Kindness

It may be esteemed, perhaps, a superfluous task to prove, that the benevolent or softer affections are estimable; and wherever they appear, engage the approbation and good-will of mankind. The epithets SOCIABLE, GOOD-NATURED, HUMANE, MERCIFUL, GRATEFUL, FRIENDLY, GENEROUS, BENEFICENT, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and universally express the highest merit, which HUMAN NATURE is capable of attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good government or useful instruction of mankind, they seem even to raise the possessors of them above the rank of HUMAN NATURE, and make them approach in some measure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted courage, prosperous success; these may only expose a hero or politician to the envy and ill-will of the public: but as soon as the praises are added of humane and beneficent; when instances are displayed of lenity, tenderness or friendship; envy itself is silent, or joins the general voice of approbation and applause.

It may seem unnecessary to prove that kindness and other gentle feelings are worthy of respect. Wherever they appear, they win people’s approval and goodwill. Words such as SOCIABLE, GOOD-NATURED, HUMANE, MERCIFUL, GRATEFUL, FRIENDLY, GENEROUS, and BENEFICENT, or their equivalents, exist in every language. They universally express the highest merit that HUMAN NATURE can attain. When these appealing qualities are combined with high birth, power, and exceptional abilities, they may show themselves in good government or useful teaching. Then they seem to raise those who possess them above the rank of HUMAN NATURE and bring them somewhat closer to the divine. Great ability, fearless courage, and success may only expose a hero or politician to public envy and ill will. But as soon as the hero or politician is also praised as humane and beneficent, envy itself falls silent. When examples of mercy, tenderness, or friendship are shown, envy may even join in the general approval and applause.

When Pericles, the great Athenian statesman and general, was on his death-bed, his surrounding friends, deeming him now insensible, began to indulge their sorrow for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great qualities and successes, his conquests and victories, the unusual length of his administration, and his nine trophies erected over the enemies of the republic. YOU FORGET, cries the dying hero, who had heard all, YOU FORGET THE MOST EMINENT OF MY PRAISES, WHILE YOU DWELL SO MUCH ON THOSE VULGAR ADVANTAGES, IN WHICH FORTUNE HAD A PRINCIPAL SHARE. YOU HAVE NOT OBSERVED THAT NO CITIZEN HAS EVER YET WORNE MOURNING ON MY ACCOUNT. [Plut. in Pericle]

When Pericles, the great Athenian statesman and general, was dying, his friends gathered around him. Believing he could no longer hear them, they expressed their sorrow for their dying patron by listing his great qualities and successes. They spoke of his conquests and victories, his unusually long administration, and his nine trophies raised over the republic’s enemies. “You forget,” cried the dying hero, who had heard everything, “you forget my greatest claim to praise. You dwell so much on those ordinary advantages, in which fortune played a major part. You have not mentioned that no citizen has ever worn mourning on my account.” [Plut. in Pericle]

In men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the social virtues become, if possible, still more essentially requisite; there being nothing eminent, in that case, to compensate for the want of them, or preserve the person from our severest hatred, as well as contempt. A high ambition, an elevated courage, is apt, says Cicero, in less perfect characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more social and softer virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. These are always good and amiable [Cic. de Officiis, lib. I].

In men of more ordinary talents and abilities, social virtues are, if possible, even more essential. Such men have no outstanding qualities to make up for their lack of social virtues. Without those virtues, nothing protects them from our deepest hatred as well as our contempt. As Cicero says, great ambition and lofty courage are liable to turn into unruly ferocity in less perfect characters. In such characters, the gentler, more social virtues deserve the most attention. These virtues are always good and endearing [Cic. de Officiis, lib. I].

The principal advantage, which Juvenal discovers in the extensive capacity of the human species, is that it renders our benevolence also more extensive, and gives us larger opportunities of spreading our kindly influence than what are indulged to the inferior creation [Sat. XV. 139 and seq.]. It must, indeed, be confessed, that by doing good only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent. His exalted station, of itself but the more exposes him to danger and tempest. His sole prerogative is to afford shelter to inferiors, who repose themselves under his cover and protection.

Juvenal identifies the main advantage of humanity’s greater abilities. They allow us to extend our goodwill and spread our beneficial influence further than other creatures can [Sat. XV. 139 and seq.]. Indeed, we must admit that a man can truly enjoy the advantages of high status only by doing good. His high position alone only exposes him more to danger and storms. His only privilege is to shelter those below him, who rest under his protection.

But I forget, that it is not my present business to recommend generosity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms of the social virtues. These, indeed, sufficiently engage every heart, on the first apprehension of them; and it is difficult to abstain from some sally of panegyric, as often as they occur in discourse or reasoning. But our object here being more the speculative, than the practical part of morals, it will suffice to remark, (what will readily, I believe, be allowed) that no qualities are more intitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species. These wherever they appear seem to transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call forth, in their own behalf, the same favourable and affectionate sentiments, which they exert on all around.

But I forget that my present task is not to recommend generosity and benevolence. Nor is it to portray all the true charms of the social virtues as they really are. These virtues win every heart as soon as they are understood. Whenever they come up in discussion or argument, it is difficult to resist a burst of praise. But our concern here is more with the theory of morals than with their practice. So it will be enough to make one observation, which I believe will readily be accepted. No qualities deserve humanity’s general goodwill and approval more than kindness and compassion, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit. The same is true of any quality that arises from tender sympathy for others and generous concern for our fellow human beings. Wherever these qualities appear, they seem in a way to pass into everyone who sees them. They seem to inspire the same warm and affectionate feelings toward themselves that they show to everyone around them.

We may observe that, in displaying the praises of any humane, beneficent man, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted on, namely, the happiness and satisfaction, derived to society from his intercourse and good offices. To his parents, we are apt to say, he endears himself by his pious attachment and duteous care still more than by the connexions of nature. His children never feel his authority, but when employed for their advantage. With him, the ties of love are consolidated by beneficence and friendship. The ties of friendship approach, in a fond observance of each obliging office, to those of love and inclination. His domestics and dependants have in him a sure resource; and no longer dread the power of fortune, but so far as she exercises it over him. From him the hungry receive food, the naked clothing, the ignorant and slothful skill and industry. Like the sun, an inferior minister of providence he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the surrounding world.

We may observe that praise of a kind, generous man always emphasizes one point. His company and good deeds bring happiness and satisfaction to those around him. We often say that his devoted affection and care make him even dearer to his parents than family ties alone. His children feel his authority only when he uses it for their benefit. His kindness and friendship strengthen the bonds of love. His friendships come close to love and affection, as he takes pleasure in every act of kindness. His servants and dependents can always rely on him. They no longer fear the power of fortune, except as it affects him. He gives food to the hungry and clothing to those without clothes. He helps the ignorant and idle gain skills and become industrious. Like the sun, he serves as a lesser agent of providence, cheering, strengthening, and sustaining the world around him.

If confined to private life, the sphere of his activity is narrower; but his influence is all benign and gentle. If exalted into a higher station, mankind and posterity reap the fruit of his labours.

If he remains in private life, his opportunities to act are narrower, but his influence is entirely kind and gentle. If he rises to a higher position, humanity and future generations benefit from his work.

As these topics of praise never fail to be employed, and with success, where we would inspire esteem for any one; may it not thence be concluded, that the utility, resulting from the social virtues, forms, at least, a PART of their merit, and is one source of that approbation and regard so universally paid to them?

When we want to inspire esteem for someone, we always use these kinds of praise, and they succeed. May we therefore conclude that the benefits of social virtues form at least PART of their merit? May we also conclude that these benefits are one source of the approval and regard so universally given to them?

When we recommend even an animal or a plant as USEFUL and BENEFICIAL, we give it an applause and recommendation suited to its nature. As, on the other hand, reflection on the baneful influence of any of these inferior beings always inspires us with the sentiment of aversion. The eye is pleased with the prospect of corn-fields and loaded vine-yards; horses grazing, and flocks pasturing: but flies the view of briars and brambles, affording shelter to wolves and serpents.

When we call even an animal or a plant USEFUL and BENEFICIAL, we praise and recommend it in a way suited to its nature. On the other hand, thinking about the harmful effects of any of these lesser beings always makes us feel aversion. The eye is pleased by the sight of fields of grain, vineyards heavy with grapes, grazing horses, and pasturing flocks. But it turns away from the sight of briars and brambles that shelter wolves and snakes.

A machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a house well contrived for use and conveniency, is so far beautiful, and is contemplated with pleasure and approbation. An experienced eye is here sensible to many excellencies, which escape persons ignorant and uninstructed.

A machine, a piece of furniture, a garment, or a house designed for use and convenience is beautiful to that extent. People look at it with pleasure and approval. An experienced eye notices many qualities that people without knowledge or training overlook.

Can anything stronger be said in praise of a profession, such as merchandize or manufacture, than to observe the advantages which it procures to society; and is not a monk and inquisitor enraged when we treat his order as useless or pernicious to mankind?

Can we praise a profession like trade or manufacturing more highly than by pointing out its benefits to society? And aren’t monks and inquisitors outraged when we call their orders useless or harmful to humanity?

The historian exults in displaying the benefit arising from his labours. The writer of romance alleviates or denies the bad consequences ascribed to his manner of composition.

The historian delights in showing the benefits of his work. The writer of fiction downplays or denies the harmful effects attributed to his kind of writing.

In general, what praise is implied in the simple epithet USEFUL! What reproach in the contrary!

In general, how much praise is implied by the simple word USEFUL! How much criticism is implied by its opposite!

Your Gods, says Cicero [De Nat. Deor. lib. i.], in opposition to the Epicureans, cannot justly claim any worship or adoration, with whatever imaginary perfections you may suppose them endowed. They are totally useless and inactive. Even the Egyptians, whom you so much ridicule, never consecrated any animal but on account of its utility.

Cicero [De Nat. Deor. lib. i.] argues against the Epicureans: Your gods cannot rightly claim worship or adoration, whatever imaginary perfections you suppose they have. They are completely useless and inactive. Even the Egyptians, whom you ridicule so much, never consecrated an animal except because it was useful.

The sceptics assert [Sext. Emp. adrersus Math. lib. viii.], though absurdly, that the origin of all religious worship was derived from the utility of inanimate objects, as the sun and moon, to the support and well-being of mankind. This is also the common reason assigned by historians, for the deification of eminent heroes and legislators [Diod. Sic. passim.].

The skeptics argue [Sext. Emp. adrersus Math. lib. viii.] that all religious worship began because inanimate objects, such as the sun and moon, helped sustain humanity and promote its well-being. This claim is absurd. Historians also commonly give this reason for the worship of eminent heroes and lawmakers as gods [Diod. Sic. passim.].

To plant a tree, to cultivate a field, to beget children; meritorious acts, according to the religion of Zoroaster.

Planting a tree, cultivating a field, and having children are good deeds according to the religion of Zoroaster.

In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil.

In all judgments about morality, public usefulness is always the main consideration. Disputes about the limits of duty arise in philosophy and everyday life. The surest way to settle them is to establish humanity’s true interests on each side of the question. If a false opinion based on appearances has become widespread, further experience and sounder reasoning may give us a more accurate understanding of human affairs. As soon as they do, we withdraw our original judgment and redraw the boundaries of moral good and evil.

Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent: but when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue.

Giving money to beggars is naturally praised because it seems to help people in distress and poverty. But when we see that it encourages idleness and vice, we regard this kind of charity as a weakness rather than a virtue.

Tyrannicide, or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive princes, was highly extolled in ancient times; because it both freed mankind from many of these monsters, and seemed to keep the others in awe, whom the sword or poniard could not reach. But history and experience having since convinced us, that this practice increases the jealousy and cruelty of princes, a Timoleon and a Brutus, though treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now considered as very improper models for imitation.

Tyrannicide, or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive rulers, was highly praised in ancient times. It freed humanity from many of these monsters. It also seemed to keep the others in fear, even when a sword or dagger could not reach them. But history and experience have since convinced us that this practice makes rulers more suspicious and cruel. We make allowances for people like Timoleon and Brutus because of the prejudices of their times. Even so, they are now considered very poor models to imitate.

Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence, but when it occurs, that the homely bread of the honest and industrious is often thereby converted into delicious cates for the idle and the prodigal, we soon retract our heedless praises. The regrets of a prince, for having lost a day, were noble and generous: but had he intended to have spent it in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost than misemployed after that manner.

A prince’s generosity is seen as a sign of kindness. But we soon withdraw our careless praise when the generosity often turns the plain bread of honest, hardworking people into delicacies for the idle and wasteful. A prince’s regret at having lost a day was noble and generous. But if he had intended to spend the day being generous to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost than wasted in that way.

Luxury, or a refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life, had not long been supposed the source of every corruption in government, and the immediate cause of faction, sedition, civil wars, and the total loss of liberty. It was, therefore, universally regarded as a vice, and was an object of declamation to all satirists, and severe moralists. Those, who prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements rather tend to the increase of industry, civility, and arts regulate anew our MORAL as well as POLITICAL sentiments, and represent, as laudable or innocent, what had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable.

Not long ago, luxury, or the refinement of life’s pleasures and conveniences, was thought to cause every form of corruption in government. It was also thought to be the direct cause of faction, rebellion, civil wars, and the total loss of liberty. Luxury was therefore universally regarded as a vice. All satirists and strict moralists condemned it. Others prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements tend instead to increase industry, civility, and the arts. In doing so, they reshape our moral as well as our political views. They present as praiseworthy or innocent what had previously been considered harmful and blameworthy.

Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, THAT nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and THAT a PART, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society. We carry our view into the salutary consequences of such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an influence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleasure. The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their gentle dominion over the breasts of men.

Overall, then, it seems undeniable that nothing gives a person more merit than a strong sense of benevolence. At least part of its merit comes from its tendency to promote the interests of our species and bring happiness to human society. We look at the beneficial consequences of a benevolent character and disposition. We view anything with such a kind influence, which promotes such a desirable end, with satisfaction and pleasure. We never consider the social virtues apart from their beneficial tendencies or see them as barren and unproductive. We always consider the happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, and the mutual support of friends as results of the gentle influence of these virtues over people's hearts.

How considerable a PART of their merit we ought to ascribe to their utility, will better appear from future disquisitions;³ as well as the reason, why this circumstance has such a command over our esteem and approbation.⁴

Later discussions will make clearer how much of their merit we should attribute to their usefulness.³ They will also explain why usefulness has such a strong influence on our esteem and approval.⁴