Forms of Pleasure and Pain

8 min

1. Pleasure and Pain, simple Ideas.

1. Pleasure and pain are simple ideas.

AMONGST the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, PAIN and PLEASURE are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For, to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or considered by us.

Among the simple ideas we receive through both sensation and reflection, PAIN and PLEASURE are two very important ones. For bodily sensation can occur on its own or be accompanied by pain or pleasure. In the same way, a thought or perception in the mind can occur on its own. Or the thought or perception can be accompanied by pleasure or pain, delight or distress, whatever you call these feelings. Like other simple ideas, pain and pleasure cannot be described, nor can their names be defined. We can know pain and pleasure only through experience, just as we know the simple ideas of the senses. For defining pain and pleasure by the presence of good or evil only directs us to examine our own feelings. We reflect on the various effects of good and evil on our minds. These effects differ according to how good and evil affect us or how we consider them.

2. Good and evil, what.

2. What good and evil are.

Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call GOOD, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that EVIL which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us: or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of the MIND, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.

Things, then, are good or evil only in relation to pleasure or pain. We call something GOOD if it tends to cause or increase pleasure in us, or reduce our pain. We also call something good if it helps us gain or keep any other good, or remain free from any evil. By contrast, we call something EVIL if it tends to cause or increase pain in us, or reduce our pleasure. We also call something evil if it brings us any evil or deprives us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I mean bodily or mental pleasure and pain, as people commonly distinguish them. In truth, though, pleasure and pain are only different states of the MIND. Sometimes these states arise from disturbances in the body, and sometimes from thoughts in the mind.

3. Our passions moved by Good and Evil.

3. Our emotions are stirred by good and evil.

Pleasure and pain and that which causes them,—good and evil, are the hinges on which our passions turn. And if we reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call them) they produce in us we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions.

Pleasure and pain are the hinges on which our emotions turn. So are good and evil, which cause pleasure and pain. If we reflect on ourselves and observe how pleasure and pain affect us under different circumstances, we may understand our emotions. To do so, we must notice the changes in our minds, moods, and inner sensations (if I may call them that).

Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call LOVE. For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them, or in spring when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him: let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer.

Anyone who reflects on the pleasure something tends to give them has the idea we call LOVE. The thing may be present or absent. For example, a man may say he loves grapes in autumn, while eating them, or in spring, when none are available. He means only that the taste of grapes delights him. If a change in his health or physical condition removes that pleasure, he can no longer be said to love grapes.

5. Hatred.

On the contrary, the thought of the pain which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call HATRED. Were it my business here to inquire any further than into the bare ideas of our passions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I should remark that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible beings is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our senses though with their destruction. But hatred or love, to beings capable of happiness or misery, is often the uneasiness of delight which we find in ourselves, arising from their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man’s children or friends, producing constant delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in general, however caused in us.

By contrast, HATRED is the thought of the pain something tends to cause us, whether present or absent. My purpose here is only to examine our basic ideas of emotions as different forms of pleasure and pain. If I were to go further, I would make another observation. Our love and hatred of lifeless, unfeeling things usually rest on the pleasure and pain we get from using them. We experience that pleasure and pain through our senses, even when using those things destroys them. But love or hatred toward beings capable of happiness or misery often comes from a different source. We feel discomfort or delight simply because those beings exist or are happy. Thus, the existence and well-being of someone's children or friends give that person constant delight. For that reason, we say that the person constantly loves them. But it is enough to note that our ideas of love and hatred are simply the mind's attitudes toward pleasure and pain in general, however they arise in us.

6. Desire.

The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call DESIRE; which is greater or less as that uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action is UNEASINESS. For whatsoever good is proposed, if its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything, that it carries a man no further than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts further, were it seasonable in this place.

We call the uneasiness someone feels when lacking something they associate with pleasure DESIRE. Desire is stronger or weaker according to the intensity of that uneasiness. Here, perhaps, a passing observation may be useful. UNEASINESS is the chief, if not the only, driving force behind human effort and action. Whatever good someone considers, if lacking it causes no displeasure or pain, they neither desire nor pursue it. They are comfortable and content without it. There is only a faint wish, or velleity, the term for the lowest degree of desire, barely above none. In this state, lacking something causes so little uneasiness that a person goes no further than faintly wishing for it. They make no more effective or vigorous effort to obtain it. Desire is also stopped or weakened by the belief that the good being considered is impossible or unattainable. This happens to the extent that this belief removes or eases the uneasiness. We might pursue these thoughts further, if this were the right place to do so.

JOY is a delight of the mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good; and we are then possessed of any good, when we have it so in our power that we can use it when we please. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it: and a father, in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such a state, in the possession of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

JOY is the mind’s delight in thinking about a good we possess now or are certain to possess soon. We possess a good when we have control over it and can use it whenever we please. Thus, a nearly starving man feels joy when help arrives, even before he enjoys using the supplies. A father who delights in his children’s well-being always possesses that good as long as his children are doing well. For he only needs to think about their well-being to feel that pleasure.

8. Sorrow.

SORROW is uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of a good lost, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the sense of a present evil.

SORROW is mental distress at the thought of losing something good that could have been enjoyed longer. It can also be distress caused by suffering something bad in the present.

HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him.

HOPE is the pleasure everyone feels in their mind at the thought of likely enjoying something in the future that would delight them.

FEAR is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befall us.

FEAR is the mental unease we feel when we think about harm likely to happen to us.

11. Despair.

DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men’s minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.

DESPAIR is the thought that something good cannot be attained. This thought affects people’s minds differently, sometimes causing uneasiness or pain, sometimes calm and inactivity.

12. Anger.

ANGER is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge.

ANGER is mental unease or distress caused by being wronged, along with an immediate intention to take revenge.

ENVY is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.

ENVY is an uneasy feeling caused by knowing that someone else has gained something we want. We think that person should not have gained it before us.

14. What Passions all Men have.

14. Emotions All People Have.

These two last, ENVY and ANGER, not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts, of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them. But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately. In fine, all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least, if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us; because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again. But this by the by.

These last two passions, ENVY and ANGER, are not caused by pain and pleasure alone. They also involve judgments about ourselves and others. So they are not found in everyone, because some people lack those further elements, such as judging merit or intending revenge. But all the other passions concern pain and pleasure alone, and I think they are found in everyone. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope only in relation to pleasure. We hate, fear, and grieve only in relation, ultimately, to pain. In short, things stir all these passions only when they seem to cause pleasure or pain. The same is true when pleasure or pain seems connected with those things in some way. Thus, we usually extend our hatred to whatever has caused us pain, at least if it can feel or act voluntarily. This is because the fear left by that source of pain is itself a constant pain. But we do not as consistently love whatever has benefited us. This is because pleasure affects us less strongly than pain does. We are also less ready to hope that the same source will benefit us again. But that is an aside.

15. Pleasure and Pain, what.

15. What Pleasure and Pain Are.

By pleasure and pain, delight and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection.

As I have already indicated, I use pleasure and pain, delight and uneasiness, to mean more than bodily feelings. Throughout, I mean any delight or uneasiness we feel, whether from pleasant or unpleasant sensations or reflections.

16. Removal or lessening of either.

16. Removing or reducing either.

It is further to be considered, that, in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates, as a pleasure: and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

We should also consider how emotions work: removing or reducing pain is seen as pleasure and has the same effect. Likewise, losing pleasure or having it reduced is seen as pain and has the same effect.

17. Shame.

The passions too have most of them, in most persons, operations on the body, and cause various changes in it; which not being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion. For SHAME, which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

Most emotions also affect the body in most people, causing various physical changes. These changes are not always noticeable, so they are not a necessary part of our idea of each emotion. For example, SHAME is mental discomfort at the thought of having done something improper. It can also arise from thinking we have done something that will lower others’ esteem for us, which we value. Yet shame is not always accompanied by blushing.

18. These Instances to show how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflection.

18. These examples show how we get our ideas of emotions from sensation and reflection.

I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the Passions; they are many more than those I have here named: and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse. I have only mentioned these here, as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain, more simple than these; as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them: the pain of teeth set on edge; the pleasure of music; pain from captious uninstructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth. But the passions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation or reflection.

I do not want to be misunderstood as offering a full discussion of the emotions here. There are many more emotions than I have named. And each emotion I have mentioned would require a much longer and more precise discussion. I have mentioned these emotions only as examples of forms of pleasure and pain. These arise in our minds from different ways of considering good and evil. I might perhaps have given examples of other, simpler forms of pleasure and pain. Examples include the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to relieve those pains. Others include the discomfort of having one’s teeth set on edge, and the pleasure of music. There is also the pain of fault-finding arguments that teach us nothing, and the pleasure of thoughtful conversation with a friend. Or there is the pleasure of well-directed study in the search for and discovery of truth. But because the emotions matter much more to us, I chose them as my examples instead. My purpose was to show how our ideas of these emotions come from sensation or reflection.