VIII

On reaching the end of such a journey as this, the author must beg his readers to pardon him for not having been a more skilful guide, not sparing them bleak stretches of country at times and laborious detours at others. There is no doubt that it could have been done better. I will now try to make some amends.

At the end of a journey like this, the author must ask his readers to forgive his shortcomings as a guide. He has not spared them bleak stretches of country at times or difficult detours at others. There is no doubt that the journey could have been better guided. I will now try to make up for some of these shortcomings.

First of all, I suspect the reader feels that the discussion about the sense of guilt oversteps its proper boundaries in this essay and takes up too much space, so that the rest of the subject-matter, which is not always closely connected with it, gets pushed on one side. This may have spoilt the composition of the work; but it faithfully corresponds to my intention to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the evolution of culture, and to convey that the price of progress in civilization is paid in forfeiting happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt.⁠²⁹ What sounds puzzling in this statement, which is the final conclusion of our whole investigation, is probably due to the quite peculiar relation—as yet completely unexplained—the sense of guilt has to our consciousness. In the common cases of remorse which we think normal it becomes clearly perceptible to consciousness; indeed, we often speak of ‘consciousness of guilt’ instead of sense of guilt. In our study of the neuroses, in which we have found invaluable clues towards an understanding of normal people, we find some very contradictory states of affairs in this respect. In one of these maladies, the obsessional neurosis, the sense of guilt makes itself loudly heard in consciousness; it dominates the clinical picture as well as the patient’s life and lets hardly anything else appear alongside of it. But in most of the other types and forms of neurosis it remains completely unconscious, without its effect being any less great, however. Our patients do not believe us when we ascribe an ‘unconscious sense of guilt’ to them; in order to become even moderately intelligible to them we have to explain that the sense of guilt expresses itself in an unconscious seeking for punishment. But its connection with the form of the neurosis is not to be over-estimated; even in the obsessional neurosis there are people who are not aware of their sense of guilt or who perceive it only as a tormenting uneasiness or kind of anxiety and then not until they are prevented from carrying out certain actions. We ought some day to be able at last to understand these things; as yet we cannot. Here perhaps is the place to remark that at bottom the sense of guilt is nothing but a topographical variety of anxiety, and that in its later phases it coincides completely with the dread of the super-ego. The relation of anxiety to consciousness, moreover, is characterized by the same extraordinary variations. Somewhere or other there is always anxiety hidden behind all symptoms; at one moment, however, it sweeps into consciousness, drowning everything else with its clamour, and at the next it secretes itself so completely that we are forced to speak of unconscious anxiety—or if we want to have a cleaner conscience psychologically, since anxiety is after all only a perception—of possibilities of anxiety. Consequently it is very likely that the sense of guilt produced by culture is not perceived as such and remains to a great extent unconscious, or comes to expression as a sort of uneasiness or discontent for which other motivations are sought. The different religions at any rate have never overlooked the part played by the sense of guilt in civilization. What is more, they come forward with a claim, which I have not considered elsewhere,⁠³⁰ to save mankind from this sense of guilt, which they call sin. We indeed have drawn our conclusions, from the way in which in Christianity this salvation is won—the sacrificial death of one who therewith takes the whole of the common guilt of all upon himself—about the occasion on which this primal sense of guilt was first acquired, that is, the occasion which was also the inception of culture.⁠³¹

First, I suspect the reader feels that the discussion of guilt goes beyond this essay’s proper scope. It takes up too much space, pushing aside other subjects that are not always closely connected with guilt. This may have weakened the structure of the work. But it faithfully reflects my intention to present guilt as the most important problem in the development of culture. I also want to show that civilization’s progress comes at a price: lost happiness as our sense of guilt increases.²⁹ This statement is the final conclusion of our entire investigation. What makes it sound puzzling is probably guilt’s peculiar relationship to consciousness, a relationship that remains completely unexplained. In ordinary cases of remorse, which we consider normal, we are clearly conscious of guilt. Indeed, we often speak of ‘consciousness of guilt’ rather than a sense of guilt. Our study of neuroses has given us invaluable clues to understanding normal people. Yet in these disorders, we find some sharply contradictory patterns in how guilt relates to consciousness. In one such disorder, obsessional neurosis, guilt makes itself loudly heard in consciousness. It dominates both the symptoms and the patient’s life, leaving hardly any room for anything else. But in most other types and forms of neurosis, guilt remains completely unconscious, although its effects are no less powerful. Our patients do not believe us when we attribute an ‘unconscious sense of guilt’ to them. To make ourselves even moderately understood, we must explain that guilt appears as an unconscious search for punishment. But we should not overestimate the connection between guilt and the form of neurosis. Even among people with obsessional neurosis, some are unaware of their guilt. Others experience guilt only as tormenting uneasiness or a kind of anxiety. Even then, they feel it only when prevented from carrying out certain actions. We ought someday to be able to understand these things at last. For now, we cannot. Perhaps this is the place to note that guilt is fundamentally just anxiety in a different location within the mind. In its later stages, guilt becomes entirely identical with fear of the super-ego. Anxiety’s relationship to consciousness also shows the same extraordinary variations. There is always anxiety hidden somewhere behind all symptoms. At one moment, however, anxiety floods consciousness, drowning out everything else with its noise. At the next, anxiety hides so completely that we are forced to speak of unconscious anxiety. Or, to give ourselves a clearer psychological conscience, we might speak of possibilities of anxiety. After all, anxiety is only a perception. Consequently, the guilt produced by culture very likely goes unrecognized as guilt and remains largely unconscious. Or it appears as a kind of uneasiness or discontent for which people seek other explanations. At any rate, the different religions have never overlooked guilt’s role in civilization. What is more, they claim to save humanity from this guilt, which they call sin. I have not considered this claim elsewhere.³⁰ In Christianity, this salvation comes through the sacrificial death of someone who takes everyone’s shared guilt upon himself. From this means of salvation, we have drawn conclusions about the event when this original guilt was first acquired. That event was also the beginning of culture.³¹

It will not be very important, but it may be just as well to go more precisely into the meaning of certain words like super-ego, conscience, sense of guilt, need for punishment, remorse, which we have perhaps often used too loosely and in place of one another. They all relate to the same situation, but they denote different aspects of it. The super-ego is an agency or institution in the mind whose existence we have inferred: conscience is a function we ascribe, among others, to the super-ego; it consists of watching over and judging the actions and intentions of the ego, exercising the functions of a censor. The sense of guilt, the severity of the super-ego, is therefore the same thing as the rigour of conscience; it is the perception the ego has that it is watched in this way, the ego’s appreciation of the tension between its strivings and the standards of the super-ego; and the anxiety that lies behind all these relations, the dread of that critical institution, the need for punishment, is an instinctual manifestation on the part of the ego, which has become masochistic under the influence of the sadistic super-ego, i.e. which has brought a part of the instinct of destruction at work within itself into the service of an erotic attachment to the super-ego. We ought not to speak of conscience before a super-ego is demonstrable; as to consciousness of guilt, we must admit that it comes into being before the super-ego, therefore before conscience. At that time it is the direct expression of the dread of external authority, the recognition of the tension between the ego and this latter; it is the direct derivative of the conflict between the need for parental love and the urgency towards instinctual gratification, and it is the thwarting of this urgency that provokes the tendency to aggression. It is because these two different versions of the sense of guilt—one arising from dread of the external and the other from dread of the inner authority—are superimposed one on the other that our insight into the relations of conscience has been hampered in so many ways. Remorse is a general term denoting the ego’s reaction under a special form of the sense of guilt; it includes the almost unaltered sensory material belonging to the anxiety that is at work behind the sense of guilt; it is itself a punishment and may include the need for punishment; it too, therefore, may occur before conscience has developed.

The distinction may not matter much, but we might as well define certain words more precisely. These include super-ego, conscience, sense of guilt, need for punishment, and remorse. We have perhaps often used these words too loosely and interchangeably. They all concern the same situation, but describe different aspects of it. The super-ego is a structure within the mind whose existence we have inferred. Conscience is one of the functions we assign to the super-ego. Conscience watches and judges the ego’s actions and intentions, acting as a censor. The sense of guilt, or the severity of the super-ego, therefore means the same thing as the strictness of conscience. Guilt is the ego’s awareness of being watched in this way. It is the ego’s awareness of the tension between its own aims and the super-ego’s standards. Behind all these relationships lies anxiety: fear of this critical structure, the super-ego. The need for punishment expresses an instinct in the ego, which has become masochistic under the sadistic super-ego’s influence. That is, the ego has put part of its own destructive instinct into the service of an erotic attachment to the super-ego. We should not speak of conscience before we can establish that a super-ego exists. But we must acknowledge that awareness of guilt develops before the super-ego, and therefore before conscience. At that stage, guilt directly expresses fear of external authority and awareness of the tension between the ego and that authority. Guilt then arises directly from the conflict between needing parental love and urgently seeking instinctual satisfaction. Blocking this urge for satisfaction provokes the tendency toward aggression. These two forms of guilt overlap: one arises from fear of external authority, the other from fear of inner authority. Because they overlap, our understanding of how conscience relates to these experiences has been hindered in many ways. Remorse is a general term for the ego’s reaction to a particular form of guilt. Remorse includes, almost unchanged, the sensory experience of the anxiety underlying guilt. Remorse is itself a punishment and may include a need for punishment. Therefore, remorse too may occur before conscience has developed.

Further, it will do no harm for us to review once more the contradictions which have confused us at times during our enquiries. The sense of guilt, we said at one point, was the consequence of uncommitted aggressions; but another time and in particular in the case of its historical beginning, the murder of the father, it was the consequence of an aggression that was carried out. We also found a way out of this difficulty. The development of the inner authority, the super-ego, was precisely what radically altered the whole situation. Before this, the sense of guilt coincided with remorse; we observe, in saying this, that the term remorse is to be reserved for the reaction after an actual performance of an aggressive deed. After this, the omniscience of the super-ego robbed the distinction between intended aggressions and aggressions committed of its significance; a mere intention to commit an act of violence could then evoke a sense of guilt—as psycho-analysis has found—as well as one which has actually been committed—as all the world knows. The conflict of ambivalence between the two primal instincts leaves the same impress on the psychological situation, irrespective of the change that has taken place in this. A temptation arises to look here for an explanation of the mystery of the varying relation between the sense of guilt and consciousness. The sense of guilt which is due to remorse for an evil deed must always have been conscious; that due to a perception of an evil impulse could have remained unconscious. But it cannot be as simple as that: the obsessional neurosis contradicts it emphatically. The second contradiction was that the aggressive energy with which one imagined the super-ego to be endowed was, according to one view, merely a continuation of the punitive energy belonging to external authority, preserved within the mind; whereas according to another view it consisted, on the contrary, of aggressive energy originating in the self, levelled against this inhibiting authority but not allowed to discharge itself in actions. The first view seemed to accord better with the history of the sense of guilt, the second with the theory of it. More searching reflection has resolved this apparently irreconcilable contradiction almost too completely; what remained as essential and common to both was that in both cases we were dealing with an aggression that had been turned inward. Clinical observation, moreover, really permits us to distinguish two sources for the aggressiveness we ascribe to the super-ego, each of which in any given case may be operating predominantly, but which usually are both at work together.

It will also do no harm to revisit the contradictions that have sometimes confused us during our inquiries. At one point, we said that guilt resulted from acts of aggression that were never carried out. But elsewhere, guilt resulted from aggression that was carried out, particularly at its historical beginning, the murder of the father. We also found a way out of this difficulty. The development of an internal authority, the super-ego, radically changed the whole situation. Before the super-ego developed, guilt was the same as remorse. Here, we reserve the word remorse for the reaction that follows an actual act of aggression. Afterward, the super-ego’s knowledge of everything made the distinction between intended and actual aggression insignificant. A mere intention to commit violence could then cause guilt, as psycho-analysis has found. An actual act of violence could also cause guilt, as everyone knows. The conflict of ambivalence between the two primal instincts leaves the same mark on the psychological situation, despite this change. We are tempted to look here for an explanation of the puzzling relationship between guilt and conscious awareness. Guilt arising from remorse for an evil deed must always have been conscious. Guilt arising from recognizing an evil impulse could have remained unconscious. But the explanation cannot be so simple. Obsessional neurosis firmly contradicts it. The second contradiction concerned the source of the aggressive energy we attributed to the super-ego. According to one view, this energy merely continued the punitive energy of external authority, now preserved within the mind. According to another view, however, the aggressive energy originated in the self. This aggression was directed against the restraining authority but was not allowed to express itself in actions. The first view seemed to fit the history of guilt better, while the second better fit the theory of guilt. Closer reflection has resolved this apparently irreconcilable contradiction almost too completely. What remained essential and common to both views was that both involved aggression turned inward. Moreover, clinical observation really does allow us to distinguish two sources of the aggression we attribute to the super-ego. Either source may predominate in a given case, but both are usually at work together.

This, I think, is the place to suggest that a proposal which I previously put forward as a provisional assumption should be taken in earnest. In the latest analytical literature⁠³² a predilection has been shown for the view that any kind of privation, any thwarted instinctual gratification, results in a heightening of the sense of guilt, or may do so. I believe one obtains a great simplification of theory if one regards this as valid only for the aggressive instincts, and that little will be found to contradict this assumption. How then is it to be explained dynamically and economically that a heightening of the sense of guilt should appear in place of an unfulfilled erotic desire? This can surely only happen in a roundabout way: the thwarting of the erotic gratification provokes an access of aggressiveness against the person who interfered with the gratification, and then this tendency to aggression in its turn has itself to be suppressed. So then it is, after all, only the aggression which is changed into guilt, by being suppressed and made over to the super-ego. I am convinced that very many processes will admit of much simpler and clearer explanation if we restrict the findings of psycho-analysis in respect of the origin of the sense of guilt to the aggressive instincts. Reference to the clinical material here gives us no unequivocal answer, because, according to our own hypothesis, the two kinds of instincts hardly ever appear in a pure form, unmixed with each other; but the investigation of extreme cases would probably point in the direction I anticipate. I am tempted to extract our first advantage from this narrower conception by applying it to the repression-process. The symptoms of neurosis, as we have learnt, are essentially substitutive gratifications for unfulfilled sexual wishes. In the course of our analytic work we have found to our surprise that perhaps every neurosis masks a certain amount of unconscious sense of guilt, which in its turn reinforces the symptoms by exploiting them as punishment. One is now inclined to suggest the following statement as a possible formulation: when an instinctual trend undergoes repression, its libidinal elements are transformed into symptoms and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt. Even if this statement is only accurate as an approximation it merits our interest.

I think this is the point to take seriously a proposal I previously offered as a tentative assumption. Recent psychoanalytic literature⁠³² has favored the view that any deprivation, any blocked instinctual satisfaction, increases guilt or may do so. I believe we can greatly simplify the theory if we regard this view as valid only for aggressive instincts. I also believe we will find little to contradict this assumption. How, then, can an unfulfilled erotic desire lead instead to increased guilt? How can we explain this in terms of psychological forces and the distribution of mental energy? Surely, this can happen only indirectly. Blocking erotic satisfaction provokes a surge of aggression against the person who prevented that satisfaction. This aggressive impulse must then itself be suppressed. So, after all, only aggression is turned into guilt, by being suppressed and handed over to the super-ego. I am convinced that we can explain very many processes more simply and clearly if we narrow our account. We should limit psychoanalytic findings about the origin of guilt to aggressive instincts. The clinical evidence gives us no clear answer here. According to our own hypothesis, the two kinds of instincts hardly ever appear in a pure form, unmixed with each other. But investigating extreme cases would probably point in the direction I expect. I am tempted to draw our first benefit from this narrower view by applying it to the process of repression. As we have learned, neurotic symptoms are essentially substitute satisfactions for unfulfilled sexual wishes. During our analytic work, we have been surprised to find that perhaps every neurosis conceals some unconscious guilt. This guilt, in turn, strengthens the symptoms by using them as punishment. We are now inclined to suggest the following possible formulation: when an instinctual impulse undergoes repression, its libidinal elements become symptoms. Its aggressive components become a sense of guilt. Even if this statement is only approximately accurate, it deserves our attention.

Some readers of this essay, too, may be under the impression that the formula of the struggle between Eros and the death instinct has been reiterated too often. It is supposed to characterize the cultural process which evolves in humanity; but it has been related also to the development of the individual, and besides this, is supposed to have revealed the secret of organic life in general. It becomes necessary for us to examine the relation of these three processes to one another. Now, the repetition of the same formula is vindicated by the consideration that the cultural processes both in humanity and in the development of an individual are life-processes; consequently they must both partake of the most universal characteristic of life. On the other hand, evidence of the presence of this universal characteristic does not help us to discriminate, unless it is further narrowed down by special qualifications. We can therefore set our minds at rest only if we say that the cultural process is the particular modification undergone by the life-process under the influence of the task set before it by Eros and stimulated by Ananke, external necessity; and this task is that of uniting single human beings into a larger unity with libidinal attachments between them. When, however, we compare the cultural process in humanity with the process of development or upbringing in an individual human being, we shall conclude without much hesitation that the two are very similar in nature, if not in fact the same process applied to a different kind of object. The civilizing process in the human species is naturally more of an abstraction than the development of an individual, and therefore harder to apprehend in concrete terms, nor should the discovery of analogies be pushed to extremes; but in view of the similar character of the aims of the two processes—in one the incorporation of an individual as a member of a group and in the other the creation of a single group out of many individuals—the similarity of the means employed and of the results obtained in the two cases is not surprising. In view of its exceptional importance, we must no longer postpone mention of one feature differentiating the two processes. The development of the individual is ordered according to the programme laid down by the pleasure-principle, namely, the attainment of happiness, and to this main objective it holds firmly; the incorporation of the individual as a member of a community, or his adaptation to it, seems like an almost unavoidable condition which has to be filled before he can attain this objective of happiness. If he could achieve it without fulfilling this condition it would perhaps be better. To express it differently, we may say: individual development seems to us a product of the interplay of two trends, the striving for happiness, generally called ‘egoistic’, and the impulse towards merging with others in the community, which we call ‘altruistic’. Neither of these descriptions goes far beneath the surface. In individual development, as we have said, the main accent falls on the egoistic trend, the striving for happiness; while the other tendency, which may be called the ‘cultural’ one, usually contents itself with instituting restrictions. But things are different in the development of culture: here far the most important aim is that of creating a single unity out of individual men and women, while the objective of happiness, though still present, is pushed into the background; it almost seems as if humanity could be most successfully united into one great whole if there were no need to trouble about the happiness of individuals. The process of development in individuals must therefore be admitted to have its special features which are not repeated in the cultural evolution of humanity; the two processes only necessarily coincide in so far as the first also includes the aim of incorporation into the community.

Some readers of this essay, too, may feel that the idea of a struggle between Eros and the death instinct has been repeated too often. This idea is meant to describe the cultural process unfolding in humanity. But it has also been applied to individual development and is supposed to reveal the secret of organic life generally. We therefore need to examine how these three processes relate to one another. Repeating the same idea is justified because cultural development, both in humanity and in individuals, is a process of life. Both must therefore share life’s most universal characteristic. Yet finding this universal characteristic does not help us distinguish these processes unless we describe their specific features more precisely. We can therefore settle the matter only by defining the cultural process more specifically. It is the particular form that the life process takes under the task imposed by Eros and prompted by Ananke, external necessity. That task is to bring separate human beings into a larger unity through libidinal bonds between them. Now let us compare humanity’s cultural development with the development or upbringing of an individual. We will conclude, without much hesitation, that the two processes are very similar in nature. They may even be the same process applied to different kinds of objects. The civilizing process in the human species is naturally more abstract than individual development. It is therefore harder to grasp in concrete terms, and we should not push the parallels too far. Still, the two processes have similar aims. One brings an individual into a group, while the other creates a single group from many individuals. So it is not surprising that both use similar means and produce similar results. But we must no longer postpone discussing one exceptionally important difference between the two processes. Individual development follows the programme set by the pleasure-principle: the pursuit of happiness. It holds firmly to this main goal. Joining a community, or adapting to one, seems an almost unavoidable condition for achieving that happiness. If the individual could achieve happiness without meeting this condition, perhaps that would be better. In other words, individual development seems to result from the interaction of two tendencies. One is the pursuit of happiness, generally called ‘egoistic’. The other is the impulse to join with others in a community, which we call ‘altruistic’. Neither description goes far beneath the surface. As we have said, individual development gives priority to the egoistic tendency, the pursuit of happiness. The other tendency, which we may call the ‘cultural’ one, usually does little more than impose restrictions. But cultural development is different. Its most important aim, by far, is to create a single unity from individual men and women. Happiness remains a goal, but it is pushed into the background. It almost seems as if humanity could unite most successfully into one great whole without concern for individual happiness. We must therefore recognize that individual development has distinctive features that do not recur in humanity’s cultural evolution. The two processes necessarily overlap only insofar as individual development also aims to bring the individual into the community.

Just as a planet circles round its central body while at the same time rotating on its own axis, so the individual man takes his part in the course of humanity’s development as he goes on his way through life. But to our dull eyes the play of forces in the heavens seems set fast in a never-varying scheme, though in organic life we can still see how the forces contend with one another and the results of the conflict change from day to day. So in every individual the two trends, one towards personal happiness and the other towards unity with the rest of humanity, must contend with each other; so must the two processes of individual and of cultural development oppose each other and dispute the ground against each other. This struggle between individual and society, however, is not derived from the antagonism of the primal instincts, Eros and Death, which are probably irreconcilable; it is a dissension in the camp of the libido itself, comparable to the contest between the ego and its objects for a share of the libido; and it does eventually admit of a solution in the individual, as we may hope it will also do in the future of civilization—however greatly it may oppress the lives of individuals at the present time.

Just as a planet orbits its central body while spinning on its axis, each person helps shape humanity’s development while living their own life. But to our limited vision, the forces at work in the heavens seem locked in an unchanging pattern. In living things, however, we can still see forces competing and the results of their conflict changing daily. So within each person, two tendencies must compete: the pursuit of personal happiness and the pursuit of unity with humanity. Likewise, individual development and cultural development must oppose each other and compete for ground. This struggle between the individual and society, however, does not arise from the conflict between the primal instincts, Eros and Death. Those instincts are probably impossible to reconcile. Instead, the struggle is a conflict within the libido itself. It resembles the competition between the ego and its objects for a share of the libido. And this struggle does eventually allow a resolution within the individual. We may hope for a resolution in civilization’s future too, however heavily the struggle burdens individual lives today.

The analogy between the process of cultural evolution and the path of individual development may be carried further in an important respect. It can be maintained that the community, too, develops a super-ego, under whose influence cultural evolution proceeds. It would be an enticing task for an authority on human systems of culture to work out this analogy in specific cases. I will confine myself to pointing out certain striking details. The super-ego of any given epoch of civilization originates in the same way as that of an individual; it is based on the impression left behind them by great leading personalities, men of outstanding force of mind, or men in whom some one human tendency has developed in unusual strength and purity, often for that reason very disproportionately. In many instances the analogy goes still further, in that during their lives—often enough, even if not always—such persons are ridiculed by others, ill-used or even cruelly done to death, just as happened with the primal father who also rose again to become a deity long after his death by violence. The most striking example of this double fate is the figure of Jesus Christ, if indeed it does not itself belong to the realm of mythology which called it into being out of a dim memory of that primordial event. Another point of agreement is that the cultural super-ego, just like that of an individual, sets up high ideals and standards, and that failure to fulfil them is punished by both with ‘anxiety of conscience’. In this particular, indeed, we come across the remarkable circumstance that the mental processes concerned here are actually more familiar to us and more accessible to consciousness when they proceed from the group than they can be in the individual. In the latter, when tension arises, the aggressions of the super-ego voicing its noisy reproaches are all that is perceived, while its injunctions themselves often remain unconscious in the background. If we bring them to the knowledge of consciousness we find that they coincide with the demands of the prevailing cultural super-ego. At this point the two processes, that of the evolution of the group and the development of the individual, are always firmly mortised together, so to speak. Consequently many of the effects and properties of the super-ego can be more easily detected through its operations in the group than in the individual.

The comparison between cultural evolution and individual development can be taken further in one important respect. We can argue that a community, too, develops a super-ego, whose influence guides cultural evolution. For an expert on human cultures, exploring this comparison in specific cases would be an appealing task. I will limit myself to pointing out a few striking details. The super-ego of any period of civilization develops in the same way as an individual’s super-ego. It is based on the impression left by great leaders, men of exceptional mental power. Or these may be men in whom one human tendency has developed with unusual strength and purity. Often, for that very reason, the tendency is greatly out of proportion to their other qualities. In many cases, the comparison goes still further. During their lives, such people are often, though not always, mocked, mistreated, or even cruelly killed. The same happened to the primal father, who also rose again as a deity long after his violent death. The most striking example of this double fate is Jesus Christ. Yet the figure of Jesus Christ may itself belong to mythology, created from a faint memory of that primordial event. There is another similarity. The cultural super-ego, like an individual’s super-ego, establishes high ideals and standards. Both punish failure to meet those standards with ‘anxiety of conscience’. Here we encounter a remarkable fact. These mental processes are actually more familiar and more accessible to consciousness when they arise from the group. They are less familiar and accessible within the individual. When tension arises in an individual, only the super-ego’s aggression, expressed in loud accusations, is perceived. The super-ego’s commands themselves often remain unconscious in the background. If we bring those commands into consciousness, we find they match the demands of the prevailing cultural super-ego. At this point, the group’s evolution and the individual’s development are always firmly fitted together, so to speak. Consequently, many effects and characteristics of the super-ego are easier to detect in its workings within the group. They are harder to detect in its workings within the individual.

The cultural super-ego has elaborated its ideals and erected its standards. Those of its demands which deal with the relations of human beings to one another are comprised under the name of ethics. The greatest value has at all times been set upon systems of ethics, as if men had expected them in particular to achieve something especially important. And ethics does in fact deal predominantly with the point which is easily seen to be the sorest of all in any scheme of civilization. Ethics must be regarded therefore as a therapeutic effort: as an endeavour to achieve something through the standards imposed by the super-ego which had not been attained by the work of civilization in other ways. We already know—it is what we have been discussing—that the question is how to dislodge the greatest obstacle to civilization, the constitutional tendency in men to aggressions against one another; and for that very reason the commandment to love one’s neighbour as oneself—probably the most recent of the cultural super-ego’s demands—is especially interesting to us. In our investigations and our therapy of the neuroses we cannot avoid finding fault with the super-ego of the individual on two counts: in commanding and prohibiting with such severity it troubles too little about the happiness of the ego, and it fails to take into account sufficiently the difficulties in the way of obeying it—the strength of instinctual cravings in the id and the hardships of external environment. Consequently in our therapy we often find ourselves obliged to do battle with the super-ego and work to moderate its demands. Exactly the same objections can be made against the ethical standards of the cultural super-ego. It, too, does not trouble enough about the mental constitution of human beings; it enjoins a command and never asks whether or not it is possible for them to obey it. It presumes, on the contrary, that a man’s ego is psychologically capable of anything that is required of it—that his ego has unlimited power over his id. This is an error; even in so-called normal people the power of controlling the id cannot be increased beyond certain limits. If one asks more of them, one produces revolt or neurosis in individuals or makes them unhappy. The command to love our neighbours as ourselves is the strongest defence there is against human aggressiveness and it is a superlative example of the unpsychological attitude of the cultural super-ego. The command is impossible to fulfil; such an enormous inflation of love can only lower its value and not remedy the evil. Civilization pays no heed to all this; it merely prates that the harder it is to obey the more laudable the obedience. The fact remains that anyone who follows such preaching in the present state of civilization only puts himself at a disadvantage beside all those who set it at naught. What an overwhelming obstacle to civilization aggression must be if the defence against it can cause as much misery as aggression itself! ‘Natural’ ethics, as it is called, has nothing to offer here beyond the narcissistic satisfaction of thinking oneself better than others. The variety of ethics that links itself with religion brings in at this point its promises of a better future life. I should imagine that as long as virtue is not rewarded in this life ethics will preach in vain. I too think it unquestionable that an actual change in men’s attitude to property would be of more help in this direction than any ethical commands; but among the Socialists this proposal is obscured by new idealistic expectations disregarding human nature, which detract from its value in actual practice.

The cultural super-ego has developed its ideals and set its standards. Its demands concerning how people relate to one another are called ethics. People have always placed the highest value on ethical systems, as if expecting something especially important from them. And ethics does mainly address what is clearly the most painful problem in any form of civilization. Ethics must therefore be seen as an effort at treatment. It tries to achieve through the super-ego’s standards what civilization has failed to achieve by other means. We already know the problem, since we have been discussing it. How can we remove civilization’s greatest obstacle, the aggression toward one another that is part of human nature? For that very reason, the commandment to love one’s neighbour as oneself is especially interesting to us. It is probably the cultural super-ego’s most recent demand. In studying and treating neuroses, we cannot avoid criticizing the individual’s super-ego on two grounds. First, its commands and prohibitions are so severe that it gives too little thought to the ego’s happiness. Second, it takes too little account of the difficulties of obedience. These difficulties include the strength of instinctive urges in the id and the hardships of the outside world. So, in treatment, we often have to fight the super-ego and work to soften its demands. Exactly the same objections apply to the cultural super-ego’s ethical standards. The cultural super-ego, too, gives too little thought to how the human mind works. It issues a command without ever asking whether people can obey. Instead, it assumes that a person’s ego is psychologically capable of anything demanded of it. It assumes that the ego has unlimited power over the id. This is a mistake. Even in so-called normal people, control over the id cannot be increased beyond certain limits. Demanding more causes individuals to rebel, develop neuroses, or become unhappy. The command to love our neighbours as ourselves is the strongest defence against human aggression. It is also a supreme example of the cultural super-ego’s disregard for human psychology. The command is impossible to obey. Such an enormous expansion of love can only reduce love’s value, not remedy the evil of aggression. Civilization ignores all these objections. It merely babbles that the harder obedience is, the more praiseworthy it becomes. The fact remains that, under present civilization, anyone following such preaching is at a disadvantage compared with everyone ignoring it. What an enormous obstacle aggression must be to civilization if the defence against aggression can cause just as much misery! So-called ‘Natural’ ethics offers nothing here beyond the narcissistic satisfaction of thinking oneself better than others. Religious ethics brings in its promises of a better life after death at this point. I would imagine that as long as virtue goes unrewarded in this life, ethics will preach in vain. I too consider one thing beyond question. A real change in people’s attitude to property would help more in this respect than any ethical commands. But among the Socialists, this proposal is clouded by new idealistic expectations that ignore human nature. Those expectations reduce the proposal’s practical value.

It seems to me that the point of view which seeks to follow the phenomena of cultural evolution as manifestations of a super-ego promises to yield still further discoveries. I am coming quickly to an end. There is one question, however, which I can hardly ignore. If the evolution of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity with the development of an individual, and if the same methods are employed in both, would not the diagnosis be justified that many systems of civilization—or epochs of it—possibly even the whole of humanity—have become ‘neurotic’ under the pressure of the civilizing trends? To analytic dissection of these neuroses therapeutic recommendations might follow which could claim a great practical interest. I would not say that such an attempt to apply psycho-analysis to civilized society would be fanciful or doomed to fruitlessness. But it behoves us to be very careful, not to forget that after all we are dealing only with analogies, and that it is dangerous, not only with men but also with concepts, to drag them out of the region where they originated and have matured. The diagnosis of collective neuroses, moreover, will be confronted by a special difficulty. In the neurosis of an individual we can use as a starting-point the contrast presented to us between the patient and his environment which we assume to be ‘normal’. No such background as this would be available for any society similarly affected; it would have to be supplied in some other way. And with regard to any therapeutic application of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most acute analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses power to compel the community to adopt the therapy? In spite of all these difficulties, we may expect that one day someone will venture upon this research into the pathology of civilized communities.

I think we may make further discoveries by viewing cultural evolution as an expression of a super-ego. I am now nearing the end. But there is one question I can hardly ignore. Suppose the evolution of civilization so closely resembles an individual’s development, and both use the same methods. Would we not then be justified in diagnosing many civilizations, or periods in their history, as ‘neurotic’? Possibly even all humanity has become ‘neurotic’ under the pressure of the forces driving civilization. An analysis of these neuroses might lead to treatment recommendations of great practical interest. I would not say that applying psycho-analysis to civilized society would be fanciful or bound to achieve nothing. But we must be very careful to remember that we are dealing only with analogies. Moving concepts beyond the setting where they originated and developed is dangerous, just as moving people is. Diagnosing collective neuroses also presents a particular difficulty. With an individual’s neurosis, we can start by comparing the patient with their surroundings, which we assume are ‘normal’. No such background would be available for a society affected by neurosis. We would have to find some other basis for comparison. And what about using our knowledge to provide treatment? What use would even the most insightful analysis of social neuroses be, since no one can compel society to accept treatment? Despite all these difficulties, we may expect someone someday to attempt this research into the disorders of civilized communities.

For various reasons, it is very far from my intention to express any opinion concerning the value of human civilization. I have endeavoured to guard myself against the enthusiastic partiality which believes our civilization to be the most precious thing that we possess or could acquire, and thinks it must inevitably lead us to undreamt-of heights of perfection. I can at any rate listen without taking umbrage to those critics who aver that when one surveys the aims of civilization and the means it employs, one is bound to conclude that the whole thing is not worth the effort and that in the end it can only produce a state of things which no individual will be able to bear. My impartiality is all the easier to me since I know very little about these things and am sure only of one thing, that the judgements of value made by mankind are immediately determined by their desires for happiness: in other words, that those judgements are attempts to prop up their illusions with arguments. I could understand it very well if anyone were to point to the inevitable nature of the process of cultural development and say, for instance, that the tendency to institute restrictions upon sexual life or to carry humanitarian ideals into effect at the cost of natural selection are developmental trends which it is impossible to avert or divert, and to which it is best for us to submit as though they were natural necessities. I know, too, the objection that can be raised against this: that tendencies such as these, which are believed to have insuperable power behind them, have often in the history of man been thrown aside and replaced by others. My courage fails me, therefore, at the thought of rising up as a prophet before my fellow-men, and I bow to their reproach that I have no consolation to offer them; for at bottom this is what they all demand—the frenzied revolutionary as passionately as the most pious believer.

For various reasons, I have no intention of offering an opinion on the value of human civilization. I have tried to avoid the enthusiastic bias that sees civilization as our most precious possession or possible achievement. That same bias assumes civilization must inevitably lead us to heights of perfection we have never imagined. At least I can listen without offense to critics who consider civilization’s aims and methods and find the effort worthless. They argue that civilization can ultimately produce only conditions that no individual will be able to bear. Remaining impartial is easier because I know very little about these matters. I am sure of only one thing: people’s value judgments are directly determined by their desires for happiness. In other words, those judgments are attempts to support their illusions with arguments. I could well understand someone pointing to the inevitable course of cultural development and making the following argument. Trends such as restricting sexual life or putting humanitarian ideals into practice at the expense of natural selection cannot be stopped or redirected. According to that argument, we would do best to accept those trends as if they were necessities of nature. I also know the objection to this argument. Throughout human history, trends believed to have irresistible force behind them have often been abandoned and replaced by others. So I lose courage at the thought of standing before my fellow human beings as a prophet. I accept their criticism that I have no comfort to offer them. For, at heart, comfort is what they all demand, the frenzied revolutionary as passionately as the most devout believer.

The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural process developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction. In this connection, perhaps the phase through which we are at this moment passing deserves special interest. Men have brought their powers of subduing the forces of nature to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily exterminate one another to the last man. They know this—hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension. And now it may be expected that the other of the two ‘heavenly forces’, eternal Eros, will put forth his strength so as to maintain himself alongside of his equally immortal adversary.

To me, humanity’s fateful question seems to be whether, and how far, civilization can control disruptions to communal life. These disruptions arise from the human instinct for aggression and self-destruction. In this connection, perhaps the period we are now living through deserves special attention. Humans have gained such control over the forces of nature that they could now easily use them to destroy one another completely. They know this, and that knowledge accounts for much of their current unease, despair, and anxiety. And now we may expect the other of the two ‘heavenly forces’, eternal Eros, to exert his strength. He will do so to hold his own alongside his equally immortal opponent.