Political Society

Had every man sufficient SAGACITY to perceive, at all times, the strong interest which binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and STRENGTH OF MIND sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a general and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage; there had never, in that case, been any such thing as government or political society, but each man, following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace and harmony with all others. What need of positive law where natural justice is, of itself, a sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates, where there never arises any disorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? It is evident, that, if government were totally useless, it never could have place, and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is the ADVANTAGE, which it procures to society, by preserving peace and order among mankind.

Suppose everyone were wise enough to see, at all times, how strongly their interests bind them to act justly and fairly. Suppose everyone also had the strength of mind to pursue a general, distant interest steadily, despite the temptations of immediate pleasure and advantage. Then there would never have been any government or political society. Each person would have exercised their natural freedom and lived in complete peace and harmony with everyone else. What need would there be for human-made laws if natural justice were enough to restrain people? Why appoint officials if disorder and injustice never arose? Why limit our natural freedom if exercising it to the fullest were always harmless and beneficial? Clearly, if government were completely useless, it could never exist. The only foundation for the duty of allegiance is the benefit government brings to society by preserving peace and order among people.

When a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a great intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to be USEFUL in that particular situation; and accordingly take place under the title of Laws of Nations. Of this kind are, the sacredness of the person of ambassadors, abstaining from poisoned arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind, which are plainly calculated for the ADVANTAGE of states and kingdoms in their intercourse with each other.

When several political societies are established and have extensive dealings with one another, people immediately discover that new rules are USEFUL in this situation. These rules therefore come into effect as the Laws of Nations. They include respect for the inviolability of ambassadors, the avoidance of poisoned weapons, and sparing the lives of enemies who surrender in war. These and similar rules are plainly designed for the ADVANTAGE of states and kingdoms in their dealings with one another.

The rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not entirely suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a regard to the rights of other princes; and some, no doubt, without hypocrisy. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent states, which would only be so much waste of parchment, if they were not found by experience to have SOME influence and authority. But here is the difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot by any means subsist, without the association of individuals; and that association never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against all, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct. But nations can subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist, in some degree, under a general war. The observance of justice, though useful among them, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals; and the moral obligation holds proportion with the USEFULNESS. All politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state may, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of it would be prejudicial, in a considerable degree, to either of the contracting parties. But nothing less than the most extreme necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a breach of promise, or an invasion of the properties of others.

The rules of justice that apply between individuals are not entirely suspended between political societies. All rulers claim to respect the rights of other rulers, and some, no doubt, are sincere. Independent states make alliances and treaties every day. These agreements would be a waste of parchment if experience did not show that they have SOME influence and authority. But there is a difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human beings cannot survive without joining together in society. And society could never exist if people paid no regard to the laws of fairness and justice. Disorder, confusion, and a war of all against all are the inevitable results of such lawless behavior. But nations can survive without contact with one another. They can even survive, to some extent, in a general war. Observing justice is useful among nations, but it is not as necessary as it is among individuals. And the moral obligation is proportional to its USEFULNESS. All politicians and most philosophers will agree on this point. In particular emergencies, reasons of state may justify setting aside the rules of justice. They may also invalidate a treaty or alliance if strictly observing it would considerably harm either party to it. But, it is acknowledged, only the most extreme necessity can justify individuals in breaking a promise or violating others’ property rights.

In a confederated commonwealth, such as the Achaean republic of old, or the Swiss Cantons and United Provinces in modern times; as the league has here a peculiar UTILITY, the conditions of union have a peculiar sacredness and authority, and a violation of them would be regarded as no less, or even as more criminal, than any private injury or injustice.

In a confederation, the alliance is especially useful. Examples include the ancient Achaean republic and, in modern times, the Swiss Cantons and United Provinces. Because of this special usefulness, the terms of union have a special sacredness and authority. Breaking them would be regarded as no less criminal, or even more criminal, than any private injury or injustice.

The long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of their young; and that combination requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage bed. Without such a UTILITY, it will readily be owned, that such a virtue would never have been thought of.¹⁰

Human infants are helpless for a long time, so their parents must work together to provide for them. This cooperation requires the virtue of chastity, or faithfulness in marriage. Without this USEFUL PURPOSE, people would readily agree that such a virtue would never have been thought of.¹⁰

An infidelity of this nature is much more PERNICIOUS in WOMEN than in MEN. Hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than over the other.

This kind of infidelity is much more HARMFUL in WOMEN than in MEN. Therefore, the rules of chastity are much stricter for women than for men.

These rules have all a reference to generation; and yet women past child-bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than those in the flower of their youth and beauty. GENERAL RULES are often extended beyond the principle whence they first arise; and this in all matters of taste and sentiment. It is a vulgar story at Paris, that, during the rage of the Mississippi, a hump-backed fellow went every day into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the stock-jobbers met in great crowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make use of his hump as a desk, in order to sign their contracts upon it. Would the fortune, which he raised by this expedient, make him a handsome fellow; though it be confessed, that personal beauty arises very much from ideas of utility? The imagination is influenced by associations of ideas; which, though they arise at first from the judgement, are not easily altered by every particular exception that occurs to us. To which we may add, in the present case of chastity, that the example of the old would be pernicious to the young; and that women, continually foreseeing that a certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would naturally advance that period, and think more lightly of this whole duty, so requisite to society.

These rules all relate to having children. Yet women past childbearing age are considered no less bound by them than women in the prime of youth and beauty. GENERAL RULES often extend beyond the principle that first gave rise to them. This happens in all matters of taste and feeling. A common story in Paris concerns the frenzy over the Mississippi scheme. A hunchback went every day to the Rue de Quincempoix, where stock traders gathered in great crowds. They paid him well to let them use his hump as a desk for signing their contracts. Would the fortune he made this way make him handsome? It is true that ideas of usefulness contribute greatly to our sense of personal beauty. The imagination is influenced by associations of ideas. Although these associations first arise from judgment, they are not easily changed by every individual exception we encounter. In the present case of chastity, we may add that the example set by older women would be harmful to younger women. Women would always look forward to a time when they would be free to indulge themselves. They would naturally bring that time forward and think less seriously of the whole duty of chastity, which is so necessary to society.

Those who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of licence of this kind, that nothing could prevent purity of manners, were marriage allowed, among the nearest relations, or any intercourse of love between them ratified by law and custom. Incest, therefore, being PERNICIOUS in a superior degree, has also a superior turpitude and moral deformity annexed to it.

People living in the same family have frequent opportunities for sexual misconduct of this kind. If marriage between close relatives were allowed, or sexual relationships between them were approved by law and custom, nothing could prevent purity of conduct. Incest is therefore exceptionally HARMFUL and carries an equally exceptional degree of wickedness and moral ugliness.

What is the reason, why, by the Athenian laws, one might marry a half-sister by the father, but not by the mother? Plainly this: The manners of the Athenians were so reserved, that a man was never permitted to approach the women's apartment, even in the same family, unless where he visited his own mother. His step-mother and her children were as much shut up from him as the woman of any other family, and there was as little danger of any criminal correspondence between them. Uncles and nieces, for a like reason, might marry at Athens; but neither these, nor half-brothers and sisters, could contract that alliance at Rome, where the intercourse was more open between the sexes. Public utility is the cause of all these variations.

Why did Athenian law allow a man to marry a half-sister who shared his father, but not one who shared his mother? The reason is clear. Athenian customs were so reserved that a man was never allowed into the women's quarters, even in his own family, except to visit his mother. His stepmother and her children were kept as separate from him as the women of any other family. There was just as little danger of an illicit relationship between them. For a similar reason, uncles and nieces could marry in Athens. But in Rome, neither uncles and nieces nor half-brothers and half-sisters could marry, because men and women had more open contact there. Public utility is the cause of all these differences.

To repeat, to a man's prejudice, anything that escaped him in private conversation, or to make any such use of his private letters, is highly blamed. The free and social intercourse of minds must be extremely checked, where no such rules of fidelity are established.

To repeat, it is strongly condemned to use something a man said in private conversation against him. The same applies to using his private letters against him. Where no such rules of confidentiality exist, free and sociable exchanges of ideas must be severely restricted.

Even in repeating stories, whence we can foresee no ill consequences to result, the giving of one's author is regarded as a piece of indiscretion, if not of immorality. These stories, in passing from hand to hand, and receiving all the usual variations, frequently come about to the persons concerned, and produce animosities and quarrels among people, whose intentions are the most innocent and inoffensive.

Even when repeating stories that we expect to cause no harm, naming the source is considered indiscreet, if not immoral. These stories pass from person to person and undergo all the usual changes. They often reach the people concerned and cause resentment and quarrels among people whose intentions are entirely innocent and harmless.

To pry into secrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to play the spy upon their words and looks and actions; what habits more inconvenient in society? What habits, of consequence, more blameable?

Prying into secrets, opening or even reading other people’s letters, spying on their words, looks, and actions. What habits are more harmful to social life? And what habits are therefore more deserving of blame?

This principle is also the foundation of most of the laws of good manners; a kind of lesser morality, calculated for the ease of company and conversation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed, and everything, which promotes ease, without an indecent familiarity, is useful and laudable.

This principle also forms the basis of most rules of good manners. These are a kind of lesser morality, intended to make social gatherings and conversations comfortable. Both too much and too little formality are criticized. Anything that makes people comfortable without being improperly familiar is useful and worthy of praise.

Constancy in friendships, attachments, and familiarities, is commendable, and is requisite to support trust and good correspondence in society. But in places of general, though casual concourse, where the pursuit of health and pleasure brings people promiscuously together, public conveniency has dispensed with this maxim; and custom there promotes an unreserved conversation for the time, by indulging the privilege of dropping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance, without breach of civility or good manners.

Loyalty in friendships and other close relationships is admirable. It is also necessary for trust and good relations in society. But public convenience makes an exception to this rule in places where people gather casually in search of health and pleasure. There, custom encourages people to talk freely for the time being. They may later drop any acquaintance they do not care to keep, without being impolite or showing bad manners.

Even in societies, which are established on principles the most immoral, and the most destructive to the interests of the general society, there are required certain rules, which a species of false honour, as well as private interest, engages the members to observe. Robbers and pirates, it has often been remarked, could not maintain their pernicious confederacy, did they not establish a pew distributive justice among themselves, and recall those laws of equity, which they have violated with the rest of mankind.

Even societies founded on the most immoral principles, and most destructive to the interests of society as a whole, need certain rules. Both a kind of false honor and self-interest lead their members to follow these rules. As people have often noted, robbers and pirates could not maintain their harmful alliance without establishing their own rules of fair distribution. They must also observe among themselves the rules of fairness they have violated in dealing with the rest of humanity.

I hate a drinking companion, says the Greek proverb, who never forgets. The follies of the last debauch should be buried in eternal oblivion, in order to give full scope to the follies of the next.

“I hate a drinking companion who never forgets,” says the Greek proverb. The foolishness of the last drinking spree should be forgotten forever, so that the next spree can be just as foolish.

Among nations, where an immoral gallantry, if covered with a thin veil of mystery, is, in some degree, authorized by custom, there immediately arise a set of rules, calculated for the conveniency of that attachment. The famous court or parliament of love in Provence formerly decided all difficult cases of this nature.

In some nations, custom permits immoral love affairs to some degree, if they are kept only lightly concealed. In these nations, rules immediately arise to make such affairs more convenient. The famous court or parliament of love in Provence formerly decided all difficult cases of this kind.

In societies for play, there are laws required for the conduct of the game; and these laws are different in each game. The foundation, I own, of such societies is frivolous; and the laws are, in a great measure, though not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a material difference between them and the rules of justice, fidelity, and loyalty. The general societies of men are absolutely requisite for the subsistence of the species; and the public conveniency, which regulates morals, is inviolably established in the nature of man, and of the world, in which he lives. The comparison, therefore, in these respects, is very imperfect. We may only learn from it the necessity of rules, wherever men have any intercourse with each other.

Groups that play games need rules to govern how they play. These rules differ from one game to another. I admit that such groups are formed for a frivolous purpose. Their rules are also largely, though not entirely, a matter of whim and arbitrary choice. In these respects, the rules of games differ significantly from the rules of justice, fidelity, and loyalty. Human societies in general are absolutely necessary for the survival of the species. And the public good, which governs morals, is firmly rooted in human nature and in the nature of the world we live in. The comparison is therefore very imperfect in these respects. We can learn from it only that rules are necessary wherever people interact with one another.

They cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and postilions have principles, by which they give the way; and these are chiefly founded on mutual ease and convenience. Sometimes also they are arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious analogy like many of the reasonings of lawyers.¹¹

They cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Wagon drivers, coachmen, and postilions have rules for giving way. These rules are based chiefly on mutual ease and convenience. Sometimes, though, the rules are arbitrary, or at least depend on a kind of fanciful analogy, like much of lawyers’ reasoning.¹¹

To carry the matter farther, we may observe, that it is impossible for men so much as to murder each other without statutes, and maxims, and an idea of justice and honour. War has its laws as well as peace; and even that sportive kind of war, carried on among wrestlers, boxers, cudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Common interest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong among the parties concerned.

Taking the point further, we can observe that people cannot even murder one another without rules, principles, and ideas of justice and honor. War has its laws just as peace does. Even the sporting kind of war among wrestlers, boxers, cudgel fighters, and gladiators is governed by fixed principles. Shared interests and practical needs inevitably create a standard of right and wrong among those involved.