Perception

1. Perception the first simple Idea of Reflection.

1. Perception is the first simple idea gained through reflection.

PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

PERCEPTION is the first faculty the mind uses to engage with our ideas. It is also the first and simplest idea we gain by reflecting on our minds. Some call perception thinking in general. But in its proper English sense, thinking means an activity in which the mind actively engages with its ideas. In thinking, the mind considers something with some degree of deliberate attention. In simple perception, by contrast, the mind is mostly passive. The mind cannot avoid perceiving what it perceives.

2. Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is.

2. Only reflection can give us an idea of what perception is.

What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it. And if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.

Everyone can understand perception better by reflecting on their own seeing, hearing, feeling, or thinking than by reading my explanations. Anyone who reflects on what happens in their own mind cannot fail to recognize perception. And if they do not reflect, all the words in the world cannot give them any idea of perception.

3. Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression.

3. Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the impression made on the sense organs.

This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the sense of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind; wherein consists actual perception.

One thing is certain: changes in the body produce no perception if they do not reach the mind. Nor do effects on the body's outer parts produce perception if the mind does not notice them. Fire may burn our bodies just as it burns a piece of wood, unless the motion reaches the brain. There, the motion must produce a feeling of heat or an idea of pain in the mind. That feeling or idea is what actual perception consists of.

4. Impulse on the organ insufficient.

4. A physical impact on the sense organ is not enough.

How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the observation of the mind, there follows no perception: and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man’s ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no sensation. So that wherever there is sense of perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.

How often may a person notice that, while deeply focused on certain objects and closely examining ideas, the mind ignores sounds? Sounding objects affect the ear in the same way they usually do when producing the idea of sound. But the mind takes no notice. The ear may receive a strong enough impulse, but no perception follows if the mind does not notice the impulse. Although the movement that usually produces the idea of sound occurs in the ear, no sound is heard. This lack of sensation does not result from any defect in the ear. Nor is the ear affected any less than at other times when the person does hear. Rather, the understanding does not notice what usually produces the idea, although the stimulus comes through the usual sense organ. So no idea is formed in the mind, and no sensation follows. Thus, wherever sensory perception occurs, an idea is actually produced and is present in the understanding.

5. Children, though they may have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate.

5. Although children may have ideas in the womb, none of their ideas are innate.

Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their senses about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies that environ them, or else of those wants or diseases they suffer; amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two: which probably are some of the first that children have, and which they scarce ever part with again.

Therefore, I have no doubt that children receive a few ideas before birth through their senses responding to things in the womb. These ideas arise inevitably from the bodies surrounding them, or from the needs or illnesses they experience. If we may speculate about things so difficult to examine, I think hunger and warmth are two such ideas. These are probably among children's first ideas, and children hardly ever lose them again.

6. The effects of Sensation in the womb.

6. The effects of sensation in the womb.

But though it be reasonable to imagine that children receive some ideas before they come into the world, yet these simple ideas are far from those INNATE PRINCIPLES which some contend for, and we, above, have rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of sensation, are only from some affections of the body, which happen to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the mind; no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense, but only in the precedency of time. Whereas those innate principles are supposed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind by any accidental alterations in, or operations on the body; but, as it were, original characters impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its being and constitution.

But although children may reasonably be thought to receive some ideas before birth, these simple ideas are far from INNATE PRINCIPLES. Some people argue for such principles, but we have rejected them above. The ideas mentioned here come from sensations caused by bodily changes before birth. So these ideas depend on something outside the mind. They arise in the same way as other ideas received through the senses, differing only in coming earlier. Innate principles, by contrast, are supposed to be entirely different in nature. They supposedly do not enter the mind through incidental changes in the body or actions upon it. Instead, they are supposedly like original marks stamped on the mind at the very moment it first takes shape and exists.

7. Which Ideas appear first is not evident, nor important.

7. It is neither clear nor important which ideas appear first.

As there are some ideas which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb, subservient to the necessities of their life and being there: so, after they are born, those ideas are the earliest imprinted which happen to be the sensible qualities which first occur to them; amongst which light is not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how covetous the mind is to be furnished with all such ideas as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little guessed by what is observable in children new-born; who always turn their eyes to that part from whence the light comes, lay them how you please. But the ideas that are most familiar at first, being various according to the divers circumstances of children’s first entertainment in the world, the order wherein the several ideas come at first into the mind is very various, and uncertain also; neither is it much material to know it.

We may reasonably suppose that some ideas enter children’s minds in the womb, serving the needs of life there. Similarly, after birth, the first ideas formed come from the qualities children first encounter through their senses. Among these, light is neither unimportant nor weak in its effects. And newborn children give us some indication of how eagerly the mind seeks all ideas that bring no pain. However you position newborn children, they always turn their eyes toward the light. But children’s earliest circumstances differ, so the ideas most familiar to them at first also differ. The order in which different ideas first enter the mind therefore varies greatly and is uncertain. Nor does knowing that order matter much.

8. Sensations often changed by the Judgment.

8. Sensations are often changed by judgment.

We are further to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, v.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted on our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we having, by use, been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies;—the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes. So that from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour; when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting. To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since; and it is this:—“Suppose a man BORN blind, and now adult, and taught by his TOUCH to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quaere, whether BY HIS SIGHT, BEFORE HE TOUCHED THEM, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?” To which the acute and judicious proposer answers, “Not. For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch, yet he has not yet obtained the experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so; or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.”—I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this problem; and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least use of, or help from them. And the rather, because this observing gentleman further adds, that “having, upon the occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.”

We must also consider another point about perception. In adults, judgment often changes the ideas we receive through our senses without our noticing. Suppose we look at a round globe of one uniform colour, such as gold, alabaster, or jet. The image impressed on our minds is certainly a flat circle with varying shadows and degrees of light and brightness. But experience has taught us how convex bodies appear to us. We have learned how differences in the shapes of objects change the light reflected from them. So judgment, through habit, immediately turns these appearances into the causes behind them. From what is really a variety of shadows or colours, judgment infers a shape. It treats those variations as signs of shape and produces a perception of a convex body with a uniform colour. Yet the image we receive is only a flat surface with varying colours, as painting clearly shows. To illustrate this point, I will include a problem sent to me in a letter some months ago. Its author is the learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, a very ingenious and dedicated promoter of genuine knowledge. The problem is this: “Suppose a man was BORN blind and is now an adult. Through TOUCH, he has learned to distinguish a cube from a sphere of the same metal and nearly equal size. By feeling each object, he can tell which is the cube and which is the sphere. Now suppose the cube and sphere are placed on a table, and the blind man is given sight. Could he distinguish them BY SIGHT, BEFORE TOUCHING THEM, and say which is the globe and which is the cube?” The perceptive and thoughtful author of this question answers: “No. He has experienced how a globe and a cube feel to his touch. But he has not yet learned how those experiences of touch correspond to experiences of sight. Nor has he learned how a projecting corner of the cube, pressing unevenly against his hand, will appear to his eyes.” I agree with the answer given by this thoughtful gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend. I believe the blind man could not, on first seeing the objects, say with certainty which was the globe or cube. Yet by touch he could name them without error and distinguish them with certainty by feeling their different shapes. I have recorded this problem for my readers to consider. It offers a chance to reflect on how much they may owe to experience, learning, and acquired ideas. They may depend on these things even when they think they have made no use of them or received any help from them. This reflection is especially worth making because the observant gentleman adds: “Prompted by your book, I put this question to various very ingenious men. Hardly any initially gave the answer I consider true. Only after hearing my reasons were they convinced.”

9. This judgement apt to be mistaken for direct perception.

9. This judgment is easily mistaken for direct perception.

But this is not, I think, usual in any of our ideas, but those received by sight. Because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours; we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases by a settled habit,—in things whereof we have frequent experience is performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself;—as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

But I think this happens rarely with any of our ideas except those received through sight. Sight is the most wide-ranging of all our senses. It brings our minds ideas of light and colours, which come only through sight. It also brings us the very different ideas of space, shape, and motion. Variations in space, shape, and motion change how light and colours, sight’s particular objects, appear to us. Because of this, we learn through practice to judge one set of ideas by the other. In many cases involving things we frequently experience, this judgment becomes a settled habit. We make the judgment so consistently and quickly that we mistake an idea formed by judgment for a direct sensory perception. So the sensory idea serves only to trigger the idea formed by judgment, and we hardly notice the sensation itself. Similarly, someone who reads or listens attentively and with understanding pays little attention to the written marks or sounds. Instead, the reader or listener attends to the ideas those marks or sounds bring to mind.

10. How, by Habit, ideas of Sensation are unconsciously changed into ideas of Judgment.

10. How habit turns ideas from our senses into ideas formed by judgment without our noticing.

Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how quick the actions of the mind are performed. For, as itself is thought to take up no space to have no extension; so its actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body. Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an instant, do our minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step show it another? Secondly, we shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape our observation. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eyelids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark! Men that, by custom, have got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe. And therefore it is not so strange, that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

We need not be surprised that this happens with so little awareness, if we consider how quickly the mind acts. The mind itself is thought to occupy no space and have no physical dimensions. Likewise, its actions seem to take no time, and many seem crowded into a single instant. I mean this in comparison with the actions of the body. Anyone who takes the trouble to reflect on their own thoughts can easily observe this speed. How our minds seem to see all the parts of a proof at a single glance, almost instantly! Yet we might well call the proof long, considering the time needed to explain it to someone step by step. Second, we will be less surprised that this happens with so little awareness if we consider the effects of habit. Practice makes things so easy that we often do them without noticing. Habits, especially those formed very early, eventually lead us to act in ways that often escape our attention. How often each day do we cover our eyes with our eyelids without noticing that we are in darkness! People who habitually use a stock expression say it in almost every sentence. Although others notice these sounds, the speakers themselves neither hear nor notice them. So it is not so strange that our minds often replace an idea received through sensation with a judgment. The sensory idea then serves only to trigger the judgment, without our noticing the change.

11. Perception puts the difference between Animals and Vegetables.

11. Perception distinguishes animals from plants.

This faculty of perception seems to me to be, that which puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature. For, however vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briskly alter their figures and motions, and so have obtained the name of sensitive plants, from a motion which has some resemblance to that which in animals follows upon sensation: yet I suppose it is all bare MECHANISM; and no otherwise produced than the turning of a wild oat-beard, by the insinuation of the particles of moisture, or the shortening of a rope, by the affusion of water. All which is done without any sensation in the subject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

This ability to perceive seems to me to distinguish the animal kingdom from the lower parts of nature. Many plants do have some ability to move. When other bodies act on these plants in different ways, the plants change their shapes and movements very quickly. These movements have earned them the name sensitive plants, because they somewhat resemble the movements that follow sensation in animals. Yet I suppose these plant movements are all simply MECHANISM. They occur just as a wild oat’s bristle turns when particles of moisture enter it. Or just as a rope shortens when water is poured over it. All these changes happen without the thing undergoing them feeling anything, or having or receiving any ideas.

12. Perception in all animals.

12. Perception in all animals.

Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of animals; though in some possibly the avenues provided by nature for the reception of sensations are so few, and the perception they are received with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensation which is in other animals; but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and condition of that sort of animals who are thus made. So that the wisdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric, and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it.

I believe all kinds of animals have some degree of perception. Yet some may have very few natural channels for receiving sensations, and their perception may be faint and dull. Their sensations may therefore fall far short of the speed and variety found in other animals. But their perception is still sufficient for their needs and wisely suited to their circumstances. So the Maker’s wisdom and goodness are clearly visible in every part of this magnificent creation. They are also visible in all the different degrees and ranks of creatures within it.

13. According to their condition.

13. Depending on their circumstances.

We may, I think, from the make of an oyster or cockle, reasonably conclude that it has not so many, nor so quick senses as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that cannot move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once placed it, and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?

From the structure of an oyster or cockle, we may reasonably conclude, I think, that its senses are limited. It has fewer senses, and they are less sensitive, than those of humans or several other animals. Even if it had such senses, they would not help it, given its condition and inability to move about. What good would sight and hearing do a creature unable to move toward or away from distant objects it perceives as helpful or harmful? And would greater sensitivity not be a burden to an animal forced to stay wherever chance has placed it? The animal must remain there, exposed to whatever water happens to flow over it, colder or warmer, clean or dirty.

14. Decay of perception in old age.

14. Decline in perception in old age.

But yet I cannot but think there is some small dull perception, whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility. And that this may be so, we have plain instances, even in mankind itself. Take one in whom decrepit old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with, and has, by destroying his sight, hearing, and smell quite, and his taste to a great degree, stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter; or if there be some of the inlets yet half open, the impressions made are scarcely perceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his knowledge and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cockle or an oyster, I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three days, I wonder what difference there would be, in any intellectual perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.

Yet I cannot help thinking they have some faint, dull perception that sets them apart from complete insensibility. We have clear examples, even among human beings, showing that such a state is possible. Consider someone whose extreme old age has erased the memory of his past knowledge. It has completely wiped out the ideas once stored in his mind. It has also entirely destroyed his sight, hearing, and smell, and largely destroyed his taste. In doing so, it has blocked almost every route by which new ideas could enter. Or if some routes remain half open, the impressions they admit are barely perceived or not retained at all. Despite all the boasts about innate principles, consider how far this person's knowledge and intellectual abilities exceed a cockle's or oyster's. I leave that question for others to consider. And suppose a man had spent sixty years in such a state, as he possibly could, rather than three days. I wonder what difference in intellectual abilities there would be between him and the lowest animals.

15. Perception the Inlet of all materials of Knowledge.

15. Perception is the gateway for all the materials of knowledge.

Perception then being the FIRST step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impressions are that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are that are employed about them,—the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here,—that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is perception, in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in hand which way the learned shall determine of it.

Perception, then, is the FIRST step toward knowledge and the entry point for all the materials of knowledge. The fewer senses a person or any other creature has, the further they are from the knowledge some people possess. The same is true when the senses produce fewer and weaker impressions, or the faculties processing those impressions are less capable. But these differences vary greatly in degree, as we can see among people. We cannot reliably identify these degrees in different animal species, much less in individual animals. Here I need only note that perception is the first activity of all our intellectual faculties. Perception is also the entry point for all knowledge in our minds. I also tend to think that perception, even at its lowest degree, marks the boundary between animals and lower creatures. But I mention this only as a passing guess. Whatever scholars decide about this boundary makes no difference to the subject at hand.