Relations

1. Relation, what.

1. What relation is.

BESIDES the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other—this is, as the words import, RELATION and RESPECT; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated, to something distinct from it, are what we call RELATIVES; and the things so brought together, RELATED. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; v.g. when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species, man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name HUSBAND, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name WHITER, I intimate some other thing: in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct: therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than free-stone.

BESIDES its ideas of things as they are in themselves, whether simple or complex, the mind gains ideas by comparison. When considering something, the understanding is not limited to that particular object. The mind can, as it were, carry any idea beyond itself, or at least look beyond the idea. In doing so, the mind sees how the idea agrees with another. The mind can consider one thing by, as it were, bringing it alongside another and looking from one to the other. This comparison is what the words RELATION and RESPECT mean. Names given to things that indicate such a connection are what we call RELATIVES. These names direct our thoughts beyond the thing named to something distinct from it. The things brought together in this way are RELATED. Thus, when the mind considers Caius simply as a being in himself, its idea includes only what actually exists in Caius. For example, when I consider him as a man, I think only of the complex idea of the species, man. Likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I consider only a man who has that white colour. But when I call Caius a HUSBAND, I imply the existence of another person. When I call him WHITER, I imply some other thing. In both cases, my thought goes beyond Caius, and I consider two things. Any idea, whether simple or complex, may lead the mind to bring two things together in this way. The mind, as it were, views both things at once, though it still considers them distinct. Therefore, any of our ideas may form the basis of a relation. In the example above, Caius’s marriage contract and ceremony with Sempronia give rise to the name and relation of husband. His white colour gives rise to the statement that he is whiter than free-stone.

2. Ideas of relations without correlative Terms, not easily apprehended.

2. Ideas about relationships are hard to grasp without terms for both sides of the relationship.

These and the like relations, expressed by relative terms that have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and son, bigger and less, cause and effect, are very obvious to every one, and everybody at first sight perceives the relation. For father and son, husband and wife, and such other correlative terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and, through custom, do so readily chime and answer one another in people’s memories, that, upon the naming of either of them, the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named; and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of. CONCUBINE is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife: but in languages where this and the like words have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of those names, which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called EXTERNAL DENOMINATIONS. But all names that are more than empty sounds must signify some idea, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied, and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to and existing in the thing to which the denomination is given; or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it, and then it includes a relation.

These and similar relations are obvious to everyone, and everyone recognizes them at once. They are expressed by paired terms that point to one another, such as father and son, bigger and smaller, cause and effect. Father and son, husband and wife, and other such paired terms seem to belong closely together. Through habit, each term so readily calls up its partner in people’s memories that naming either immediately suggests something beyond it. No one overlooks or doubts a relation when the terms point to it so plainly. But where languages lack paired names, people do not always notice the relation so easily. CONCUBINE is undoubtedly a relational name, just as wife is. But in languages without corresponding terms for concubine and similar words, people are less likely to recognize these as relational names. Such words lack the clear sign of a relation found in paired terms. Paired terms seem to explain one another and to be unable to exist except together. For this reason, many names that clearly express relations, when properly considered, have been called EXTERNAL DENOMINATIONS. But all names that are more than empty sounds must stand for some idea. That idea is either in the thing named or arises from its relation to something else. In the first case, the idea is positive, regarded as belonging to and existing in the thing named. In the second case, the idea arises from a connection the mind finds between the thing and something distinct from it. The mind considers the two together, and the name therefore includes a relation.

3. Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations.

3. Some terms that seem absolute imply relationships.

Another sort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external denominations: which yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable, relation. Such are the seemingly positive terms of OLD, GREAT, IMPERFECT, &c., whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.

There is another kind of relative term that people do not consider relative, or even a description involving something external. Such terms seem to describe something absolute in the subject itself. Yet they conceal an unspoken, though less noticeable, relation. Examples include the seemingly absolute terms OLD, GREAT, IMPERFECT, and so on. I will discuss these terms more fully in the following chapters.

4. Relation different from the Things related.

4. A relationship is different from the things it relates.

This further may be observed, That the ideas of relations may be the same in men who have far different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared: v. g. those who have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father; which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.

We may also observe that people may share the same ideas about relations while understanding the things compared very differently. For example, people with very different ideas of a man may still agree on the idea of a father. The idea of a father is added to the idea of the substance, or man. It refers only to an act by which the being called man helped produce another of his own kind. This relation holds whatever a man may be.

5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in the things related.

5. A relationship may change without any change in the things related.

The nature therefore of relation consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which comparison one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be removed, or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all; v.g. Caius, whom I consider to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow, only by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind’s changing the object to which it compares anything, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time: v.g. Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.

The nature of a relation, then, consists in referring or comparing two things to one another. From this comparison, one or both things receive a particular description. If either thing is removed or ceases to exist, the relation ends, along with the description arising from it. This happens even though the other thing remains entirely unchanged. For example, Caius, whom I consider a father today, ceases to be a father tomorrow simply because his son dies. Caius himself undergoes no change. Indeed, merely changing what the mind compares something to can give that same thing opposite descriptions at the same time. For example, when compared with several people, Caius can truly be called both older and younger, stronger and weaker, and so on.

6. Relation only betwixt two things.

6. A relation exists only between two things.

Whatsoever doth or can exist, or be considered as one thing is positive: and so not only simple ideas and substances, but modes also, are positive beings: though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another: but the whole together considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and under one name, it is a positive or absolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea. The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c.; for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things. There must always be in relation two ideas or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.

Anything that exists, can exist, or can be considered as one thing is positive, rather than relative. So not only simple ideas and substances, but also modes, are positive beings. Yet the parts they consist of are very often related to one another. But consider the whole as one thing, producing in us a complex idea of one thing. The idea forms one picture in our minds, though made up of different parts, and has one name. Considered this way, the whole is a positive or absolute thing or idea. Thus, although a triangle’s parts are relative when compared with one another, the idea of the whole is positive and absolute. The same may be said of a family, a tune, and so on. For a relation can exist only between two things considered as two things. Every relation must involve two ideas or things, either actually separate or considered distinct. There must then be some basis or occasion for comparing them.

7. All Things capable of Relation.

7. All things can be related to other things.

Concerning relation in general, these things may be considered:

On the subject of relation in general, we may consider the following points:

First, That there is no one thing, whether simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations in reference to other things: and therefore this makes no small part of men’s thoughts and words: v.g. one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c., to an almost infinite number: he being capable of as many relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever. For, as I said, relation is a way of comparing or considering two things [*dropped line] from that comparison; and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name.

First, everything can be considered in almost infinitely many ways in relation to other things. This applies to every simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, and to the names of all these. So these considerations make up no small part of people's thoughts and words. For example, a single man may stand in all the following relations at once, and many more: father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, bigger, smaller, older, younger, contemporary, alike, unlike, and so on, almost without limit. He can have as many relations as there are occasions to compare him with other things. These comparisons may concern any kind of agreement, disagreement, or connection whatsoever. For, as I said, a relation is a way of comparing or considering two things [*dropped line] from that comparison. Sometimes even the relation itself is given a name.

8. Our Ideas of Relations often clearer than of the Subjects related.

8. Our ideas about relationships are often clearer than our ideas about the things being related.

Secondly, This further may be considered concerning relation, that though it be not contained in the real existence of things, but something extraneous and superinduced, yet the ideas which relative words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than of those substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of a man; or, if you will, PATERNITY is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear idea, than of HUMANITY; and I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what God; because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein he compares them: so that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. THE IDEAS, THEN, OF RELATIONS, ARE CAPABLE AT LEAST OF BEING MORE PERFECT AND DISTINCT IN OUR MINDS THAN THOSE OF SUBSTANCES. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance, but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for: v.g. comparing two men in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For significant relative words, as well as others, standing only for ideas; and those being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus, having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of DAM and CHICK between the two cassiowaries in St. James’s Park; though perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves.

Secondly, we may consider another point about relations. A relation is not part of the actual existence of things, but something added from outside. Yet the ideas expressed by relative words are often clearer and more distinct than our ideas of the substances concerned. Our idea of a father or brother is much clearer and more distinct than our idea of a man. Or, if you prefer, it is easier to have a clear idea of PATERNITY than of HUMANITY. And I can much more easily understand what a friend is than what God is. This is because knowing one action, or one simple idea, is often enough to give me an idea of a relation. But knowing any substantial being requires an accurate collection of several ideas. If someone compares two things, we can hardly suppose they do not know the basis of the comparison. So, when someone compares things, they cannot help having a very clear idea of the relation involved. OUR IDEAS OF RELATIONS, THEN, CAN AT LEAST BE MORE COMPLETE AND DISTINCT THAN OUR IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES. This is because knowing all the simple ideas actually present in any substance is usually difficult. But knowing the simple ideas making up a relation I think about, or have a name for, is usually easy enough. For example, suppose we compare two men in terms of having one parent in common. It is very easy to form the idea of brothers without yet having a complete idea of a man. Meaningful relative words, like other words, stand only for ideas. And all ideas are either simple or made up of simple ideas. So, to know precisely what idea a relative term expresses, we need only clearly understand the basis of the relation. We can understand that basis without having a complete and clear idea of the thing to which the relation applies. Thus, I understand that one of the two cassowaries in St. James’s Park laid the egg from which the other hatched. This gives me a clear idea of the relation of MOTHER and CHICK between those birds. Yet perhaps my idea of the birds themselves is very unclear and incomplete.

9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.

9. All relations ultimately come down to simple ideas.

Thirdly, Though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations, yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about those simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall show it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of; and in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection: which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it past doubt that the notions we have of them are but certain simple ideas, and so originally derived from sense or reflection.

Thirdly, although things can be compared in many ways, giving rise to many relations, all these relations concern simple ideas. All ultimately come down to simple ideas of sensation or reflection. I believe these simple ideas provide all the material for our knowledge. To make this clear, I will examine the most important relations we have any notion of. I will also examine some relations that seem furthest removed from sensation or reflection. Yet even our ideas of these relations will prove to come from sensation or reflection. This will leave no doubt that our notions of these relations are simply certain simple ideas. They therefore originate in sensation or reflection.

10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are relative.

10. Terms that lead the mind beyond the subject they name are relative.

Fourthly, That relation being the considering of one thing with another which is extrinsical to it, it is evident that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are supposed really to exist in that thing to which the words are applied are relative words: v.g.a MAN, BLACK, MERRY, THOUGHTFUL, THIRSTY, ANGRY, EXTENDED; these and the like are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate anything but what does or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated; but FATHER, BROTHER, KING, HUSBAND, BLACKER, MERRIER, &c., are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing.

Fourth, a relation involves considering one thing in connection with something outside it. Clearly, then, all words that necessarily direct the mind beyond a thing’s supposed actual qualities are relative words. For example, MAN, BLACK, MERRY, THOUGHTFUL, THIRSTY, ANGRY, and EXTENDED are all absolute words. These words neither express nor suggest anything beyond what actually exists, or is supposed to exist, in the man described. But FATHER, BROTHER, KING, HUSBAND, BLACKER, MERRIER, and so on are relative words. Besides naming something, these words also imply something else, separate from and outside the thing named.

11. All relatives made up of simple ideas.

11. All ideas of relationships are made up of simple ideas.

Having laid down these premises concerning relation in general, I shall now proceed to show, in some instances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of simple ideas; and that they all, how refined or remote from sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do, or can exist, are concerned, and that is the relation of CAUSE and EFFECT: the idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, sensation and reflection, I shall in the next place consider.

Having established these points about relations in general, I shall now give some examples. These will show how all our ideas of relations, like our other ideas, consist only of simple ideas. However abstract or distant from sense these ideas of relations may seem, they all ultimately come down to simple ideas. I shall begin with the broadest relation, involving all things that exist or can exist: the relation of CAUSE and EFFECT. Next, I shall consider how we derive this idea from sensation and reflection, the two sources of all our knowledge.