Part 10

The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. We must next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite' is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.

We have now dealt adequately with the proposed categories. Next, we must explain the different senses of the term 'opposite'. Things are said to be opposed in four ways: (i) as relative terms, (ii) as contraries, (iii) as absence and presence of a quality, (iv) as affirmation and negation.

Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are 'blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.

Let me give a brief outline of what I mean. The word 'opposite' applies to correlatives, such as 'double' and 'half', and to contraries, such as 'bad' and 'good'. Examples of opposites called 'privatives' and 'positives' are 'blindness' and 'sight'. Examples of affirmative and negative opposites are the statements 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.

(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other.

(i) Pairs of opposites in the category of relation are explained by referring each to the other. This relationship is expressed by the preposition 'of' or another preposition. For example, double is a relative term because something double is explained as the double of something else. Knowledge, too, is the opposite of the thing known in this same sense. The thing known is also explained through its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as something known by something else, namely, by knowledge. So opposites that are correlatives are explained by referring each to the other.

(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.

(ii) Opposites that are contraries do not depend on each other in any way. Instead, they are contrary to each other. We do not speak of good as the good of bad, but as the contrary of bad. Likewise, we do not speak of white as the white of black, but as the contrary of black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Some contraries must occur as one or the other in the subjects where they naturally occur or apply. Such contraries have no intermediate. But when neither contrary must occur, there is always an intermediate. Thus, disease and health naturally occur in an animal’s body, and one or the other must be present. Likewise, odd and even apply to numbers, and every number must be one or the other. Neither pair has an intermediate. On the other hand, contraries have an intermediate when neither contrary must be present. Blackness and whiteness naturally occur in bodies, but neither must be present in any given body. For not every body must be either white or black. Likewise, badness and goodness apply to human beings and many other things. But neither quality must be present in everything to which these qualities apply. Not everything capable of being good or bad must actually be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates. Between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours in between. Between good and bad is what is neither good nor bad.

Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.

Some qualities between two extremes have names, such as grey, sallow, and all the other colours between white and black. In other cases, however, the quality between the extremes is not easy to name. Instead, we must define it as neither one extreme nor the other. Examples include what is neither good nor bad, or neither just nor unjust.

(iii) 'privatives' and 'positives' have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.

(iii) 'privatives' and 'positives' refer to the same subject. For example, sight and blindness refer to the eye. Each opposite in such a pair always refers to the subject in which the particular 'positive' naturally belongs. We say that something capable of a particular ability or quality has suffered privation under the following conditions. The ability or quality must be entirely absent where and when it should naturally be present. We do not call something toothless simply because it has no teeth, or blind simply because it has no sight. Rather, we use these terms when teeth or sight are absent at the time they should naturally be present. For some creatures lack sight or teeth from birth, but these creatures are not called toothless or blind.

To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', 'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to 'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a 'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness.

Lacking or possessing a faculty is not the same as the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', and 'blindness' is a 'privative'. But 'to possess sight' is not the same as 'sight', and 'to be blind' is not the same as 'blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative'. To be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not itself a 'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were the same as 'being blind', both could be said of the same subject. But although a man is said to be blind, he is certainly not said to be blindness.

To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight.

Being in a state of 'possession' seems to be the opposite of being in a state of 'privation'. Likewise, 'positives' and 'privatives' themselves are opposites. The same kind of opposition applies in both cases. For just as blindness is opposed to sight, being blind is opposed to having sight.

That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting.

What is affirmed or denied is not itself an affirmation or denial. By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative statement, and by 'denial' a negative statement. The facts that an affirmation or denial concerns are not statements. Yet these facts are said to oppose each other in the same sense as affirmation and denial. The kind of opposition is the same in both cases. An affirmation opposes a denial, as in the two statements 'he sits', 'he does not sit'. In the same way, the fact expressed by one statement opposes the fact expressed by the other. His sitting, in other words, opposes his not sitting.

It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness.

Clearly, 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed to each other in the same way as relative terms. Neither is explained by reference to the other. Sight is not sight of blindness, nor does any other preposition express a relation between them. Similarly, blindness is not called blindness of sight, but rather the absence of sight. Relative terms, moreover, have a two-way relationship. So if blindness were a relative term, the relationship between blindness and its counterpart would work both ways. But that is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness.

That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved, in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present.

Terms classified as 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed to each other as contraries either. The following facts make this clear. When two contraries have no intermediate, one or the other must be present in the appropriate subject. That subject is one in which the contraries naturally occur, or of which they are predicated. As we proved, contraries have no intermediate precisely when this necessity holds. We gave health and disease, and odd and even, as examples. But contraries with an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. Not every substance capable of having these qualities must be either black or white, cold or hot. An intermediate between these contraries may well be present in the subject. Moreover, we proved that contraries have an intermediate when neither contrary must be present. Yet when one contrary is an essential property of the subject, that particular contrary must be present. For example, heat is an essential property of fire, and whiteness is an essential property of snow. The necessity concerns one specific contrary, not either one or the other. For fire cannot be cold, and snow cannot be black. Thus, one of the two need not be present in every subject capable of having these qualities. The necessity applies only to a subject for which one contrary is an essential property. Moreover, in such cases, that specific member of the pair must be present, not simply one or the other.

In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed.

With 'positives' and 'privatives', however, neither of the two earlier statements holds true. A subject capable of having these qualities need not always have one or the other. Something that has not yet reached the stage when sight is natural is called neither blind nor able to see. Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to the class of contraries with no intermediate state. But neither do they belong to the class of contraries with an intermediate state. For under certain conditions, every suitable subject must have one or the other. Once something reaches the stage when it is naturally capable of sight, it must either see or be blind. Neither particular state is required, since the capacity for sight may be either present or absent. It need not see, and it need not be blind, but it must be in one state or the other. Yet we found something different with contraries that have an intermediate state. Every suitable subject need not have one or the other. Only certain subjects must have one of the pair, and in those subjects, the particular quality is fixed. Clearly, then, 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed in either of the ways that contraries are opposed.

Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set.

Again, with contraries, a subject can change from either opposite to the other while remaining the same subject. The exception is when one contrary is an essential property of the subject, as heat is of fire. Something healthy can become diseased, something white can become black, and something cold can become hot. Something good can become bad, and something bad can become good. A bad man may make some progress, however slight, if guided toward a better way of living and thinking. If he improves even a little, he clearly might change completely, or at least make very great progress. For a man becomes increasingly ready to act virtuously, however small his initial improvement. So it is natural to suppose that he will make even greater progress than before. As this process continues, it will change him completely and settle him in the opposite state, provided he has enough time. With 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change in both directions is impossible. A subject may change from having a property to lacking it, but not from lacking it to having it. A man who has become blind does not regain his sight. A man who has become bald does not regain his hair. A man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set.

(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false.

(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation clearly form a distinct class. For only in this kind of opposition must one statement be true and the other false.

Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as 'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words.

With contraries, correlatives, or 'positives' and 'privatives', one need not be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries. Neither is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed as correlatives. Neither is true or false. The same is true, of course, of 'positives' and 'privatives', such as 'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where words are not combined, there is no truth or falsity. All the opposites mentioned so far consist of single words.

At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.

At the same time, consider opposing statements whose words are contraries. Such statements seem more likely than any other kind of opposites to have this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is well'. But even with these statements, one need not always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false. But if he does not exist, both will be false. For neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true if Socrates does not exist at all.

In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false. For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.

For 'positives' and 'privatives', neither statement is true if the subject does not exist at all. But even if the subject exists, one statement is not always true and the other false. For example, 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind'. Here, 'opposite' refers to having an ability and being deprived of it. Now, if Socrates exists, one statement need not be true and the other false. For when Socrates is not yet able to acquire sight, both statements are false. Both are also false if Socrates does not exist at all.

But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false.

But with affirmation and negation, one is always false and the other true, whether the subject exists or not. Clearly, if Socrates exists, one of the statements 'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates is not ill', is true. The other is false. The same holds if Socrates does not exist. For if Socrates does not exist, saying he is ill is false, and saying he is not ill is true. Thus, the rule holds only for opposites that take the form of affirmation and negation. One of the pair must be true and the other false.