it. You will find nothing but one great machine, divided into an infinite number of smaller machines. These smaller machines divide further, beyond what human senses and abilities can trace and explain. All these different machines, even their smallest parts, fit together with extraordinary precision. This precision fills everyone who has ever studied them with wonder. Throughout nature, the intricate fitting of means to ends exactly resembles human inventions, though it far surpasses them. These inventions are the products of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since the effects resemble one another, all the rules of analogy lead us to infer that their causes also resemble one another. We therefore infer that the Author of Nature is somewhat like the human mind. Yet he possesses far greater abilities, proportionate to the grandeur of the work he has carried out. This argument reasons from observed effects back to their cause. By this argument, and this argument alone, we prove both that a Deity exists and that his mind and intelligence resemble ours.

I shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the beginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity: But surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning.

I will speak frankly, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA. From the beginning, I could not accept your conclusion that the Deity resembles human beings. Still less can I accept the methods you use to support that conclusion. What! No conclusive demonstration that God exists! No abstract arguments! No a priori proofs, based on reasoning alone! Are these arguments, which philosophers have emphasized so strongly until now, all false, all deceptive reasoning? Can we go no further on this subject than experience and probability? I will not say that your approach betrays the case for a Deity. But surely your show of open-mindedness gives Atheists advantages they could never gain through argument and reasoning alone.

What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that all religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.

My main concern about this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that CLEANTHES bases all religious arguments on experience. Rather, these arguments seem not even to be the most certain and undeniable examples of that less reliable kind. We have observed thousands upon thousands of times that stones fall, fire burns, and the earth is solid. When we encounter another such case, we draw the usual conclusion without hesitation. The exact similarity between the cases makes us completely certain that the same outcome will follow. We never want or look for stronger evidence. But whenever the cases differ even slightly, the evidence becomes weaker in proportion to the difference. Eventually, the reasoning may rest on a very weak analogy, admittedly open to error and uncertainty. After observing blood circulating in humans, we have no doubt that blood circulates in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But observing blood circulating in frogs and fish gives us only a presumption about humans and other animals. That presumption rests on analogy, though it is a strong one. The analogy is much weaker when we infer that sap circulates in plants because blood circulates in animals. More accurate experiments have shown that those who hastily relied on that imperfect analogy were mistaken.

If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.

If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude with the greatest certainty that it had an architect or builder. We do so because experience shows us that precisely this kind of effect comes from this kind of cause. But surely you will not claim that the universe resembles a house so closely. We cannot infer a similar cause with the same certainty, nor is the analogy complete and perfect. The differences are so striking that, at most, you can offer a guess, a conjecture, a presumption about a similar cause. And I leave you to consider how the world will receive that claim.

It would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?

That would certainly be very badly received, replied CLEANTHES. I would deserve blame and hatred if I admitted that the proofs of God’s existence were only guesses or conjectures. But is the resemblance between a house and the universe really so slight in how means serve ends? What about the way things serve their purposes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? Stairs are clearly designed so that human legs can use them to climb. This conclusion is certain and beyond doubt. Human legs are also designed for walking and climbing. I admit that this conclusion is not quite as certain, because of the difference you point out. But does that make the conclusion about human legs merely an assumption or a guess?

Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these extravagant opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them? or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS?

Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him. Where have we ended up? Passionate defenders of religion admit that the evidence for a Deity falls short of complete certainty! And you, PHILO, I counted on your help in proving that the Divine Nature is mysterious and worthy of worship. Do you agree with all these outrageous opinions of CLEANTHES? For what else can I call them? Or why should I hold back my criticism when such principles are put forward with such authoritative support? Especially before someone as young as PAMPHILUS?

You seem not to apprehend, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of CLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it.

You seem not to understand, replied PHILO, that I am arguing with CLEANTHES on his own terms. By showing him the dangerous consequences of his beliefs, I hope to bring him around to our view. But I notice that your main difficulty is with CLEANTHES’s account of the a posteriori argument, which reasons from experience. You find that the argument seems likely to slip from your grasp and vanish into thin air. So you think his account distorts the argument so much that you can hardly believe he presents it accurately. Now, however much I may disagree with CLEANTHES’s dangerous principles in other respects, I must admit he presents this argument fairly. I will try to explain the matter so that you have no further doubts about his account.

Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally possible.

Suppose a man set aside everything he knows or has seen. His ideas alone could not tell him at all what kind of universe there must be. Nor could he favor one state or arrangement of things over another. For nothing he clearly imagines could be considered impossible or contradictory. So every fantasy of his imagination would stand on equal ground. He could give no sound reason for accepting one idea or system and rejecting others that are equally possible.

Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.

Again, after he opens his eyes and studies the world as it really is, he could not initially identify the cause of any single event. Much less could he identify the cause of everything, or of the universe. He might let his imagination wander, and his imagination might offer him an infinite variety of explanations and images. All these would be possible. But since all would be equally possible, he could never, on his own, satisfactorily explain why he preferred one over the rest. Experience alone can show him the true cause of any phenomenon.

Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by experience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.

Now, DEMEA, this method of reasoning leads to the following conclusion. (CLEANTHES himself implicitly accepts it.) Order, arrangement, or the fitting of things to their purposes is not, by itself, any proof of design. Such order proves design only insofar as experience has shown that it comes from design. For all we can know without experience, matter may have the original source of order within itself, just as mind does. We can imagine the various elements falling into the most perfect arrangement through some unknown internal cause. It is no harder to imagine this than to imagine their ideas taking that arrangement in the great universal mind. There, too, the arrangement would arise from some unknown internal cause. Both possibilities are admitted to be equally possible. But experience, according to CLEANTHES, shows us a difference between them. Throw together several pieces of steel without shape or form. They will never arrange themselves into a watch. Stone, mortar, and wood never build a house without an architect. But we see ideas in a human mind arrange themselves into the plan of a watch or house. They do so through some unknown, inexplicable process. Experience therefore proves that mind contains an original source of order, while matter does not. From similar effects, we infer similar causes. The fitting of means to ends is alike in the universe and in a machine devised by humans. The causes, therefore, must be similar.

I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.

I must admit, I was offended from the start by the claimed resemblance between the Deity and human beings. I can only see this resemblance as lowering the Supreme Being in a way no reasonable Theist could tolerate. So, with your help, DEMEA, I will try to defend what you rightly call the awe-inspiring mystery of God's nature. I will also refute CLEANTHES's argument, provided he agrees that I have represented his argument fairly.

When CLEANTHES had assented, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the following manner.

After CLEANTHES agreed, PHILO paused briefly, then continued as follows.

That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or consideration.

For now, CLEANTHES, I will not much dispute your claim that all conclusions about facts are based on experience. Nor will I much dispute your account of all reasoning from experience. Such reasoning assumes that similar causes produce similar effects, and that similar effects point to similar causes. But please notice how extremely careful sound reasoners are when applying experimental findings to similar cases. Unless the cases are exactly alike, they have no complete confidence in applying past observations to any particular event. Every change in circumstances raises doubts about the outcome. New experiments are needed to establish with certainty that the new circumstances make no difference. Changes in size, position, arrangement, age, air conditions, or surrounding objects may have the most unexpected consequences. Unless the objects are very familiar to us, confidently expecting the same outcome after any such change is extremely rash. Here, if anywhere, philosophers’ slow, deliberate approach stands apart from the hasty judgments of ordinary people. Carried away by the slightest resemblance, ordinary people are incapable of making distinctions or thinking matters through.

But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

But do you think, CLEANTHES, that you have kept your usual calm and philosophical judgment in taking such a leap? You compared the universe to houses, ships, furniture, and machines. Because they resemble the universe in some ways, you concluded that their causes must also be similar. Thought, design, and intelligence, as we find them in humans and other animals, are only one of the universe’s driving forces. They stand alongside heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred other forces we observe daily. Thought is an active cause through which we find some particular parts of nature producing changes in other parts. But can we reasonably apply a conclusion about the parts to the whole? Doesn’t the vast difference in scale rule out all comparison and inference? Can observing how a hair grows teach us anything about how a human being comes into existence? Would knowing how a leaf unfolds, even perfectly, teach us anything about how a tree grows?

But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.

But suppose we judged the origin of all nature by how one part of nature acts on another. Such a basis for judgment can never be accepted. Yet why choose a principle as tiny, weak, and limited as animal reason and design on this planet? What special privilege does this little stir in the brain, which we call thought, possess? Why must we make thought the model for the whole universe? Our bias in our own favor does indeed lead us to propose thought as a model on every occasion. But sound philosophy should carefully guard against so natural an illusion.

So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.

Far from accepting that how one part works tells us anything sound about the origin of the whole, continued PHILO, I go further. I will not even let one part serve as a guide to another if the two are very far apart. Is there any reasonable basis for concluding that inhabitants of other planets have thought, intelligence, or reason? Or that they have anything like these human abilities? Nature works in so many different ways on this small globe. Can we imagine, then, that she endlessly copies herself throughout such an immense universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, exists only in this tiny corner, its influence even here is limited. How, then, can we reasonably call thought the original cause of all things? A peasant might take the way he manages his household as a model for governing kingdoms. In comparison, even that narrow-minded reasoning would be an excusable error.

But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling the human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted, arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and nourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.

But suppose we were completely certain that thought and reason resembling our own existed throughout the universe. Suppose also that their activity elsewhere was vastly greater and more powerful than on this globe. Even then, I cannot see why we could reasonably extend our conclusions about how an established, ordered, balanced world works. How could those conclusions apply to a world still in its embryonic state, developing toward that structure and order? Through observation, we know something about how a fully developed animal is organized, functions, and feeds. But we must be very cautious in applying those observations to the growth of a fetus in the womb. We must be even more cautious when applying them to the formation of a tiny organism in its male parent's loins. Even our limited experience shows that nature possesses an infinite number of mechanisms and principles. These mechanisms and principles constantly reveal themselves whenever nature's position and circumstances change. What new and unknown principles would drive nature in circumstances as new and unknown as the formation of a universe? We cannot claim to answer without the greatest recklessness.

A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?

We know only a tiny part of this vast system, over a very short time, and even that knowledge is very incomplete. Can we then confidently declare how the whole system began?

Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former?

What an admirable conclusion! Here and now, on this tiny globe of earth, stone, wood, brick, iron, and brass require human skill and planning to be arranged in order. Therefore, the universe could not originally have gained its order and arrangement without something like human skill. But can one part of nature serve as a guide to another, very different part? Can one part serve as a guide to the whole? Can a very small part serve as a guide to the universe? Can nature in one situation be a reliable guide to nature in another, vastly different situation?

And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by HIERO, What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance...

And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I follow the example of SIMONIDES and show the same cautious restraint? According to the famous story, HIERO asked him what God was. SIMONIDES asked for a day to think, then two more days. He kept extending the time in this way, without ever offering a definition or description. Could you even blame me if I had said from the start that I did not know? Could you blame me for recognizing that the subject lay far beyond my understanding? You might call me a skeptic and a mocker as much as you pleased. But I have found flaws and even contradictions in human reason on many other, much more familiar subjects. So I would never expect success from reason’s weak guesses about something so lofty and so far beyond our observation. When two kinds of things have always been observed together, habit allows me to infer one’s existence from the other’s. I call such reasoning an argument from experience. But how can such an argument apply when the things involved are unique, as they are here? They have no parallel and no resemblance to other things of their kind. How such an argument could apply may be difficult to explain. And will anyone seriously tell me that an orderly universe must come from thought and skill like our own? Will anyone say we know from experience that universes arise this way? To establish such reasoning, we would need experience of the origin of worlds. Surely seeing ships and cities arise from human skill and planning is not enough...

PHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? Have...

PHILO continued speaking heatedly, half joking and half serious, as it seemed to me. But when he noticed some signs of impatience in CLEANTHES, he stopped abruptly. All I wanted to suggest, said CLEANTHES, is that you should not misuse words. Nor should you use everyday expressions to undermine philosophical arguments. You know that ordinary people often distinguish reason from experience, even in questions concerning only facts and existence. Yet when such reasoning is properly examined, it turns out to be nothing but a kind of experience. Proving through experience that the universe originated from a mind is no more contrary to everyday usage than proving the earth’s motion through experience. And someone determined to find fault could raise all the same objections against the Copernican system that you have raised against my arguments. Have you seen other earths moving, he might ask? Have...

Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.

Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him. We do have other earths. Isn’t the moon another earth, which we see rotating on its axis? Isn’t Venus another earth, where we observe the same rotation? Doesn’t the sun’s rotation also support the same theory by analogy? Aren’t all the planets earths that revolve around the sun? Aren’t the satellites moons that move around Jupiter and Saturn, and with those planets around the sun? These analogies and similarities, along with others I haven’t mentioned, are the only proofs of the COPERNICAN system. And you must consider whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.

In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing. But if we peruse GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c. After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other.

In reality, CLEANTHES, he continued, all who study astronomy now accept the modern system so widely that we rarely question its foundations. The system has become an essential part even of our earliest education. Reading the earliest writers on the subject is now merely a matter of curiosity. Those writers had to face the full force of prejudice. They had to present their arguments from every angle to make them widely accepted and convincing. But if we read GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the system of the world, we will find where he first directed all his efforts. That great genius, one of the greatest minds who ever lived, challenged the usual distinction between earthly and heavenly substances. He sought to prove that the distinction had no foundation. The scholastic philosophers, misled by the senses, had taken this distinction very far. They declared that heavenly substances could neither come into being nor decay, undergo change, or be affected by anything. They assigned all the opposite qualities to earthly substances. But GALILEO began with the moon and proved its similarity to the earth in every respect. He showed its rounded shape, its natural darkness when unlit, its density, and its division into solid and liquid. He also showed its changing phases, how the earth and moon illuminate and eclipse each other, its uneven surface, and more. After many examples of this kind concerning all the planets, people clearly saw that these bodies could be studied through experience. Because these bodies were similar in nature, we could apply the same arguments and observations from one to another.

In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own condemnation, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory.

In the astronomers’ cautious approach, you may see your own condemnation, CLEANTHES. Or rather, you may see that your subject lies beyond all human reason and inquiry. Can you claim any such similarity between the construction of a house and the creation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in a state resembling the first arrangement of the elements? Have you ever watched worlds being formed? And have you had time to observe the entire process, from the first appearance of order to its final completion? If you have, then cite your experience and present your theory.