Chapter 15
IDEAS OF DURATION AND SPACE CONSIDERED TOGETHER
1. Both capable of greater and less.
1. Both can be greater or smaller.
Though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration, yet, they being ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its simple abstract conception, to avoid confusion, I call EXPANSION, to distinguish it from extension, which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter, and so includes, or at least intimates, the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing. I prefer also the word expansion to space, because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (viz. expansion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or less quantities. For a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day, as of an inch and a foot.
Although we have spent considerable time discussing space and duration in the preceding chapters, comparing them may help explain them. Both ideas have broad relevance, and their nature has aspects that are very difficult to understand and distinctive. We may therefore understand them more clearly and precisely by considering them together. To avoid confusion, I call distance or space, considered simply and abstractly, EXPANSION. This term distinguishes it from extension. Some people use extension to mean distance only within the solid parts of matter. Their use therefore includes, or at least suggests, the idea of a body. The idea of pure distance, however, includes no such thing. I also prefer expansion to space because space often refers to the distance between fleeting, successive parts that never exist together. Space also refers to the distance between parts that remain. In both expansion and duration, the mind has the same idea of continuous lengths that can be greater or smaller. For a person understands the difference in length between an hour and a day as clearly as between an inch and a foot.
2. Expansion not bounded by Matter.
2. Space is not limited by matter.
The mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a span, or a pace, or what length you will, CAN, as has been said, repeat that idea, and so, adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two spans, or two paces; and so, as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increase thus till it amounts to the distance of the sun or remotest star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in or without body. It is true, we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of SOLID extension; the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at: but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all; unless he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts when he says, ‘Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee.’ And he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts further than God exists, or imagine any expansion where He is not.
Once the mind has an idea of a length in space, it CAN repeat that idea, as already explained. The length might be a span, a pace, or any other length. By adding the same length again, the mind expands its idea of length to two spans or two paces. It can repeat this process as often as it likes, until the imagined length equals any distance on earth. It can keep increasing that length until it reaches the distance to the sun or the most distant star. Starting from its own location or any other place, the mind can continue beyond all those distances. Nothing stops the mind from going farther, either within physical bodies or beyond them. It is true that we can easily reach the end of SOLID matter in our thoughts. We have no difficulty imagining the outer limits of all physical bodies. But once the mind reaches those limits, nothing prevents it from continuing into endless space. The mind can neither find nor imagine any end to that space. Nor should anyone say that beyond the limits of physical bodies there is nothing at all. To say so would be to confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was filled and expanded by wisdom, seems to think otherwise when he says, ‘Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee.’ Someone may convince himself that his thoughts can reach farther than God exists, or imagine any space where God is not. But such a person, I think, greatly overestimates the capacity of his own understanding.
3. Nor Duration by Motion.
3. Nor duration by motion.
Just so is it in duration. The mind having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures of time, taken from the great bodies of all the world and their motions. But yet every one easily admits, that, though we make duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason why any one should doubt that He likewise fills immensity. His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter to say, where there is no body, there is nothing.
The same is true of duration. Once the mind has an idea of any length of time, it can double, multiply, and extend that length. It can extend that duration beyond its own existence and beyond the existence of all physical beings. It can also go beyond all measures of time drawn from the universe’s great bodies and their movements. Yet everyone readily accepts that although duration is boundless, as it certainly is, we cannot extend it beyond all existence. Everyone readily accepts that God fills eternity. And it is hard to find a reason why anyone should doubt that he also fills limitless space. His infinite being is certainly as boundless in one respect as in the other. And I think saying that nothing exists where there is no physical body gives matter a little too much importance.
4. Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration than infinite Expansion.
4. Why people more readily accept infinite time than infinite space.
Hence I think we may learn the reason why every one familiarly and without the least hesitation speaks of and supposes Eternity, and sticks not to ascribe INFINITY to DURATION; but it is with more doubting and reserve that many admit or suppose the INFINITY OF SPACE. The reason whereof seems to me to be this,—That duration and extension being used as names of affections belonging to other beings, we easily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing so: but, not attributing to him extension, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of expansion without matter; of which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute. And, therefore, when men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body: as if space were there at an end too, and reached no further. Or if their ideas, upon consideration, carry them further, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe, imaginary space: as if IT were nothing, because there is no body existing in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is measured by, they never term imaginary: because it is never supposed void of some other real existence. And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the original of men’s ideas, (as I am apt to think they may very much,) one may have occasion to think by the name DURATION, that the continuation of existence, with a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of matter, is little different from, hardness) were thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words so near of kin as durare and durum esse. And that durare is applied to the idea of hardness, as well as that of existence, we see in Horace, Epod. xvi. ferro duravit secula. But, be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of space or expansion; the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body and all other things: which may, (to those who please,) be a subject of further meditation.
From this, I think we can see why everyone speaks freely and without hesitation of Eternity. No one hesitates to attribute INFINITY to DURATION. Yet many accept or suppose the INFINITY OF SPACE with more doubt and caution. The reason seems to me to be this. We use duration and extension as names for properties of other beings or things. We easily conceive of God as having infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing so. But we attribute extension only to matter, which is finite, and not to God. So we are more likely to doubt that space exists without matter. We commonly suppose that space is a property of matter alone. Therefore, when people think about space, they tend to stop at the boundaries of physical bodies. They think as if space also ended there and went no further. Or, if reflection carries their ideas further, they call what lies beyond the universe imaginary space. They speak as if IT were nothing because no physical body exists there. Yet they never call duration before all physical bodies, and before the motions used to measure duration, imaginary. This is because they never suppose duration to be empty of all other real existence. The names of things may help us trace the origins of people's ideas. I am inclined to think that names can help a great deal. If so, the name DURATION gives us some reason to think that people saw an analogy between two things. One was continued existence, with a kind of resistance to any destructive force. The other was continued solidity. Solidity is easily confused with hardness. And if we examine matter's minute internal parts, solidity differs little from hardness. This supposed analogy may have led to such closely related expressions as durare and durum esse. We see durare applied to hardness as well as existence in Horace, Epod. xvi. ferro duravit secula. But however that may be, one thing is certain. Anyone who follows their own thoughts will sometimes find those thoughts reaching beyond the extent of physical bodies. Their thoughts will reach into the infinity of space or expansion. The idea of that space is distinct and separate from physical bodies and all other things. Those who wish may reflect further on this subject.
5. Time to Duration is as Place to Expansion.
5. Time relates to duration as place relates to space.
Time in general is to duration as place to expansion. They are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity as is set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by landmarks; and so are made use of to denote the position of FINITE real beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite oceans of duration and space. These, rightly considered, are only ideas of determinate distances from certain known points, fixed in distinguishable sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one from another. From such points fixed in sensible beings we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities; which, so considered, are that which we call TIME and PLACE. For duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the order and position of things, without such known settled points, would be lost in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion.
Time in general relates to duration as place relates to spatial extent. Time and place are portions marked off from the boundless oceans of eternity and immensity, as if by landmarks. We use these portions to indicate the positions of FINITE real beings relative to one another. These positions lie within the uniform, infinite oceans of duration and space. Properly understood, time and place are only ideas of specific distances from certain known points. These points are fixed in distinguishable things we can perceive, and are assumed to remain the same distance apart. We count from these points fixed in things we can perceive. From these points, we measure portions of those infinite quantities. These portions, considered in this way, are what we call TIME and PLACE. For duration and space are themselves uniform and boundless. Without such known, fixed points, the order and position of things would be lost within duration and space. Everything would lie jumbled together in a confusion that could never be resolved.
6. Time and Place are taken for so much of either as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Bodies.
6. Time and place refer to portions of time and space marked out by the existence and movement of bodies.
Time and place, taken thus for determinate distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration, set out or supposed to be distinguished from the rest, by marks and known boundaries, have each of them a twofold acceptation.
Time and place, understood here, are definite, distinct portions of the infinite expanses of space and duration. These portions are marked off, or assumed to be marked off, from the rest by signs and known boundaries. Time and place, understood in this way, each have two meanings.
FIRST, Time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration as is measured by, and co-existent with, the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know anything of them: and in this sense time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world, as in these phrases before mentioned, ‘Before all time,’ or, ‘When time shall be no more.’ Place likewise is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space which is possessed by and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion; though this may be more properly called extension than place. Within these two are confined, and by the observable parts of them are measured and determined, the particular time or duration, and the particular extension and place, of all corporeal beings.
FIRST, time generally means the part of infinite duration measured by the existence and movements of the universe’s great bodies. It lasts as long as their existence and movements, as far as we know anything about them. In this sense, time begins and ends with the structure of the world we can perceive through our senses. This is the meaning of the phrases mentioned earlier, ‘Before all time,’ or, ‘When time shall be no more.’ Likewise, place sometimes means the portion of infinite space occupied by and contained within the material world. This distinguishes that portion from the rest of space, though “extension” may be a more accurate name than “place.” The particular time or duration of all physical beings falls within time understood in this way. Likewise, their particular extension and place fall within space understood in this way. The observable parts of time and space measure and determine these particular durations, extensions, and places.
7. Sometimes for so much of either as we design by Measures taken from the Bulk or Motion of Bodies.
7. Sometimes for the amount of either we specify using measurements based on the size or motion of bodies.
SECONDLY, sometimes the word time is used in a larger sense, and is applied to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real existence, and periodical motions of bodies, that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs and for seasons and for days and years, and are accordingly our measures of time; but such other portions too of that infinite uniform duration, which we upon any occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time; and so consider them as bounded and determined. For, if we should suppose the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we should speak properly enough, and should be understood if we said, it is a longer time since the creation of angels than the creation of the world, by 7640 years: whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished duration as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted, 7640 annual revolutions of the sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of place, distance, or bulk, in the great INANE, beyond the confines of the world, when we consider so much of that space as is equal to, or capable to receive, a body of any assigned dimensions, as a cubic foot; or do suppose a point in it, at such a certain distance from any part of the universe.
SECONDLY, we sometimes use the word time in a broader sense, applying it to portions of infinite duration. These include portions not actually marked out and measured by the existence and regular movements of bodies. Those bodies were appointed from the beginning to mark signs, seasons, days, and years. Their movements therefore serve as our measures of time. But we also include other portions of that infinite, uniform duration. On various occasions, we suppose these portions equal certain lengths of measured time. We therefore treat these portions as having definite limits. For example, suppose the creation or fall of the angels occurred at the beginning of the Julian period. We could properly and clearly say that the angels were created 7640 years before the world was created. We would thereby mark out a portion of otherwise undivided duration. We suppose this portion equals the time needed for 7640 annual revolutions of the sun at its present rate. That portion of duration would have allowed for those revolutions. Likewise, we sometimes speak of place, distance, or volume in the great INANE, beyond the boundaries of the world. We do so when considering a portion of that space equal in size to a body of specified dimensions. Such a portion could contain that body, for example, a cubic foot. Or we suppose a point in that space lies at a definite distance from some part of the universe.
8. They belong to all finite beings.
8. They apply to all finite beings.
WHERE and WHEN are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible world, and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it. Without some such fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be lost, to our finite understandings, in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion, which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them, either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible Being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space as the bulk of the body takes up. And place is the position of any body, when considered at a certain distance from some other. As the idea of the particular duration of anything is, an idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes during the existence of that thing; so the time when the thing existed is, the idea of that space of duration which passed between some known and fixed period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shows the distance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the same thing, as that it is a foot square, or lasted two years; the other shows the distance of it in place, or existence from other fixed points of space or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincoln’s Inn Fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000th year of the Julian period. All which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration,—as inches, feet, miles, and degrees, and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.
WHERE and WHEN are questions that apply to all finite things. We always answer them by referring to known parts of the world we perceive through our senses. We also refer to fixed starting points marked by movements we observe in that world. Without such fixed places or periods, our finite minds would lose track of the order of things. That order would disappear in the boundless, unchanging oceans of duration and space. These contain all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to God. So we should not be surprised that we cannot fully understand duration and space. Our thoughts often fail us when we consider them either in themselves or as attributes of the first, incomprehensible Being. But when we consider particular finite things, a body's extension is the portion of infinite space its bulk occupies. A body's place is its position considered at a certain distance from another body. Similarly, a thing's particular duration is the portion of infinite duration that passes while the thing exists. The time when the thing existed is the stretch of duration between a known, fixed starting point and its existence. Extension and duration show the distance between the boundaries of a thing's bulk or existence. For example, a thing may be a foot square or last two years. Place and time, by contrast, show a thing's distance from other fixed points in space or duration. For place, examples are the middle of Lincoln’s Inn Fields or the first degree of Taurus. For time, examples are the year of our Lord 1671 or the 1000th year of the Julian period. We measure all these distances using previously formed ideas of definite lengths of space and duration. For space, we use inches, feet, miles, and degrees. For duration, we use minutes, days, years, and so on.
9. All the Parts of Extension are Extension, and all the Parts of Duration are Duration.
9. All parts of extension are themselves extension, and all parts of duration are themselves duration.
There is one thing more wherein space and duration have a great conformity, and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our SIMPLE IDEAS, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of composition: it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so small a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility, THAT would be, as it were, the indivisible unit or idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration. But, since the mind is not able to frame an idea of ANY space without parts, instead thereof it makes use of the common measures, which, by familiar use in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and parasangs; and so seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration);—the mind makes use, I say, of such ideas as these, as simple ones: and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind upon occasion makes by the addition of such known lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number, when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and division, either of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very big or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused; and it is the NUMBER of its repeated additions or divisions that alone remains clear and distinct; as will easily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space, or divisibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum. But THE LEAST PORTIONS OF EITHER OF THEM, WHEREOF WE HAVE CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of space, extension, and duration are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolved. Such a small part in duration may be called a MOMENT, and is the time of one idea in our minds, in the train of their ordinary succession there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a SENSIBLE POINT, meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space we can discern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the centre.
Space and duration have one more important similarity. Although both rightly count among our SIMPLE IDEAS, every distinct idea we have of either has some internal complexity. Both space and duration consist of parts by their very nature. But those parts are all of the same kind, with no other idea mixed in. So having parts does not prevent space and duration from counting as simple ideas. Suppose the mind could reach a part of extension or duration too small to divide, as it can with numbers. THAT would be, so to speak, the indivisible unit or idea. By repeating that unit, the mind would form its larger ideas of extension and duration. But the mind cannot form an idea of ANY space without parts. Instead, the mind uses familiar measures, fixed in memory through common use in each country. These include inches and feet, or cubits and parasangs, and, for duration, seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years. The mind uses these ideas, I say, as simple ones. These measures become the parts of larger ideas. When needed, the mind forms those larger ideas by adding together familiar lengths. Conversely, when the mind divides space or duration into smaller fractions, it treats the smallest ordinary measure as a numerical unit. Yet whether we add or divide space or duration, the idea under consideration can become very large or very small. When that happens, its exact size becomes very unclear and confused. Only the NUMBER of repeated additions or divisions remains clear and distinct. Anyone can easily see this by letting their thoughts range freely through the vastness of space or the divisibility of matter. Every part of duration is also duration, and every part of extension is extension. Both can be added to or divided without end. But THE SMALLEST PORTIONS OF EITHER FOR WHICH WE HAVE CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS may perhaps best serve as simple ideas. Our complex forms of space, extension, and duration are built from these simple ideas. Those complex forms can also be clearly broken down into these ideas again. Such a small part of duration may be called a MOMENT. A moment is the time occupied by one idea in the ordinary succession of ideas in our minds. The corresponding part of extension has no proper name. I do not know whether I may be allowed to call it a SENSIBLE POINT. By this I mean the smallest particle of matter or space we can perceive. Such a particle ordinarily spans about one minute of a circle whose centre is the eye. Even for the sharpest eyes, it seldom spans less than thirty seconds of that circle.
10. Their Parts inseparable.
10. Their parts cannot be separated.
Expansion and duration have this further agreement, that, though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, no not even in thought: though the parts of bodies from whence we take our MEASURE of the one; and the parts of motion, or rather the succession of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the MEASURE of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by rest, and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too.
Spatial extent and duration have another feature in common. Although we think of both as having parts, those parts cannot be separated from one another, even in thought. Yet the parts of bodies, from which we take our MEASURE of spatial extent, can be separated. Motion, from which we take our MEASURE of duration, can also be interrupted. More precisely, we measure duration by the succession of ideas in our minds. Motion is often interrupted by rest, and the succession of ideas by sleep, which we also call rest.
11. Duration is as a Line, Expansion as a Solid.
11. Duration is like a line, and space is like a solid.
But there is this manifest difference between them,—That the ideas of length which we have of expansion are turned every way, and so make figure, and breadth, and thickness; but duration is but as it were the length of one straight line, extended in infinitum, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever, wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one single being; and we may truly say, they all exist in the SAME moment of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this, in respect to expansion, is beyond my comprehension: and perhaps for us, who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings, it is near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion, as it is to have the idea of any real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of duration. And therefore, what spirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent of solid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space, whilst it remains there.
But there is a clear difference between space and duration. Our ideas of length in space extend in every direction, producing shape, breadth, and thickness. But duration is like the length of a single straight line extending infinitely. It cannot have multiple dimensions, variations, or shape. Instead, duration is one common measure of all existence, shared equally by all things while they exist. The present moment is common to everything that exists now. It includes the present part of each thing’s existence equally, just as if all things were one single being. We can truly say that all things now existing exist at the SAME moment in time. Whether angels and spirits have anything comparable in relation to space is beyond my understanding. And perhaps our understanding makes it nearly as hard to conceive of existence entirely without space as entirely without duration. Our understanding is suited to our own preservation and the purposes of our existence. It is not suited to grasping the reality and full extent of all other beings. So we do not know how spirits relate to space, or how they share in it. All we know is that each body occupies its own portion of space, according to the extent of its solid parts. By doing so, each body excludes all other bodies from sharing that particular space while it remains there.
12. Duration has never two Parts together, Expansion altogether.
12. No two parts of time exist at once, but all parts of space exist together.
DURATION, and TIME which is a part of it, is the idea we have of PERISHING distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in succession; an EXPANSION is the idea of LASTING distance, all whose parts exist together and are not capable of succession. And therefore, though we cannot conceive any duration without succession, nor can put it together in our thoughts that any being does NOW exist to-morrow, or possess at once more than the present moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends not in his knowledge or power all past and future things: his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past he can never recall; and what is yet to come he cannot make present. What I say of man, I say of all finite beings; who, though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meanest creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite or any magnitude holds not any proportion to infinite. God’s infinite duration, being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power, he sees all things, past and to come; and they are no more distant from his knowledge, no further removed from his sight, than the present: they all lie under the same view: and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For the existence of all things, depending upon his good pleasure, all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude: expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion. Such a combination of two distinct ideas is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to further speculation.
Duration, and time as a part of duration, is our idea of distance that passes away. No two parts of duration exist together. Instead, one follows another. Expansion is our idea of distance that remains. All parts of expansion exist together and cannot follow one another in succession. So we cannot imagine duration without succession. Nor can we imagine that any being exists tomorrow now, or occupies more than the present moment at once. Yet we can imagine the Almighty’s eternal duration as very different from that of humans or any other finite being. For human knowledge and power do not extend to all past and future things. Human thoughts reach back only to yesterday, and no one knows what tomorrow will bring. What has passed can never be brought back, and what is still to come cannot be made present. What I say of humans applies to all finite beings. Although such beings may far exceed humans in knowledge and power, compared with God they are no greater than the humblest creature. No finite quantity, whatever its size, bears any proportion to the infinite. God’s infinite duration is accompanied by infinite knowledge and infinite power. He therefore sees all things, past and future. They are no more distant from his knowledge or sight than the present. All lie within the same view. And there is nothing he cannot make exist at whatever moment he pleases. For the existence of all things depends on his will. All things exist at every moment when he chooses to have them exist. To conclude, expansion and duration contain and encompass each other. Every part of space exists in every part of duration, and every part of duration exists in every part of expansion. I suppose we can hardly find another such combination of two distinct ideas among all the many ideas we can conceive. This combination may provide material for further reflection.