SAYINGS AND INTERLUDES

Chapter 4

SAYINGS AND INTERLUDES

12 min

63. He who is a thorough teacher takes things seriously—and even himself—only in relation to his pupils.

63. A true teacher takes things seriously, even himself, only in relation to his students.

64. "Knowledge for its own sake"—that is the last snare laid by morality: we are thereby completely entangled in morals once more.

64. "Knowledge for its own sake" is the last trap set by morality. Through it, we become completely entangled in morality once again.

65. The charm of knowledge would be small, were it not so much shame has to be overcome on the way to it.

65. Knowledge would have little charm if we did not have to overcome so much shame to gain it.

65A. We are most dishonourable towards our God: he is not PERMITTED to sin.

65A. We treat our God with the utmost disrespect: he is not ALLOWED to sin.

66. The tendency of a person to allow himself to be degraded, robbed, deceived, and exploited might be the diffidence of a God among men.

66. Letting oneself be degraded, robbed, deceived, and exploited might be the shyness of a God among men.

67. Love to one only is a barbarity, for it is exercised at the expense of all others. Love to God also!

67. Loving only one person is barbaric, because that love comes at the expense of all others. The same goes for loving God!

68. "I did that," says my memory. "I could not have done that," says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually—the memory yields.

68. "I did that," says my memory. "I could not have done that," says my pride, refusing to give in. Eventually, my memory gives in.

69. One has regarded life carelessly, if one has failed to see the hand that—kills with leniency.

69. You have looked at life carelessly if you have missed the hand that kills through leniency.

70. If a man has character, he has also his typical experience, which always recurs.

70. If a man has character, he also has a characteristic experience that keeps recurring.

71. THE SAGE AS ASTRONOMER.—So long as thou feelest the stars as an "above thee," thou lackest the eye of the discerning one.

71. THE SAGE AS ASTRONOMER. As long as you feel the stars are "above you," you lack a discerning eye.

72. It is not the strength, but the duration of great sentiments that makes great men.

72. What makes great men is not how strong their great feelings are, but how long those feelings last.

73. He who attains his ideal, precisely thereby surpasses it.

73. Whoever reaches their ideal surpasses that ideal in the very act of reaching it.

73A. Many a peacock hides his tail from every eye—and calls it his pride.

73A. Many peacocks hide their tails from everyone and call it pride.

74. A man of genius is unbearable, unless he possess at least two things besides: gratitude and purity.

74. A man of genius is unbearable unless he also has at least two other qualities: gratitude and purity.

75. The degree and nature of a man's sensuality extends to the highest altitudes of his spirit.

75. The intensity and nature of a man's sensuality reach even the greatest heights of his spirit.

76. Under peaceful conditions the militant man attacks himself.

76. In peaceful times, a combative man attacks himself.

77. With his principles a man seeks either to dominate, or justify, or honour, or reproach, or conceal his habits: two men with the same principles probably seek fundamentally different ends therewith.

77. A man uses his principles to try to control, justify, honor, criticize, or hide his habits. Two men with the same principles probably use those principles to pursue fundamentally different goals.

78. He who despises himself, nevertheless esteems himself thereby, as a despiser.

78. Someone who despises himself still respects himself for being someone who despises.

79. A soul which knows that it is loved, but does not itself love, betrays its sediment: its dregs come up.

79. A soul that knows it is loved but does not love reveals its sediment. Its dregs rise to the surface.

80. A thing that is explained ceases to concern us—What did the God mean who gave the advice, "Know thyself!" Did it perhaps imply "Cease to be concerned about thyself! become objective!"—And Socrates?—And the "scientific man"?

80. Once something is explained, it no longer concerns us. What did the God who advised, "Know yourself!" mean? Did the advice perhaps mean "Stop being concerned about yourself! Become objective!"? And Socrates? And the "scientific man"?

81. It is terrible to die of thirst at sea. Is it necessary that you should so salt your truth that it will no longer—quench thirst?

81. It is terrible to die of thirst at sea. Must you add so much salt to your truth that it can no longer quench thirst?

82. "Sympathy for all"—would be harshness and tyranny for THEE, my good neighbour.

82. "Sympathy for all" would mean harshness and tyranny for YOU, my good neighbor.

83. INSTINCT—When the house is on fire one forgets even the dinner—Yes, but one recovers it from among the ashes.

83. INSTINCT: When the house is on fire, you forget even your dinner. Yes, but you recover your dinner from the ashes.

84. Woman learns how to hate in proportion as she—forgets how to charm.

84. A woman learns to hate in proportion to how much she forgets how to charm.

85. The same emotions are in man and woman, but in different TEMPO, on that account man and woman never cease to misunderstand each other.

85. Men and women have the same emotions, but at a different TEMPO. So men and women never stop misunderstanding each other.

86. In the background of all their personal vanity, women themselves have still their impersonal scorn—for "woman".

86. Behind all their personal vanity, women themselves still hold an impersonal contempt for "woman".

87. FETTERED HEART, FREE SPIRIT—When one firmly fetters one's heart and keeps it prisoner, one can allow one's spirit many liberties: I said this once before But people do not believe it when I say so, unless they know it already.

87. HEART IN CHAINS, FREE SPIRIT: When you firmly chain your heart and keep it prisoner, you can give your spirit many freedoms. I have said this before. But people do not believe me unless they already know it themselves.

88. One begins to distrust very clever persons when they become embarrassed.

88. You begin to distrust very clever people when they become embarrassed.

89. Dreadful experiences raise the question whether he who experiences them is not something dreadful also.

89. Dreadful experiences raise a question: is the person who goes through them also something dreadful?

90. Heavy, melancholy men turn lighter, and come temporarily to their surface, precisely by that which makes others heavy—by hatred and love.

90. Gloomy, heavy-hearted men become lighter and briefly rise to the surface. What lifts these men is precisely what weighs others down: hatred and love.

91. So cold, so icy, that one burns one's finger at the touch of him! Every hand that lays hold of him shrinks back!—And for that very reason many think him red-hot.

91. He is so cold, so icy, that touching him burns your finger! Every hand that grabs him pulls back! And for that very reason, many think he is red-hot.

92. Who has not, at one time or another—sacrificed himself for the sake of his good name?

92. Who hasn't, at some point, sacrificed themselves for the sake of their reputation?

93. In affability there is no hatred of men, but precisely on that account a great deal too much contempt of men.

93. Friendliness holds no hatred for people. But for that very reason, it holds far too much contempt for them.

94. The maturity of man—that means, to have reacquired the seriousness that one had as a child at play.

94. A man's maturity means regaining the seriousness he had as a child at play.

95. To be ashamed of one's immorality is a step on the ladder at the end of which one is ashamed also of one's morality.

95. Being ashamed of your immorality is a step up a ladder. At the top, you are also ashamed of your morality.

96. One should part from life as Ulysses parted from Nausicaa—blessing it rather than in love with it.

96. We should leave life as Ulysses left Nausicaa, blessing life rather than being in love with it.

97. What? A great man? I always see merely the play-actor of his own ideal.

97. What? A great man? I always see only an actor playing the role of his own ideal.

98. When one trains one's conscience, it kisses one while it bites.

98. When you train your conscience, it kisses you while it bites.

99. THE DISAPPOINTED ONE SPEAKS—"I listened for the echo and I heard only praise."

99. THE DISAPPOINTED PERSON SPEAKS: "I listened for the echo and heard only praise."

100. We all feign to ourselves that we are simpler than we are, we thus relax ourselves away from our fellows.

100. We all pretend to ourselves that we are simpler than we are. In this way, we give ourselves a break from other people.

101. A discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the animalization of God.

101. A perceptive person today might easily see himself as God turned into an animal.

102. Discovering reciprocal love should really disenchant the lover with regard to the beloved. "What! She is modest enough to love even you? Or stupid enough? Or—or—-"

102. Discovering that love is mutual should really make the lover lose some admiration for the beloved. "What! Is she modest enough to love even you? Or stupid enough? Or, or..."

103. THE DANGER IN HAPPINESS.—"Everything now turns out best for me, I now love every fate:—who would like to be my fate?"

103. THE DANGER IN HAPPINESS. "Everything now works out for the best for me. I now love every fate: who would like to be my fate?"

104. Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents the Christians of today—burning us.

104. Today's Christians are kept from burning us not by their love of humanity, but by their love's weakness.

105. The pia fraus is still more repugnant to the taste (the "piety") of the free spirit (the "pious man of knowledge") than the impia fraus. Hence the profound lack of judgment, in comparison with the Church, characteristic of the type "free spirit"—as ITS non-freedom.

105. The pia fraus (pious fraud) offends the free spirit's taste (the "piety" of the "pious man of knowledge") even more than the impia fraus (impious fraud). Hence the profound lack of judgment that marks the "free spirit" compared with the Church. That lack of judgment is ITS lack of freedom.

106. By means of music the very passions enjoy themselves.

106. Through music, the passions themselves enjoy themselves.

107. A sign of strong character, when once the resolution has been taken, to shut the ear even to the best counter-arguments. Occasionally, therefore, a will to stupidity.

107. Refusing to hear even the best counterarguments once a decision is made is a sign of strong character. So, at times, a will to stupidity.

108. There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.

108. No phenomenon is moral in itself. There are only moral interpretations of phenomena.

109. The criminal is often enough not equal to his deed: he extenuates and maligns it.

109. A criminal often fails to measure up to his own deed. He downplays the deed and speaks badly of it.

110. The advocates of a criminal are seldom artists enough to turn the beautiful terribleness of the deed to the advantage of the doer.

110. Those defending a criminal rarely have enough artistry to turn the deed’s terrible beauty to the criminal’s advantage.

111. Our vanity is most difficult to wound just when our pride has been wounded.

111. Our vanity is hardest to hurt just when our pride has been hurt.

112. To him who feels himself preordained to contemplation and not to belief, all believers are too noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them.

112. A man who feels destined for contemplation rather than belief finds all believers too loud and intrusive. He guards himself against them.

113. "You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be embarrassed before him."

113. "You want to win him over? Then you must be embarrassed in front of him."

114. The immense expectation with regard to sexual love, and the coyness in this expectation, spoils all the perspectives of women at the outset.

114. Women's enormous expectations of sexual love, and their coyness about those expectations, spoil all their perspectives from the start.

115. Where there is neither love nor hatred in the game, woman's play is mediocre.

115. When neither love nor hatred is part of the game, a woman's play is mediocre.

116. The great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage to rebaptize our badness as the best in us.

116. The great turning points in our lives come when we dare to rename our badness as our best qualities.

117. The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately only the will of another, or of several other, emotions.

117. The will to overcome an emotion is ultimately just the will of another emotion, or of several other emotions.

118. There is an innocence of admiration: it is possessed by him to whom it has not yet occurred that he himself may be admired some day.

118. There is an innocence in admiration. It belongs to someone who has not yet considered that he himself may someday be admired.

119. Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning ourselves—"justifying" ourselves.

119. Our disgust at dirt may be so strong that we cannot clean ourselves, or "justify" ourselves.

120. Sensuality often forces the growth of love too much, so that its root remains weak, and is easily torn up.

120. Sensuality often pushes love to grow too quickly, so love's root stays weak and is easily torn out.

121. It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author—and that he did not learn it better.

121. It’s curious that God learned Greek when he wanted to become an author. And curious that he didn’t learn it better.

122. To rejoice on account of praise is in many cases merely politeness of heart—and the very opposite of vanity of spirit.

122. In many cases, being pleased by praise is merely politeness of the heart, the very opposite of spiritual vanity.

123. Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage.

123. Even concubinage has been corrupted by marriage.

124. He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable.

124. A man who rejoices at the stake is not triumphing over pain. Instead, he triumphs because he feels no pain where he expected to feel it. A parable.

125. When we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us.

125. When we have to change our opinion of someone, we hold the inconvenience against him and make him pay dearly.

126. A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get round them.

126. A nation is nature’s roundabout way of producing six or seven great men. Yes, and then of getting around them.

127. In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it—or worse still! under their dress and finery.

127. In the eyes of all true women, science is hostile to their sense of shame. They feel as if someone wanted to use science to peek beneath their skin. Or worse still! Beneath their dresses and finery.

128. The more abstract the truth you wish to teach, the more must you allure the senses to it.

128. The more abstract the truth you want to teach, the more you must make that truth appeal to the senses.

129. The devil has the most extensive perspectives for God; on that account he keeps so far away from him:—the devil, in effect, as the oldest friend of knowledge.

129. The devil has the broadest perspective on God. That is why he stays so far away from God. The devil is, in effect, the oldest friend of knowledge.

130. What a person IS begins to betray itself when his talent decreases,—when he ceases to show what he CAN do. Talent is also an adornment; an adornment is also a concealment.

130. What a person IS begins to show when his talent fades, when he stops showing what he CAN do. Talent is also a decoration. A decoration is also a disguise.

131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is ESSENTIALLY unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanour.

131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other because they really respect and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to put it more pleasantly). So a man wants a woman to be peaceful. But a woman is ESSENTIALLY not peaceful, like a cat, however well she may have learned to appear peaceful.

132. One is punished best for one's virtues.

132. You are punished most effectively for your virtues.

133. He who cannot find the way to HIS ideal, lives more frivolously and shamelessly than the man without an ideal.

133. A man who cannot find his way to HIS ideal lives more frivolously and shamelessly than a man without an ideal.

134. From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good conscience, all evidence of truth.

134. All trustworthiness, all good conscience, and all evidence of truth come from the senses.

135. Pharisaism is not a deterioration of the good man; a considerable part of it is rather an essential condition of being good.

135. Self-righteousness is not a sign that a good person has become worse. On the contrary, a substantial part of self-righteousness is essential to being good.

136. The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the other seeks some one whom he can assist: a good conversation thus originates.

136. One person seeks someone to help him give birth to his thoughts. Another seeks someone he can help. So a good conversation begins.

137. In intercourse with scholars and artists one readily makes mistakes of opposite kinds: in a remarkable scholar one not infrequently finds a mediocre man; and often, even in a mediocre artist, one finds a very remarkable man.

137. When dealing with scholars and artists, we easily make two opposite kinds of mistakes. A remarkable scholar is not infrequently a mediocre man. And often, even a mediocre artist is a very remarkable man.

138. We do the same when awake as when dreaming: we only invent and imagine him with whom we have intercourse—and forget it immediately.

138. We do the same thing awake as we do in dreams: we merely invent and imagine the person we interact with. Then we immediately forget that we have invented him.

139. In revenge and in love woman is more barbarous than man.

139. In revenge and in love, women are more savage than men.

140. ADVICE AS A RIDDLE.—"If the band is not to break, bite it first—secure to make!"

140. ADVICE AS A RIDDLE: "If the band is not to break, bite it first to make it secure!"

141. The belly is the reason why man does not so readily take himself for a God.

141. The belly is why people don’t so easily mistake themselves for a God.

142. The chastest utterance I ever heard: "Dans le veritable amour c'est l'ame qui enveloppe le corps."

142. The chastest words I ever heard: "In true love, the soul embraces the body."

143. Our vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is most difficult to us.—Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.

143. Our vanity wants what we do best to be seen as the very thing we find hardest. On the origins of many moral systems.

144. When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste; man, indeed, if I may say so, is "the barren animal."

144. When a woman leans toward scholarship, there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself encourages a certain masculinity of taste. Indeed, if I may say so, man is "the barren animal."

145. Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the SECONDARY role.

145. Comparing men and women in general, one may say: women would have no genius for adornment if they had no instinct for the SECONDARY role.

146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.

146. Anyone who fights monsters should be careful not to become a monster in the process. And if you gaze into an abyss for a long time, the abyss will also gaze into you.

147. From old Florentine novels—moreover, from life: Buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone.—Sacchetti, Nov. 86.

147. From old Florentine tales, and from life as well: Good women and bad women alike need the stick. Sacchetti, Nov. 86.

148. To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion of their neighbour—who can do this conjuring trick so well as women?

148. Who can charm others into thinking well of them, then believe those opinions without question? Who performs this magic trick as well as women?

149. That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of what was formerly considered good—the atavism of an old ideal.

149. What an age considers evil is usually a poorly timed echo of what was once considered good. It is an old ideal resurfacing.

150. Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes—what? perhaps a "world"?

150. Around the hero, everything becomes a tragedy. Around the demigod, everything becomes a satyr-play. And around God, everything becomes what? Perhaps a "world"?

151. It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have your permission to possess it;—eh, my friends?

151. Having a talent isn't enough. You must also have permission from you, my friends, to have it. Isn't that right?

152. "Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always Paradise": so say the most ancient and the most modern serpents.

152. "Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always Paradise": so say the oldest and the most modern serpents.

153. What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil.

153. Anything done out of love is always beyond good and evil.

154. Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology.

154. Disagreement, evasion, cheerful distrust, and a love of irony are signs of health. Everything absolute is a sign of sickness.

155. The sense of the tragic increases and declines with sensuousness.

155. The sense of tragedy rises and falls with sensuality.

156. Insanity in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule.

156. Insanity is rare in individuals. But in groups, parties, nations, and eras, insanity is the rule.

157. The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night.

157. The thought of suicide is a great comfort. That thought helps people get through many a bad night.

158. Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to our strongest impulse—the tyrant in us.

158. Not only our reason but also our conscience bows to our strongest impulse, the tyrant within us.

159. One MUST repay good and ill; but why just to the person who did us good or ill?

159. We MUST repay both good and harm. But why only to the person who did us good or harm?

160. One no longer loves one's knowledge sufficiently after one has communicated it.

160. You no longer love your knowledge enough after you have shared it.

161. Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences: they exploit them.

161. Poets are shameless about their experiences: they exploit them.

162. "Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our neighbour's neighbour":—so thinks every nation.

162. "Our fellow human is not our neighbor, but our neighbor's neighbor." Every nation thinks this way.

163. Love brings to light the noble and hidden qualities of a lover—his rare and exceptional traits: it is thus liable to be deceptive as to his normal character.

163. Love reveals a lover’s noble, hidden qualities, his rare and exceptional traits. So love can give a misleading picture of his usual character.

164. Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants;—love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!"

164. Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants. Love God as I love him, as his Son! What do we Sons of God have to do with morality!"

165. IN SIGHT OF EVERY PARTY.—A shepherd has always need of a bell-wether—or he has himself to be a wether occasionally.

165. IN VIEW OF EVERY PARTY. A shepherd always needs a bellwether, a castrated ram that leads the flock. Otherwise, he must sometimes be a castrated ram himself.

166. One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with the accompanying grimace one nevertheless tells the truth.

166. You may indeed lie with your mouth. But the grimace that goes with the lie still tells the truth.

167. To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame—and something precious.

167. For strong men, intimacy is a source of shame and something precious.

168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice.

168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink. Certainly, Eros did not die from the poison, but he degenerated into Vice.

169. To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing oneself.

169. Talking a lot about yourself may also be a way of hiding yourself.

170. In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in blame.

170. Praise is more intrusive than blame.

171. Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of knowledge, like tender hands on a Cyclops.

171. Pity has an almost ridiculous effect on a knowledgeable man, like tender hands on a Cyclops.

172. One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one must never confess to the individual.

172. Sometimes we embrace someone out of love for humanity (because we cannot embrace everyone). But we must never admit that reason to the person we embrace.

173. One does not hate as long as one disesteems, but only when one esteems equal or superior.

173. You do not hate people as long as you look down on them. You hate only those you consider your equals or superiors.

174. Ye Utilitarians—ye, too, love the UTILE only as a VEHICLE for your inclinations,—ye, too, really find the noise of its wheels insupportable!

174. You Utilitarians, you too love what is USEFUL only as a VEHICLE for your own inclinations. You too really find the noise of its wheels unbearable!

175. One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired.

175. In the end, we love our desires, not what we desire.

176. The vanity of others is only counter to our taste when it is counter to our vanity.

176. Other people's vanity offends our taste only when it clashes with our own vanity.

177. With regard to what "truthfulness" is, perhaps nobody has ever been sufficiently truthful.

177. When it comes to what "truthfulness" is, perhaps no one has ever been truthful enough.

178. One does not believe in the follies of clever men: what a forfeiture of the rights of man!

178. People don't believe clever men do foolish things: what a loss of human rights!

179. The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile "reformed."

179. The consequences of our actions grab us by the hair, not caring that we have since "reformed."

180. There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a cause.

180. There is a kind of innocence in lying that shows sincere belief in a cause.

181. It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed.

181. It is inhuman to give blessings when you are being cursed.

182. The familiarity of superiors embitters one, because it may not be returned.

182. Familiarity from superiors makes us bitter because we are not allowed to be equally familiar with them.

183. "I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but because I can no longer believe in you."

183. "I'm hurt, not because you deceived me, but because I can no longer trust you."

184. There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the appearance of wickedness.

184. There is a kind of arrogance in kindness that looks like wickedness.

185. "I dislike him."—Why?—"I am not a match for him."—Did any one ever answer so?

185. "I dislike him." Why? "I'm no match for him." Has anyone ever answered like that?