SIMPLE IDEAS FROM THE SENSES

Chapter 3

SIMPLE IDEAS FROM THE SENSES

3 min

1. Division of simple ideas.

1. Categories of simple ideas.

The better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

To better understand the ideas we receive through sensation, we may find the following approach helpful. We can consider the different ways these ideas reach our minds and become perceptible to us.

FIRST, then, There are some which come into our minds BY ONE SENSE ONLY.

FIRST, then, some things enter our minds THROUGH ONLY ONE SENSE.

SECONDLY, There are others that convey themselves into the mind BY MORE SENSES THAN ONE.

SECOND, there are others that enter the mind THROUGH MORE THAN ONE SENSE.

THIRDLY, Others that are had from REFLECTION ONLY.

THIRD, Others that come from REFLECTION ALONE.

FOURTHLY, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the mind BY ALL THE WAYS OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.

FOURTH, some ideas enter the mind THROUGH ALL THE CHANNELS OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.

We shall consider them apart under these several heads.

We will consider them separately under the following headings.

Ideas of one Sense.

Ideas from a single sense.

There are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue; with their several degrees or shades and mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the eyes. All kinds of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears. The several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain,—the mind’s presence-room (as I may so call it)—are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.

Some ideas can enter only through one sense, specially suited to receive them. Thus light and colours, such as white, red, yellow, and blue, come only through the eyes. So do their various shades and mixtures, such as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest. All kinds of noises, sounds, and tones come only through the ears. The various tastes and smells come through the palate and nose. The sense organs and their nerves carry these ideas from outside to the brain, where the mind receives them. We might call the brain the mind’s reception room. If any of these organs or nerves are so damaged that they cannot function, the corresponding ideas have no back entrance. Those ideas have no other way to come into view and be perceived by the understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are heat and cold, and solidity: all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else, more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

The most important qualities perceived through touch are heat, cold, and solidity. All the others are obvious enough. They consist almost entirely in surface features we can feel, such as smoothness and roughness. Or they depend on how firmly the parts hold together, as with hardness and softness, toughness and brittleness.

2. Few simple Ideas have Names.

2. Few simple ideas have names.

I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for. The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. Sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these ideas, which in effect is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a rose and violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct ideas. Nor are the different tastes, that by our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be said of colours and sounds. I shall, therefore, in the account of simple ideas I am here giving, content myself to set down only such as are most material to our present purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas; amongst which, I think, I may well account solidity, which therefore I shall treat of in the next chapter.

I think there is no need to list all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense. Nor could we do so if we wanted to. Most senses give us far more simple ideas than we have names for. There are almost as many smells as there are kinds of bodies in the world, if not more. Most of these smells have no names. We usually make do with calling smells sweet or stinking. In effect, these words say little more than pleasing or displeasing. Yet the smells of a rose and a violet, though both sweet, are certainly very distinct ideas. The different tastes we experience through our palates are not much better supplied with names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salty are almost the only words we have for the countless varieties of taste. These distinct tastes occur not only in almost every kind of living thing. They also occur in different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same can be said of colours and sounds. So, in this account of simple ideas, I will list only those most important to our present purpose. I will also include ideas less likely to attract notice, though they very often form parts of our complex ideas. Among these less-noticed ideas, I think I may reasonably include solidity. I will therefore discuss solidity in the next chapter.