Different Types of Philosophy

1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, can be approached in two different ways. Each has its own merits and may help entertain, instruct, and improve humanity. The first approach considers people chiefly as beings born to act. It sees them as guided in their actions by taste and feeling. They pursue some things and avoid others according to how valuable those things seem and how they appear to them. Since virtue is recognized as the most valuable of all things, philosophers of this kind portray it in the most attractive light. They draw on every aid from poetry and eloquence. They treat their subject simply and clearly, in a way best suited to please the imagination and engage the emotions. They select the most striking observations and examples from everyday life and contrast opposing characters. They draw us toward virtue with visions of glory and happiness, then guide us with the soundest principles and finest examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue. They stir and guide our feelings. As long as they can turn our hearts toward a love of integrity and true honor, they believe they have fully achieved the goal of all their work.

2. The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.

2. The other kind of philosopher sees human beings as rational rather than active. These philosophers try to develop our understanding rather than improve our conduct. They treat human nature as a subject for study and examine it closely. They seek the principles that govern our understanding, arouse our feelings, and lead us to approve or blame particular objects, actions, or behavior. They think it a disgrace to all learning that philosophy has not yet settled the foundations of morals, reasoning, and criticism beyond dispute. They also consider it a disgrace that philosophy keeps discussing truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and ugliness, without being able to determine where these distinctions come from. No difficulties deter these philosophers from this demanding task. They move from particular examples to general principles, then continue their inquiries toward still more general principles. They are not satisfied until they reach the original principles that set the limits of human inquiry in every science. Their inquiries may seem abstract, and even incomprehensible, to ordinary readers. Yet they seek the approval of the learned and the wise. They consider the labor of their whole lives well rewarded if they discover hidden truths that may help instruct future generations.

3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

3. Most people will certainly always prefer easy and accessible philosophy to precise and abstract philosophy. Many will recommend it as not only more pleasant but also more useful. It has more to do with everyday life. It shapes the heart and emotions and appeals to the principles that motivate people. In this way, it reforms their conduct and brings them closer to the ideal of perfection it describes. By contrast, abstract philosophy depends on a way of thinking that cannot be applied to practical affairs and action. It vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade and steps into the light of day. Its principles can hardly retain any influence over our conduct and behavior. The feelings of our hearts, the turmoil of our passions, and the force of our emotions sweep away all its conclusions. They reduce the profound philosopher to an ordinary person.

4. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.

4. We must also admit that the most lasting and best deserved fame has gone to the accessible style of philosophy. Abstract thinkers, by contrast, seem so far to have enjoyed only brief fame, owing to the whims or ignorance of their own age. They have not been able to maintain their reputation with more fair-minded later generations. A profound philosopher can easily make a mistake in subtle reasoning. One mistake necessarily leads to another as he follows its consequences. He does not shrink from accepting any conclusion because it looks unusual or contradicts popular opinion. But another kind of philosopher aims only to present the common sense of humanity more beautifully and attractively. If he happens to make a mistake, he goes no further. Instead, he appeals again to common sense and the natural feelings of the mind. He returns to the right path and protects himself from dangerous illusions. Cicero’s fame flourishes today, but Aristotle’s has completely faded. La Bruyere’s work travels across the seas, and he still maintains his reputation. But Malebranche’s glory is confined to his own nation and his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure when Locke is entirely forgotten.

The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company, and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining.

The person who is only a philosopher is generally not well regarded in society. Such a person is thought to contribute nothing to society’s benefit or pleasure. He lives apart from others, absorbed in principles and ideas that are equally beyond their understanding. On the other hand, the person who is merely ignorant is despised even more. In a nation and an age where the sciences flourish, nothing is considered a surer sign of a narrow mind than having no taste at all for those noble pursuits. The ideal character is thought to lie between these extremes. Such a person has equal ability and taste for books, company, and business. In conversation, he shows the discernment and refinement that come from literature. In business, he shows the honesty and precision that naturally result from sound philosophy. To spread and cultivate such a well-rounded character, nothing is more useful than writings in an easy style. These writings do not draw readers too far from life. They require no intense study or seclusion to be understood. They send the reader back into society full of noble sentiments and wise principles that apply to every need of human life. Through such writings, virtue becomes attractive, science enjoyable, company instructive, and solitude entertaining.

Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

Man is a rational being, and as such he finds proper nourishment in science. But human understanding is so limited that he can hope for little satisfaction in this respect. Neither the extent of security nor his acquisitions can give him much satisfaction. Man is as sociable as he is rational. But he cannot always enjoy agreeable and entertaining company, or remain in the mood for it. Man is also active. This disposition, together with the various necessities of human life, requires him to work and attend to business. But the mind needs relaxation and cannot always remain focused on care and work. It seems, then, that nature has indicated a mixed way of life as most suitable for humanity. She has quietly warned people not to let any one of these inclinations draw too strongly. Otherwise, it may make them incapable of other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, she says, but let your science be human. Let it have a direct bearing on action and society. I forbid obscure thought and deep research, and I will punish them severely. They bring thoughtful melancholy and leave you in endless uncertainty. And when you share your supposed discoveries, they will meet with a cold reception. Be a philosopher, but amid all your philosophy, remain a human being.

5. Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without opposition, his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings, or what is commonly called metaphysics, we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf.

5. If most people were content to prefer easy philosophy to abstract and profound philosophy, perhaps we could accept that preference. As long as they did not blame or despise profound philosophy, we could let everyone enjoy their own tastes and opinions without opposition. But people often go further and reject all profound reasoning, or what is commonly called metaphysics. We will now consider what can reasonably be said in its defense.

We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage, which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object, which they set before us. An artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking, who, besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the workings of the passions, and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.

We may begin by observing one considerable advantage of precise and abstract philosophy. It supports accessible and humane philosophy. Without precise and abstract philosophy, accessible and humane philosophy can never be sufficiently exact in its sentiments, principles, or reasoning. All literature is a portrait of human life in various attitudes and situations. It inspires different feelings, such as praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, depending on the qualities it presents. An artist is better equipped to succeed at this task with a refined taste and a quick understanding. But the artist must also have precise knowledge of the mind’s inner structure, how understanding and passions work, and the different kinds of feelings that distinguish vice from virtue. However painful this inward search may seem, it is to some extent necessary for anyone who wants to describe life and manners as they outwardly appear. The anatomist shows us the most hideous and unpleasant objects. But the anatomist’s science is useful to a painter, even when depicting a Venus or an Helen. The painter uses all the richest colors of the art and gives the figures the most graceful and appealing expressions. Yet the painter must still attend to the inner structure of the human body. This includes the position of the muscles, the structure of the bones, and the use and shape of every part or organ. Accuracy always helps beauty, and sound reasoning always helps refined feeling. It is pointless to praise one by belittling the other.

Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility, in the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar gradations.

Besides, we can see that a commitment to accuracy, however it is acquired, brings every art and profession closer to perfection. This is true even of those most concerned with practical life and action. Accuracy also makes them all more useful to society. A philosopher may live far removed from practical affairs. But if several people carefully cultivate the spirit of philosophy, it must gradually spread throughout society. It will bring similar precision to every art and profession. Politicians will gain greater foresight and skill in dividing and balancing power. Lawyers will reason more methodically and with more refined principles. Generals will maintain more orderly discipline and show more caution in their plans and operations. Modern governments have become more stable than ancient ones, and modern philosophy has become more precise. Both have improved by similar gradual steps and probably will continue to improve.

6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs be delightful and rejoicing.

6. Even if these studies offered nothing beyond satisfying an innocent curiosity, we should not dismiss that pleasure. It is one more of the few safe and harmless pleasures available to humanity. The most pleasant and harmless path through life leads through science and learning. Anyone who removes an obstacle from that path or opens up a new view deserves to be considered a benefactor of humanity to that extent. Although these investigations may seem painful and tiring, some minds are like some bodies. Bodies in vigorous health need strenuous exercise and enjoy what most people may find burdensome and laborious. Obscurity is indeed painful to the mind as well as to the eye. But bringing light out of obscurity, however much work it takes, must be a source of delight and joy.

But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chaced from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their legal sovereigns.

But the obscurity of deep, abstract philosophy draws criticism not only because it is painful and tiring. It is also criticized as an inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here lies the fairest and most plausible objection to a considerable part of metaphysics: it is not really a science. Instead, it arises either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity or from the cunning of popular superstitions. Human vanity tries to penetrate subjects completely beyond our understanding. Popular superstitions cannot defend themselves on fair ground, so they raise these tangled brambles to hide and protect their weakness. Driven from the open country, these robbers flee into the forest. There they lie in wait, ready to enter the mind through any unguarded passage and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. Even the strongest opponent is overcome if he lets down his guard for a moment. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to these enemies. They willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their rightful rulers.

7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself stimulated, rather that discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom.

7. But is this enough reason for philosophers to abandon such inquiries and leave superstition in possession of its refuge? Should we not draw the opposite conclusion? Should we not see the need to carry the war into the enemy’s most secret hiding places? We hope in vain that repeated disappointment will finally lead people to abandon such speculative sciences and discover the proper scope of human reason. Many people have a strong interest in continually bringing up these subjects. Besides, blind despair can never reasonably have a place in the sciences. However unsuccessful earlier attempts have been, later generations may still make discoveries unknown to earlier ages through hard work, good fortune, or greater insight. Every adventurous genius will still leap at the difficult prize. The failures of predecessors will encourage rather than discourage each one, who hopes that the glory of so difficult an achievement is reserved for him alone. The only way to free learning from these obscure questions once and for all is to investigate the nature of human understanding seriously. We must analyze its powers and limits precisely, showing that it is in no way suited to such remote and obscure subjects. We must undertake this hard work so that we may live at ease ever after. We must cultivate true metaphysics with some care in order to destroy false and corrupt metaphysics. Laziness protects some people against this deceptive philosophy, but in others curiosity outweighs laziness. And despair, which prevails at some moments, may later give way to confident hopes and expectations. Accurate and sound reasoning is the only universal remedy, suited to all people and all temperaments. It alone can overthrow the obscure philosophy and metaphysical jargon that mingle with popular superstition. Together, they make superstition almost impenetrable to careless reasoners and give it the appearance of science and wisdom.

8. Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.

8. Careful inquiry lets us reject the most uncertain and unpleasant part of learning. But there are also many positive benefits to examining the powers and faculties of human nature closely. The workings of the mind are remarkably close to us. Yet whenever we reflect on them, they seem obscure. We cannot easily see the lines and boundaries that separate them. They are too subtle to remain long in the same form or state. They must be grasped in an instant, by exceptional insight that comes from nature and is improved by habit and reflection. It is therefore a significant part of science simply to know the different operations of the mind. We must separate them, classify them properly, and correct the apparent disorder in which they appear when we reflect on and examine them. Ordering and distinguishing external bodies, the objects of our senses, has no merit. But doing the same for the operations of the mind becomes more valuable in proportion to the difficulty and effort involved. We may be able to go no further than this mental geography, or mapping the distinct parts and powers of the mind. If so, it is at least satisfying to get that far. This science is by no means obvious. But the more obvious it may appear, the more contemptible ignorance of it must seem in anyone claiming to be learned or a philosopher.

Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some instances, especially late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those, who, with so much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately concerned?

Nor can we suspect that this science is uncertain and imaginary, unless we embrace a skepticism that undermines all thought and even action. There can be no doubt that the mind has several powers and faculties, and that these are distinct from one another. What we immediately perceive as distinct can also be distinguished by reflection. Therefore, propositions about the mind can be true or false. And their truth or falsehood is not beyond human understanding. Many such distinctions are obvious. For example, every human being can understand the differences between will and understanding, and between imagination and passions. The finer, more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain, though they are harder to understand. Some successful investigations, especially recent ones, may give us a fairer sense of this field’s certainty and solidity. Do we consider it worthwhile for a philosopher to describe the solar system accurately and determine the positions and order of those distant bodies? If so, should we pretend to overlook those who so successfully describe the parts of the mind, with which we are so intimately concerned?

9. But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This last conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their passion for some one general principle; it must, however, be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind.

9. But may we not hope that philosophy can take its investigations further? If pursued carefully and encouraged by public attention, it may discover, at least partly, the hidden forces and principles that govern the mind’s operations. Astronomers long contented themselves with using observable phenomena to establish the true motions, arrangement, and size of heavenly bodies. At last, a philosopher appeared who seems, through exceptionally successful reasoning, to have also established the laws and forces governing and directing the planets’ revolutions. Similar progress has been made in other parts of nature. And we have no reason to despair of equal success in studying the mind’s powers and workings, if we pursue the study with equal skill and caution. One operation or principle of the mind probably depends on another. That principle, in turn, may be explained by a still more general and universal one. It is hard to say exactly how far these investigations might go, whether before or even after a careful attempt. But one thing is certain: even the most careless philosophers make such attempts every day. Nothing is more necessary than to undertake the task with thorough care and attention. Then, if it is within the reach of human understanding, it may finally succeed. If not, it may still be abandoned with some confidence and assurance. Surely the latter conclusion is not desirable, and we should not embrace it too hastily. How much beauty and value would this kind of philosophy lose if we accepted that conclusion? Moralists have long considered the vast number and variety of actions that arouse our approval or disapproval. They have usually sought some common principle on which this variety of feelings might depend. Sometimes their passion for a single general principle has led them too far. Still, we must admit that they are justified in expecting to find some general principles that can rightly explain all vices and virtues. Critics, logicians, and even politicians have made similar efforts. Nor have their attempts been entirely unsuccessful. Perhaps, with more time, greater accuracy, and more devoted effort, these fields of study may come still closer to perfection. To abandon all such ambitions at once may rightly be considered more rash, hasty, and dogmatic than even the boldest and most assertive philosophy ever to impose its crude teachings and principles on humanity.

10. What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance.

10. What if these arguments about human nature seem abstract and hard to understand? That is no reason to assume they are false. On the contrary, what so many wise and profound philosophers have missed until now can hardly be obvious and easy to understand. However much effort these inquiries may require, we may consider ourselves well rewarded. We gain both benefit and pleasure if our inquiries add anything to our knowledge of subjects of such immeasurable importance.

But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And still more happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error!

But the abstract nature of these speculations is, after all, a disadvantage rather than a merit. Perhaps we can overcome this difficulty through care and skill, and by avoiding all unnecessary detail. In the following enquiry, we have therefore tried to shed some light on these subjects. Until now, uncertainty has deterred the wise from studying them, and obscurity has deterred the ignorant. We will be happy if we can bring the different kinds of philosophy together, combining deep enquiry with clarity and truth with novelty! We will be even happier if, by reasoning in this accessible way, we can undermine the foundations of an obscure philosophy. Until now, this philosophy seems to have served only as a shelter for superstition and a cover for absurdity and error!